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Abstract: The primary objective of this study is to answer two key questions regarding the U.S. 
soybean checkoff program over time: (1) What have been the effects of the soybean checkoff 
program on U.S. and world soybean and soybean product markets? (2) Has the soybean checkoff 
program benefited soybean producers?  To answer the first key question, the effects of the soy-
bean checkoff program on U.S. and foreign soybean, soybean meal, and soybean oil supplies, 
demands, prices, and trade over the 1980/81 through 2006/07 time period are measured.  Those 
results are then used to answer the second question in a benefit-cost analysis of the soybean 
checkoff program to measure the overall return to producers from soybean checkoff and related 
expenditures over the years. In general, the study concludes that the expenditure of soybean 
checkoff funds to invest in production research and to promote the demand for soybeans and 
soybean products at home and abroad has been highly effective in enhancing the profitability, 
competiveness, and size of the U.S. soybean industry since at least 1980/81. 
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he 1996 Farm Bill requires an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of all commod-
ity promotion programs not less than every 5 years.  In compliance with that legislation, 
the United Soybean Board (USB) commissioned this study of the effectiveness of the 
soybean checkoff program.  The primary objective of this study is to answer two key questions 
regarding the U.S. soybean checkoff program over time: (1) What have been the effects of the 
soybean checkoff program on U.S. and world soybean and soybean product markets? and (2) 
Has the soybean checkoff program benefited soybean producers?  In answering the first key 
question, the focus is on the effects of the soybean checkoff program on U.S. and foreign soy-
bean, soybean meal, and soybean oil supplies, demands, prices, and trade over the 1980/81 
through 2006/07 time period.  The answer to the first question provides the basis for answering 
the second question in a farm-level benefit-cost analysis. For comparison purposes, the analysis 
decomposes the results into two time periods corresponding to the periods before and after im-
plementation of the national soybean checkoff program. In general, the study concludes that the 
soybean checkoff program has been highly effective in enhancing the profitability, competive-
ness, and size of the U.S. soybean industry since at least 1980/81. 
 
The study first provides a detailed look at how soybean checkoff funds have been spent over the 
years and why expenditure patterns are important for the effectiveness of the program.  Then an 
analysis of how commodity checkoff programs affect markets is provided along with a review of 
pertinent literature and a comparison of the results of previous studies of the soybean and other 
commodity checkoff programs. The methodology used to measure the effectiveness of the soy-
bean checkoff program is then outlined and is followed by a discussion of the analytical results.  
Finally, the major conclusions of the study and implications for the management of soybean 
checkoff investments are considered. 
 
Since 1970/71, soybean farmers have invested at least $724.1 million of checkoff funds in 
supply-oriented and demand-oriented activities to benefit U.S. soybean producers. When com-
bined with the $213.8 million from the USDA cooperator and other programs and the $117.2 
million in contributions from the private sector for joint promotional activities in foreign coun-
tries, the amount spent on soybean production research and promotion programs between 
1970/71 and 2006/07 amounts to about $1.06 billion. The implementation of the national pro-
gram in the early 1990s bumped annual expenditures from an average of about $20 million to 
currently well over $70 million. The national checkoff program also signaled major shifts in the 
checkoff fund expenditure strategy that have had important effects on the returns to producers 
from those expenditures.  A review of expenditure trends over time reveals nine key characteris-
tics of expenditure patterns that have impacted the returns to the soybean checkoff program: 
 
1.  Expenditures have tended to switch from international promotion activities to production re-




2.  During most of the 1990s, expenditure allocations tended to favor domestic promotion as in-
ternational marketing promotion expenditures declined.  
3.  The share of checkoff expenditures allocated to domestic promotion after 1999/00 was cut in 
half from 40% of total expenditures to only 20%. 
4.  In international promotion programs, the focus over time has switched from maintaining and 
building a few large, mature markets to opening and developing many new, smaller markets.  
5.  In international promotion programs, the commodity emphasis of expenditures since the ear-
ly 1990s has shifted from value-added soybean products to soybeans.  
6.  The leveraging of international promotion program checkoff dollars with third party, in-
country contributions declined in the 1990s and ceased completely in 1998/99. 
7.   Total checkoff expenditures are quite small compared to the value of soybean production.  
8.  Producer communications expenditures have no effect on the supply of or demand for soy-
beans and soybean products in U.S. or world markets.  
9.  Inflation in all countries and depreciations in the value of the U.S. dollar in foreign markets 
have seriously eroded the purchasing power of soybean checkoff expenditures. 
 
The basic tool of analysis in this study is a 180-equation, fifth generation, annual econometric 
simulation model of world soybean and product markets, referred to as SOYMOD5, that allows 
for the simultaneous determination of  the supplies, demands, prices, and trade of soybeans, soy-
bean meal, and soybean oil in six major world trading regions: (1) the United States, (2) Brazil, 
(3) Argentina, (4) the European Union 15/27, (5) Japan, and (6) a Rest-of-the-World region.  Da-
ta for all types of soybean checkoff expenditures across all commodities, activities, and countries 
over a long period of time were needed for the analysis.  Collection of these data was difficult, at 
best, since no harmonized expenditure data collection and reporting system has been established.  
The most problematic data to collect were state-level expenditures  on domestic and international 
promotion. All expenditure data used in the study were converted to a constant dollar basis to 
remove the effects of inflation. Expenditures in foreign markets were also converted to the local 
currencies for the countries and regions of expenditure defined in the study. The data were then 
transformed into research and promotion stock variables to account for the time lag between ex-
penditure and market impact for each commodity (soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil) in domestic 
and international markets. Model specification tests were conducted to determine appropriate lag 
structures for calculating the stock variables.  The research stock variables enter the model 
(SOYMOD5) as arguments of the regional soybean acreage and yield functions. The domestic 
and international soybean, soybean meal, and soybean oil demand promotion expenditure stock 
variables enter SOYMOD5 as arguments of the respective demand functions in the U.S. or of the 
importing regions in which the expenditures were made. The parameters of SOYMOD5 were 
estimated using standard econometric procedures.  Validation of the model through dynamic, 
within-sample simulation indicated a highly satisfactory fit of the historical, dynamic simulation 
solution values to observed data. A sensitivity test indicated that the model is highly stable to 
changes in checkoff expenditures over time. 
 
To answer the two key questions that are the focus of this analysis, two scenarios were analyzed 
using SOYMOD5: (1) a with soybean checkoff expenditures scenario (the “with scenario”) and 
(2) a without soybean checkoff expenditures scenario (the “without scenario”).  The with scena-
rio represents actual history over the 1980/81 to 2006/07 period of analysis, that is, the level of 
supply, demand, prices, trade, etc. in world soybean and soybean product markets that include  
 
iv 
any effects on those markets from soybean checkoff expenditures in the U.S. and around the 
world. The without scenario analysis was conducted by setting the historic values of soybean 
checkoff production research and U.S. and international market promotion expenditures to zero 
in SOYMOD5 and then simulating the model once again over the same period to generate new 
values for U.S. and world soybean and product production, consumption, trade, prices, etc. Be-
cause the changes in the model variables in the without  scenario were generated by changing 
only the levels of checkoff expenditures, they represent the levels of supply, demand, prices, 
trade, etc. that would have existed over time in the absence of a soybean checkoff program.  
 
Because the differences in the simulated levels of the model variables in the with and without 
scenarios represent direct measures of the effects of the checkoff expenditures on U.S. and world 
markets, they also provide the basis for answering the first key question regarding the effects of 
the soybean checkoff program on world markets.  A comparison of the results of the scenarios 
indicates clearly that the soybean checkoff program has been effective at increasing U.S. soy-
bean production, crush, exports, price, world market share, and producer profits.  The results in-
dicate that, on average between 1980/81 and 2006/07, U.S. soybean production was higher by 
4.2%, soybean farm price by 1.6%, and soymeal wholesale price by 2.1% on average in each 
year as a result of the checkoff program. 
 
With the implementation of the national checkoff program in the early 1990s, the annual average 
impact on soybean production jumped from about 64 million bushels to about 170 million bu-
shels by 2006/07. The sharp jump in annual production made increasing additional supplies of 
soybeans available for crushing and export but put downward pressure on the market prices of  
soybean and soybean products over that period.  The U.S. soybean checkoff program successful-
ly boosted U.S. soybean, soymeal, and soyoil exports and the U.S. export market share of all 
three products while reducing the export shares of both Brazil and Argentina. On average over 
the 1980/81-2006/07 period, U.S. soybean exports were higher each year by an average of 
993,600 metric tons (mt) or nearly 5%.  U.S. soymeal and soyoil exports were higher by an an-
nual average of 15% and 24%, respectively. 
 
The second key question, the more critical question, that must be answered about the U.S. 
checkoff program is whether the market effects generated by the program have increased pro-
ducer profits by a sufficient amount to cover the cost of the program.  Using the with and without 
soybean checkoff expenditure scenario results, the net profit benefit cost ratio (BCR) for the U.S. 
soybean program over the 1980/81 to 2006/07 period is calculated to be $6.4, indicating that the 
benefits in terms of the net additional soybean industry profits generated by the U.S. soybean 
checkoff program far exceeded the cost of the program expenditures over that period. This BCR 
compares quite favorably to those found by earlier studies of the soybean checkoff program and 
by studies of other checkoff commodity programs.  Even when the net grower benefits are dis-
counted to present value (the DBCR), the ratio of benefits (net grower profits) to costs is still 
respectable at $2.4.  
 
The main conclusion of this study is that the U.S. soybean checkoff program has been highly ef-
fective over the years in enhancing the profitability, competitiveness, and size of the U.S. soy-




●  The Benefit -Cost Ratio (BCR) of the soybean checkoff program has been relatively high at 
$6.4 in additional profit earned by U.S. soybean farmers for every checkoff dollar spent. 
●  The soybean checkoff program has increased the size of the U.S. soybean industry. 
  1.  U.S. soybean production and crush each averaged 4.2% higher each year; 
  2.  The soybean farm price averaged almost 2% higher; 
  3.  The soymeal price averaged more than 2% higher with little change in soyoil price; and 
  4.  U.S. soybean meal and oil use were both 2% higher.  
●  The soybean checkoff program has reduced the competitive threat of the South American 
soybean industry. U.S. soybean, soymeal, and soyoil exports averaged 5%, 15%, and 24%, 
respectively, more each year as a result of the program, substantially increasing their shares 
of world export markets, particularly for soybean meal and soybean oil. 
●  The Benefit-Cost Ratio for the soybean checkoff program in the period following implemen-
tation of the national checkoff program was $2.8, substantially lower than the $14.1 BCR 
during the voluntary checkoff program years. 
 
These conclusions suggest a number of implications for program management purposes: 
1.  The U.S. soybean industry continues to underinvest in the soybean checkoff program despite 
the sharp increase in funding with the national checkoff program. 
2.  The current mix of checkoff expenditures appears to be reducing potential return. Several 
adjustments in the current funding allocation strategy are needed to increase in producer re-
turns, including (1) more demand pull from domestic and international demand promotion 
relative to supply push from production research; (2) more international promotion relative to 
domestic demand promotion; (3) more promotion of value-added products relative to promo-
tion of soybeans; and (4) a re-examination of the near abandonment of large, mature, devel-
oped country markets like the European Union and Japan in favor of smaller, less developed 
country markets for international promotion activities.  
3.  Care must be taken in determining the proper share of funds to allocate to production re-
search.  One the one hand, production research shifts out the supply curve and, therefore, 
tends to reduce prices suggesting that a low level of funding for production research may be 
most appropriate.  On the other hand, failing to invest aggressively in research to develop 
new, high-yielding and cost efficient soybean production technologies and techniques could 
allow the comparative advantage in the production and export of soybeans and soybean 
products to shift slowly over the long run to Brazil and Argentina. 
4.  A failure to at least maintain the growth in soybean checkoff expenditures in any area in any 
time period has serious negative impacts on soybean producer profitability over many years. 
 5. A return to the practice of leveraging international market promotion funds with contribu-
tions from third party in-country contributors could substantially enhance the level of funds 
and effectiveness of the international promotion program.  
6.  The way in which funds for international and domestic demand promotion are allocated 
among soybeans and soybean products and across countries can have important implications 
for the return to those investments and for U.S. competitiveness in foreign markets. 
7.  A harmonized, systematic procedure for collecting, classifying, maintaining, and reporting 
data on soybean checkoff expenditures by state and national soybean groups is critically 
needed for continuing program evaluation and management purposes.  
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ince at least the early 1950s, U.S. soy-
bean producers have been coopera-
tively investing in production research 
and demand promotion in an effort to en-
hance the profitability and the international 
competitiveness of their industry.  Before 
1991/92, producer contributions to this ef-
fort were facilitated in many soybean-
producing states by state legislation requir-
ing producers to pay (or “check off”) from 
½ to 2 cents per bushel sold.  Such contribu-
tions were considered to be “voluntary” be-
cause any producer could receive a full re-
fund upon request.  About 50% of the 
checkoff funds collected in each state during 
this period was allocated to and managed by 
that state’s soybean association.  The other 
half was controlled by the national soybean 
producer organization, the American Soy-
bean Association (ASA) in St. Louis, Mis-
souri. 
 
The 1990 Farm Bill
1 authorized a national 
program of mandatory soybean producer 
checkoff contributions to fund promotion 
and research activities.  Implemented in the 
Soybean Promotion, Research, & Consumer 
Information Act of 1990












                                                           
1  Food, Agric., Conservation & Trade Act of 1990, PL 101-624, 
104 Stat. 3838-3928, Nov. 28, 1990, Title XIX. 





bean checkoff program was implemented in 
1991 and upheld by soybean producers in 
a subsequent referendum required by the 
legislation. Every soybean producer is re-
quired to participate in the checkoff at the 
rate of 0.5% of the market price per bushel 
when the crop is first sold.  The right of 
soybean producers to demand a refund of 
the mandatory checkoff assessment was 
terminated in a second referendum also re-
quired by the legislation.  Half of the check-
off funds collected under the new mandatory 
national soybean checkoff program contin-
ues to remain in the states with the other half 
accruing to a new national producer-
controlled checkoff board (the United Soy-
bean Board (USB) in St. Louis, Missouri). 
To manage the half of the checkoff funds 
allocated to the states, the legislation re-
quired the establishment of new state-level, 
producer-controlled checkoff boards (Quali-
fied State Soybean Boards or QSSBs). 
 
The QSSBs invest the largest portion of 
their checkoff dollars in soybean production  
research with a normally small amount allo-
cated to funding utilization research and 
domestic and foreign  promotion programs.  
The USB also allocates a major portion of 
its funds to support soybean production re-
search as well as domestic promotion pro-
grams.  As was the case with the ASA be-
fore the establishment of the national check-
off program, the USB also manages a large 
international foreign market development 
program designed to promote U.S. exports 
of soybeans and soybean products
3. 
                                                           
3  The American Soybean Association (ASA) initially served as the 
primary contractor to the United Soybean Board for managing the 
international market promotion program. Since 2005, the interna-
tional market promotion program has been managed by the United 
States Soybean Export Council (USSEC).  
S
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nomics in the Department of Agricultural Economics 
at Texas A&M University.   
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Title V of the 1996 Farm Bill
4 requires an 
independent evaluation of the effectiveness 
of all new and existing promotion programs, 
not less than every 5 years, to assist Con-
gress and the Secretary of Agriculture in en-
suring that the objectives of the programs 
are met.  In compliance with that legislation 
and given that the last evaluation was con-
ducted in 2003, USB commissioned this 
study to update the research on the effec-
tiveness of the soybean checkoff and related 
investments in production research and 
promotion over the last two decades. 
 
The primary objective of this study is to an-
swer two key questions regarding the U.S. 
soybean checkoff program over time: (1) 
What have been the effects of the soybean 
checkoff program on U.S. and world soy-
bean and soybean product markets? (2) Has 
the soybean checkoff program benefited 
soybean producers?  In answering the first 
key question, the focus is on the effects of 
the soybean checkoff program on U.S. and 
foreign soybean, soybean meal, and soybean 
oil supplies, demands, prices, and trade.   
Once these market effects have been deter-
mined, they are then used to answer the 
second question in a benefit-cost analysis of 
the soybean checkoff program at the pro-
ducer level. In the analysis, the producer 
benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the soybean 
checkoff program is calculated as the addi-
tional net producer revenues generated by 
the checkoff program divided by the cost of 
the checkoff program.  The analysis covers 
the period of 1980/81 through 2006/07 and 
then decomposes the results for comparison 
purposes into two time periods correspond-
ing to the periods before and after imple-
mentation of the mandatory national soy-
bean checkoff program. 
                                                           
4  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, PL 
104-727, 7 U.S.C. 7201 et seq. 
The study first provides a detailed look at 
how soybean checkoff funds have been 
spent over the years and why expenditure 
patterns are important for the effectiveness 
of the program.  Then an analysis of how 
commodity checkoff programs affect mar-
kets is provided along with a review of per-
tinent literature and a comparison of the re-
sults of previous studies of the soybean and 
other commodity checkoff programs. The 
methodology used in this study to measure 
the effectiveness of the soybean checkoff 
program is then outlined and is followed by 
a discussion of the analytical results.  Final-
ly, the major conclusions of the study and 
implications for the management of soybean 
checkoff investments are considered. 
 
 




xpenditures of U.S. soybean checkoff 
funds over the years to enhance the 
profitability of the U.S. soybean in-
dustry can be classified as either supply- or 
demand-oriented. Supply-oriented expendi-
tures have concentrated on research to im-
prove agricultural productivity and reduce 
production costs. Demand-oriented expendi-
tures, on the other hand, have attempted to 
shift the demand schedules for soybeans and 
soybean products (soybean meal
5 and soy-
bean oil) through market development and 
promotional activities, thereby attempting to 
enhance price and stimulate output and pro-
ducer revenues.  Although soybean produc-
ers have been investing in both supply- and 
demand-oriented activities since the mid-
1950s, useable data and documentation of 
those investments are available only since 
                                                           
5 Soybean checkoff funds have also been used to promote “soy-
food” products. However, inasmuch as these products are manu-
factured from the meal portion of the soybean, they are treated as 




the 1970s with a few exceptions. This sec-
tion begins with a brief overview of soybean 
checkoff investment activities over the last 
two decades. Then, the expected market ef-






Since 1970/71, soybean farmers have in-
vested at least $724.1 million of checkoff 
funds in supply-oriented and demand-
oriented activities to benefit U.S. soybean 
producers (TAMRCa, TAMRCb, and 
TAMRCc)
7.  They have also invested in 
producer communications as a means of in-
forming insuring that those who pay for the 
program are kept abreast of the activities 
and effectiveness of the checkoff program.  
 
Over the same period, an additional $213.8 
million in funds have been made available 
for foreign soybean and soybean product 
demand promotion activities through the 
cooperator and other programs of the For-
eign Agriculture Service (FAS) of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  Also, until 
about 1998, the soybean checkoff and FAS 
funds invested in foreign demand promotion 
activities were leveraged in foreign markets 
to generate a total additional $117.2 million 
in contributions from the private sector for 
joint promotional activities referred to as 
                                                           
6  Unless otherwise indicated, all checkoff expenditure data pre-
sented in this section and in corresponding tables and figures are in 
nominal U.S. dollars.  As discussed later, however, all research and 
domestic demand promotion expenditures were deflated and inter-
national marketing expenditures were also corrected for changes in 
exchange rates for the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
those expenditures. 
7 This figure includes only funds collected from soybean producers 
and expended by either QSSBs or the national soybean organiza-
tion (the American Soybean Association (ASA) before 1992 and 
the United Soybean Board since that time). Funds provided by the 
Foreign Agriculture Service (USDA) through the cooperator pro-
gram are NOT included.  Also, this figure does NOT include ex-
penditures made by QSSBs for domestic or international programs 
over the years, data for which are quite sketchy and inconsistent 
and have not been well-maintained over the years (see TAMRCa). 
third party contributions
8. In total, the 
amount spent on supply-oriented and de-
mand-oriented activities by the national 
soybean organization and its contractors be-




In the years before the national mandatory 
program (pre-1992), annual soybean check-
off expenditure reached a high of a little 
more than $20 million (see Figure 1). With 
the implementation of the mandatory pro-
gram in about 1992, annual soybean check-
off expenditures grew rapidly, more than 
tripling to almost $63.2 million by 1997/98 
and subsequently growing to currently well 
over $70 million. 
 
Not only did the establishment of the na-
tional soybean checkoff program dramatical-
ly increase the level of funds available for 
investment in supply-oriented and demand-
oriented programs to increase industry prof-
itability, it also signaled a major and pro-
gram-defining shift in expenditure strategy 
away from foreign market promotion and 
toward domestic market promotion and re-
search.  In the 1970s and 1980s, internation-
al market  promotion consistently accounted 
for 80-87% of the total soybean checkoff 
investment with production research ex-
penditures accounting for most of the re-
mainder (Figure 1). With the implementa-
tion of the national soybean checkoff pro- 
                                                           
8  Whether or not such leveraging of international market promo-
tion funds in foreign markets was actually discontinued after 1998 
is not clear.  However, if such leveraging has continued, the funds 
contributed by third parties to foreign demand promotional activi-
ties have not amounted to much and have not been reported by in-
country representatives since 1998 (Rickard 2008).  
9 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references to “soybean 
checkoff expenditures/investments” in this report include not only 
producer-contributed soybean checkoff funds invested in soybean 
production research, domestic promotion, and international market 
promotion programs but also the foreign  market promotion funds 
contributed by the USDA through the Foreign Agriculture Service 
and by 3rd Party contributors in the countries of investment.  Not 
included are state expenditures of checkoff funds on domestic 
promotion programs because of the poor quality of the data on 
those programs.  See the discussion of data in the methodology 
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    Figure 2: Share of Soybean Checkoff Expenditures Allocated to International Market  































gram in 1991/92, however, an increasingly 
larger share of  checkoff funds were allo-
cated to production research and domestic 
demand promotion. By 2002/03, the  inter-
national market promotion share had de-
clined to only 30% while the production re-
search share nearly tripled from 15% in the 
mid-1980s to 43% in 2001/02 and domestic 
market promotion share increased from vir-
tually nothing before 1992 to 38% in 
1999/00 (Figure 2). Since 2000/01, domestic 
market promotion and production research 
together have accounted for 65% of annual 
expenditures with international market pro-
motion accounting for only about 35%. 
 
Another aspect of the checkoff expenditure 
strategy shift under the national program has 
been the remarkable increase in the impor-
tance of production research in the overall 
expenditure portfolio. Now accounting for 
the largest share of checkoff expenditures 
(40%), production research was a relatively 
small part of the overall expenditure strategy 
prior to the national program (15%-20%).    
 
Even though soybean farmers have spent 
millions of checkoff dollars on production 
research and demand promotion since the 
1970s, total expenditures have been quite 
meager when compared to the total industry 
revenues (cash receipts) earned by U.S. soy-
bean farmers each year (Figure 3).  Between 
1970/71 and 2006/07, total soybean check-
off investments have amounted to only be-
tween 0.05% and 0.48% of total soybean 
farm cash receipts each year. With such a 
low checkoff investment intensity, i.e., the 
level of investment compared to the size of 
the soybean market as measured by farm 
sales, the overall impact of the program 
could hardly be expected to be highly signif-
icant in a practical sense in its effects on 
U.S. production, prices, exports, and world 
market shares even if the impact could be 
said to be statistically significant. 
International Market 
Promotion Expenditures  
 
Between 1970/71 and 2006/07, $540.6 mil-
lion were invested in promoting foreign con-
sumption of U.S. soybeans and soybean 
products (TAMRCb).  Of that total, 38.8% 
came directly from soybean checkoff reve-
nues with another 39.6% from USDA 
through the Foreign Agriculture Service 
(FAS) Cooperator Program, and 21.7% from 
the private sector (third party contributions).  
 
Under the USDA Cooperator Program, 
commodity groups obtain federal funds to 
assist in developing foreign markets for 
U.S.-produced agricultural commodities by 
submitting marketing plans to FAS detailing 
how they intend to spend the requested 
funds.  If FAS approves the marketing plan, 
the commodity cooperator is expected to 
share in the cost of implementing the plan 
for which, under the Soybean Cooperator 
Program, a large portion of soybean check-
off funds have been used over the years.   
Until 1998/99, the FAS and soybean check-
off funds were leveraged with funds raised 
from third party contributors (3rd Party) in 
each country where market development 
activities are undertaken in an effort to mul-
tiply the effect of the checkoff funds (see 
inset box “International Market Promotion 
Activities” on a following page for more 
details).   
 
Between 1970/71 and 1986/87, total expend-
itures by all contributors (soybean farmers, 
FAS, and 3rd Party) in the development of 
foreign soybean and product markets consis-
tently grew but at a declining annual rate 
from $1.2 million to $19.1 million (see Fig-
ure 1), accounting for an average of 85% of 
all expenditures during that period (see Fig-
ure 2).  The annual growth rate  turned  neg-
ative  in  most  years from 1988/89 through 
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    Figure 4:  Contributor Shares of International Market Promotion Expenditures, 1970/71-  
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    Figure 3: Soybean Checkoff Expenditures as a Percent of Soybean Cash Receipts, 1970/71- 



































International market promotion includes: (1) 
trade servicing, (2) technical assistance, and (3) 
consumer promotion (Kinnucan and Williams 
1988). Trade servicing attempts to expand U.S. 
soybean and product exports through foreign 
study teams to demonstrate U.S. productive ca-
pacity and reliability as a supplier; trade press 
announcements and conferences; advertising in 
foreign periodicals; promotional material for 
foreign food buyers; and other similar activities. 
  
Technical assistance includes activities to ex-
pand the type, quality, and number of uses of 
soybeans and products in foreign markets such as 
technical assistance to foreign crushers and oil 
refiners to improve efficiency and the produc-
tion, handling, and marketing of soy products; 
feeding trials and demonstrations; animal nutri-
tion seminars; soy product development research; 
and feed technology short courses. Technical 
assistance programs seek to stimulate growth in 
the long-term demand for U.S. soybean and 
product exports. 
 
Consumer promotion includes generic or identi-
fied promotion activities to promote the use of 
soybeans and soy-based commodities such as 
formulated feeds or margarine.  Generic promo-
tion fosters manufacturer and consumer use of 
these commodities without specifically identify-
ing them as soy-based and may consist of marga-
rine and tofu sales campaigns and consumer edu-
cation seminars or meat consumption promotion 
campaigns in cooperation with the U.S. meat and 
poultry exporters. Identified promotion intends to 
enhance foreign demand by differentiating U.S. 
soy products from their competitors and might 
include baking/cooking seminars for institutional 
nutritionists, cooks, and food buyers to illustrate 
the quality and versatility of soybean oil; the   
distribution of booklets featuring soy products 
and institutional recipes; and sharing the costs of  
marketing of soy-based products with third party 














































tion research, plunging international market 
expenditures to a 12-year record low of 
$11.1 million, accounting for only 64% of  
total expenditures (see Figure 2).  With the 
implementation of the  national soybean 
checkoff program, however, international 
market promotion expenditures jumped to 
an all-time high of $28.2 million in 1997/98. 
Nevertheless, the share of total expenditures 
allocated to international market promotion 
continued to slide to 45% in that same year 
as allocations to production research and 
domestic promotion grew even faster.   
 
The growth rate in allocations to interna-
tional market promotion turned negative 
once again over the following five years un-
til 2002/03 as allocations to production re-
search jumped dramatically over that period.  
From a low that year of about 30%, the 
share of total expenditures allocated to in-
ternational promotion has edged upward 
slightly to just under 39% currently.  
 
Contributor Shares of International 
Market Development Expenditures  
 
Interestingly, before the implementation of 
the national soybean checkoff program, the 
smallest share of international market pro-
motion expenditures was contributed by 
soybean farmers through the voluntary 
checkoff program in effect at the time. Be-
tween 1970/71 and 1992/93, voluntary soy-
bean checkoff funds accounted for an aver-
age of only 26% of international market 
promotion expenditures while funds through 
the USDA cooperator program and from 
third party contributors accounted for an av-
erage of 34% and 40%, respectively (Figure 
4).  This leveraging of checkoff funds great-
ly increased the level of international pro-
motion dollars and magnified the potential 
impact of each checkoff dollar on foreign 
demand for U.S. soybeans and products dur-
ing that period.  
 
8 
The implementation of the national soybean 
checkoff program in 1992/93, however, was 
accompanied by a dramatic shift in source of 
international market promotion funds. By 
1999/2000, the checkoff share of interna-
tional market expenditures had more than 
doubled from the 1970/71-1992/93 average  
to nearly 60% with funds through the coope-
rator program accounting for all the rest of 
the expenditures (Figure 4). 
 
Although helping to reverse the downward 
trend in the financial support for develop-
ment of international markets for U.S. soy-
beans and products, the implementation of 
the national soybean checkoff program did 
little to generate additional funds from Third 
Party contributors in the program countries.  
During the mid-1980s, Third Party contribu-
tors accounted for the largest share of the 
total funds invested in foreign market devel-
opment (35% to 45%).  Following the im-
plementation of the national soybean check-
off, however, efforts to leverage checkoff 
funds in foreign markets apparently waned, 
perhaps due to the dramatic increase in 
availability of checkoff funds. By 1999/ 
2000, contributions from Third Party contri-
butors, once the largest contributor of inter-
national market promotion funds, had dried 
up completely (Figure 4). 
 
Commodity Shares of International 
Market Development Expenditures  
 
Before the implementation of the national 
soybean checkoff program, the evident strat-
egy of the international market development 
program was to emphasize soybean products 
(soybean oil and soybean meal) rather than 
soybeans as the primary export promotion 
objective
10.  In the early 1970s, soybeans 
                                                           
10 For this study, expenditures to promote soyfood in target coun-
tries were added together with such expenditures for soybean meal 
into one category referred to here as “soybean meal.” 
accounted for the largest share of interna-
tional market development expenditures 
(Figure 5). Emphasis quickly shifted to soy-
bean products in the mid- to late 1970s with 
soybean meal and soybean oil together ac-
counting for about 60% of total expendi-
tures. By 1985/86, the soybean product 
share had risen dramatically to about 94% 
with soybean oil commanding the largest 
share at 52%.  By 1991/92, the year just be-
fore the implementation of the national 
checkoff, soybean oil had become the com-
modity of preference in international market 
promotion accounting for 70% of expendi-
tures while the soybean meal share had 
slumped to only 17% (Figure 5). 
 
The implementation of the national checkoff 
program brought renewed emphasis on soy-
beans as the preferred export promotion 
commodity. The soybean share rose dramat-
ically from 12.5% in 1991/92 to a high of 
74% in 2004/05.  The growth in soybean 
promotion expenditures came at the expense 
primarily of expenditures to promote soy-
bean oil.  By 2004/05, soybean oil ac-
counted for only 23% of expenditures with 
soybean meal a paltry 3%. 
 
The motivation behind the switch from pro-
moting the export of soybean products in the 
pre-national checkoff period to promoting 
soybean exports in recent years is unclear.  
Most likely, as suggested later, the change in 
emphasis was related to a shift in the region-
al focus of expenditures that occurred with 
the implementation of the national soybean 
checkoff program.  As the regional emphasis 
of expenditures shifted from the EU and Ja-
pan to smaller, less developed countries over 
time, the commodity emphasis also shifted 
































Regional Share of International Market 
Development Expenditures  
 
In the early 1970s, Japan and the European 
Community (6 members) accounted for 
80%-90% of all international market devel-
opment expenditures (Figure 6.) Over time, 
the international market development pro-
gram expanded into a number of other coun-
tries, resulting in a steadily declining share 
of expenditures in Japan as well as in the   
European Union (EU) despite the growth in 
the number of EU member countries 
(TAMRCb).  By 2006/07, Japan and the EU 
(which by then included 27 member coun-
tries) together accounted for only about 12% 
of total international market promotion ex-
penditures (Figure 6).  In contrast, the share 
of those expenditures going to smaller, less 
developed countries outside Japan and the 


























10% in 1970/71 to nearly 90% by 2006/07. 
The shift in the allocation of expenditures 
away from developed countries towards 
smaller, emerging markets over time 
represents another key shift in the interna-
tional market development strategy of  the 
soybean checkoff program.  This shift over 
time may help explain the concurrent  shift 
in expenditures away from value-added 
products (soybean oil and meal) toward soy-
beans as noted in the previous section (also 
see Figure 5). Note that in the early years 
(1970s) of the international market devel-
opment promotion effort, the focus of the 
program activities and expenditures  was on 
soybeans, primarily in Japan and the EU.   
As those two markets matured, the emphasis 
in promotion activities began to switch to 
value added products. Then as the strategy 
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dened to include new, emerging markets 
across a broad number of less developed 
countries, the focus once again shifted to 
soybeans rather than value-added products. 
 
This strategy makes sense, of course, be-
cause before growth in consumption of val-
ue-added products can occur in a new mar-
ket, a supply of value-added products must 
be available. Working with importers, pro-
cessors, and refiners in new markets to en-
hance efficiency and capacity, develop 
products suited to the needs of the consum-
ers in that country, and  improve the produc-
tion, handling, and marketing process and 
infrastructure is an important first step to 
developing the needed supply of value-
































Between 1970/71 and 2006/07, soybean 
farmers spent a total of over $317.2 million 
in checkoff funds on soybean production 
research projects (TAMRCc). From $1.3 
million in 1970/71, the combined allocation 
of checkoff funds through both national and 
state-level organizations for soybean pro-
duction research increased steadily to $29.3 
million in 2006/07 (Figure 7)
11. 
 
  While soybean production research ac-
counted for more than half of total checkoff 
expenditures in 1970/71, however, the prod- 
                                                           
11  Note from Figure 7 that data on national and state-level expend-
itures for production research were not collected or maintained by  
project for four years beginning in 1996/97.  In additional, the 
national-level expenditures data in all other years were broken out 
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duction research share of total expenditures 
declined steadily to an all-time low of 14.1% 
in 1988/89 (see Figure 2). Aided by the im-
plementation of the mandatory checkoff 
program in the early 1990s, the production 
research share jumped once again to 43.2% 
in 2001/02, the highest level since 1970/71. 
The production research share was slightly 
lower at 40.6% in 2006/07. 
 
Production research projects funded with 
soybean checkoff dollars over at least the 
last decade have tended to fall into one of 
eight broad categories: (1) production sys-
tems research; (2) gene discovery and bio-
engineering studies; (3) soybean disease and 
pest control; (4) soybean germplasm screen-
ing and variety testing and development; (5) 
soybean composition and quality research; 
(6) soybean processing and utilization re-
search; (7) education and communication 

























ivities (see inset box “Domestic Production 
Research Expenditures” for more details). 
 
In 1978/79, about 35% of checkoff research 
funds went to production systems research, 
23% to germplasm screening and variety 
testing and development, 15% to disease and 
pest control research, 15% to the combina-
tion of education/communication and other 
projects, 5% to gene discovery and bioengi-
neering studies, 3% to soybean processing 
and utilization projects, and 3% to soybean 
composition and quality research (Figure 7). 
 
The largest component of funded production 
research projects has involved soybean dis-
ease and pest control, accounting for 30% of 
production research expenditures in 2007/ 
08, double the level of 1978/79. Soybean 
processing and utilization studies  also expe-
rienced increases in shares of production 
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Production research projects have tended to fall 
into one of 8 broad categories: (1) production 
systems research; (2) gene discovery and bioen-
gineering studies; (3) soybean disease and pest 
control; (4) soybean germplasm screening and 
variety testing and development; (5) soybean 
composition and quality research; (6) soybean 
processing and utilization research; (7) education 
and communication projects; and (8) various 
other research activities (TAMRCc 2009). 
 
Production systems research has focused on   
production management, soil moisture and water 
management, soil fertility and nutrient manage-
ment, and weed control. 
 
Gene discovery and bioengineering studies have 
covered a broad range of biotechnology and ba-
sic research projects.  
 
Soybean disease and pest control research has 
focused primarily on insect control (e.g., aphids), 
disease control (e.g., Asian rust, stem rot, leaf 
spot), nematodes, and fungicide evaluation). 
 
Soybean germplasm screening and variety test-
ing and development has included a wide range 
of activities from soybean breeding to soybean 
seed quality and germplasm screening. 
 
Soybean processing and utilization research has 
examined the use of soybean oil and meal for   
food, industrial and animal purposes, human and 
animal nutrition, processing efficiency, by-
product uses and value. 
 
Soybean composition and quality research has   
included a wide variety of activities designed to 
understand the many factors affecting the com-
position and quality of soybeans. 
 
Education and communication projects have 
included on-farm research demonstration 
projects and extension research and communica-
tion activities. 
 
Other projects have ranged from marketing stu-















































with gene discovery and bioengineering stu-
dies (12%), and soybean composition and 
quality research (11%). Those increases, 
however, have come primarily at the ex-
pense of production systems research (down 
to 10% in 2007/08), germplasm screening 
and variety testing and development (down 
to 14% in 2007/08), and education/ commu-
nication and other research (down to 8%). 
 
Between 1978/79 and 2007/08, 70% of   
soybean production research funded by the 
state soybean associations before the im-
plementation of the national soybean check-
off and then the QSSBs there-after was con-
ducted by researchers in only seven  states: 
(1) Illinois (15.9%), (2) Iowa (13.8%), (3) 
Arkansas (11.1%), (4) Missouri (7.5%), (5) 
Louisiana (7.2%), (6) Minnesota (6.9%), 
and (7) Mississippi (5.9%) (Figure 8). 
 
Domestic Promotion Program Expenditures 
 
Prior to the implementation of the national 
checkoff program, relatively few dollars 
were allocated at either the national or state 
level for activities designed to promote the 
domestic use of soybeans and soybean prod-
ucts.  Nearly all checkoff funds during that 
period were used either to promote foreign 
use of soybeans and soybean products in an 
effort to enhance U.S. exports or to fund 
production research in an effort to boost 
productivity and reduce costs of production. 
 
Few records exist to provide much insight 
on the objectives and amount of checkoff 
dollars used to fund domestic promotion ac-
tivities prior to the early 1990s. The data   
available for that period (TAMRCa) and 
discussions with ASA and USB personnel 
both indicate that until after the implemen-
tation of the national soybean checkoff pro-
gram, domestic promotion accounted for an 
extremely small proportion of all soybean 




























With the implementation of the national 
soybean checkoff program, the strategy for 
checkoff expenditures was expanded to in-
clude a broad range of activities to promote 
the use of soybeans and soybean products in 
U.S. markets (see inset box “Domestic Pro-
motion Program Activities” on a following 
page). At the national level between 1994/95 
and 2007/08 (the period over which com-
plete records are available), $211.9 million 
of soybean checkoff funds were spent on 
domestic promotion programs (TAMRCa). 
From $1.4 million in 1994/95 (5.3% of all 
checkoff promotion and research expendi-
tures), national-level domestic promotion 
expenditures increased markedly to a high of 
$23.5 million in 1997/98 (37.1% of promo-
tion and research expenditures) (Figure 9). 
Since then, annual expenditures on domestic 
promotion have backed off to $14.6 million 


























 research expenditures).  Also since 1994/95, 
soybean promotion activities have 
represented about 39% of national-level 
promotion expenditures while soybean oil 
accounted for 35% and soybean meal and 
soyfood the remaining 26% (Figure 9). 
 
Although checkoff funds have been invested 
by both state and national organizations in 
domestic promotion programs, data on   
state-level expenditures by QSSBs have not 
been systematically gathered over time.  In 
an 1997/98 study of the effectiveness of the 
soybean checkoff program, the authors at-
tempted to collect this data by survey from 
each state (QSSB) (Williams, Shumway, 
and Love 2002). 
 
At that time, we reported that the state-level 
expenditure data generated by that survey 
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ticularly for the period prior to the national 
checkoff  program” (p. 13). A number of 
QSSBs failed to respond to repeated re-
quests for the information. At the same time, 
the quality of the data provided by the res-
ponding QSSBs was highly variable in terms 
of the time period of coverage, level of 
commodity and project aggregation, com-
prehensiveness, and other characteristics
12. 
 
Since that time, little has been done to con-
sistently collect and report QSSB expendi-
tures except for  production research data 
which is collected from QSSBs by Keith 
Smith and Associates.  Consequently, in an 
effort to develop as accurate and compre-
hensive expenditure database as possible, we 
 
                                                           
12   Refer to TAMRCa (Texas Agricultural Market Research Center 
Information Report No. IR 2-09) to see what was and was not 


























once again attempted to collect the neces-
sary data directly from the QSSBs. 
 
The quality of the domestic promotion ex-
penditure data provided by the responding 
QSSBs for recent years was obviously much 
better than that of data available for earlier 
years. Even so, the lack of a harmonized 
system to maintain detailed historical infor-
mation on QSSB annual promotion and re-
search expenditures in a consistent format 
continues to render even the most recent 
state-level expenditure data virtually useless, 
at least for program evaluation purposes
13.  
 
                                                           
13 The failure to systematically compile consistent quality checkoff 
expenditure data across state QSSBs and USB contractors is a 
serious problem for nearly all types of soybean checkoff expendi-
tures. Fortunately, historical data on production research were 
faithfully compiled by a former ASA employee except for a four 






Domestic promotion programs are intended to 
boost domestic use of soybeans, soymeal and 
soyfood, and soyoil. These programs are similar 
to international promotion programs in that they 
are intended to shift out the demand curves for 
U.S. soybeans and soybean products. However, 
domestic and international promotion programs 
tend to compete in their market effects. If a do-
mestic promotion program increases the domes-
tic use of soybeans and products, for example, 
the result is less availability of these products for 
export and vice versa.  To soybean producers, 
however, the result is the same – more demand 
for what they produce, the only difference being 
whether the increased demand comes from do-
mestic or foreign consumers.  
 
In contrast to most other checkoff commodities, 
relatively few soybean checkoff dollars are spent 
on media advertising. Most domestic soybean 
and product promotion has involved new use 
research and working directly with potential us-
ers to boost awareness and usage. Examples in-
clude the following (TAMRCc 2009): 
 
Domestic soybean promotion programs range   
from many new use projects focused on soybean 
composition and quality to trade and consumer 
communication projects, and a wide variety of 
soybean chemistry, genetics, processing, and 
utilization projects. 
 
Domestic soymeal and soyfood promotion pro-
grams have focused on financing partnerships 
with meat marketing organizations, seminars and 
research on the nutritional and health aspects of 
soyfoods, and many projects related to animal 
nutrition, feeding technology, high protein meal 
development, and soymeal use in aquaculture 
production, among many others.  
 
Soybean oil promotion programs, particularly in 
recent years, have focused on developing indus-
trial applications for soyoil  (e.g., plastics, 
soyink, solvents) and the use of soyoil in biodie-















































Producer Communications Expenditures 
 
From 1992/93 to 2007/08, anywhere from 
4% (1995/96) to slightly more than 25% 
(1993/94) of national soybean checkoff pro-
gram expenditures were allocated to produc-
er communications for an average of 14.5% 
over the period. In 2007/08, producer com-
munications accounted for 13.5% of total 
expenditures.  Many other checkoff com-
modity organizations spend a similar 
amount on producer communications, from 
as low as 5% by the Beef Board and Pork 
Board to as high as 20% by the National 
Corn Grower’s Association (Table 1). Most 
smaller checkoff organizations spend little 
on producer communications. 
 
While comparisons with other checkoff 
groups are interesting, they provide little 
indication of the relative effectiveness of 
their producer communications programs.   
The lower percentage spent by the Beef and 
Pork Boards, for example, could mean they 
are more cost-effective in getting out their 
messages or simply that they under-
investing in producer communications so 
that their stakeholders are relatively less 
well-informed and, as a result, less satis-
fied with the results of their checkoff pro-
gram. 
 
Checkoff expenditures for producer com-
munications are neither expected nor in-
tended to increase soybean productivity, re-
duce soybean production costs, or promote 
demand for soybeans or soybean products 
(see inset box “Producer Communications 
Program Activities for more details).  Ra-
ther, the goals of producer communications 
are to (Osborn and Barr Communications): 
 Strengthen producer awareness and 
knowledge of soybean checkoff activi-
ties and initiatives, which can impact the 


























  communicate the benefits of the check-
off program to farm managers; 
  build relationships among key influenc-
ers in agriculture and in agricultural me-
dia industries; and 
  establish the soybean checkoff and the 
USB as resources for information per-
taining to the soybean industry. 
 
Given their highly different goals, the effec-
tiveness of commodity checkoff producer 
communications expenditures cannot be 
measured using the same statistical proce-
dures used to analyze the effectiveness of 
supply- and demand-oriented expenditures.   
Thus, studies of checkoff program effec-
tiveness normally do not include producer 
communications expenditures as part of 
their analyses. 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of producer 
communications requires a different type of 
approach, one that measures whether the 























met.  Most efforts to measure the effective-
ness of producer communications focus on 
the effect of the expenditures on enhancing 
producer awareness and the checkoff pro-
gram, its activities, and benefits.  
 
The most common method to determine the 
effectiveness of producer communications 
activities is to survey producers and measure 
their awareness of the checkoff program and 
their support, opposition, and beliefs regard-
ing the program. The initial survey normally 
establishes a benchmark against which 
changes in level of awareness, support, and 
beliefs of producers regarding the program 
can be tracked over the years in subsequent 
surveys. This iss the approach taken by the 
Tarrance Group, Inc. In a report of their 
most recent producer survey results to assess 
the effectiveness of the soybean checkoff 
program’s producer communications efforts, 
the Tarrance Group concludes, among other 
things, that on average over the period of 
1997/98 to 2008/09: 
Table 1: Comparison of Selected Commodity Checkoff Board Expenditures on Producer  
Communications 
 

















2  $2.6 million  $50.8 million  5.1 
Dairy (DMI) (2007)
3  $19.0 million*  $175.2 million  10.8 
American Lamb Board (2007)
4  $251,772 $2,331,671  10.8 
National Honey Board (2007)
5  $467,712 $4,443,442  10.5 
United Soybean Board (2007)
6  $5,703,156 $42,195,884  13.5 
American Egg Board
7  na $19,849,174  na 
National Corn Growers Assn 
 (2008 budget)
8 
na  na      20.0** 















Checkoff expenditures for producer communica-
tions are neither expected nor intended to in-
crease soybean productivity, reduce soybean 
production costs, or promote demand for soy-
beans or soybean products.  Rather, the goal of 
producer communications is generally to inform 
stakeholders of the activities funded by checkoff 
dollars and the benefits they receive. A number 
of strategies are followed to communicate the 
value of the checkoff program to producers and 
their ownership of it.  
 
Checkoff messages are communicated to soy-
bean producers through various industry trade 
shows and meetings. Some outreach is directed 
to farmers while others intend to educate media 
representatives or industry groups on checkoff 
priorities in order for them to carry the messages 
back to soybean farmers (Osborn and Barr 
Communications).  
 
Providing regular and concise soybean-industry 
focused messages to media is a major component 
of producer communications. Communications 
with media is accomplished through outreach 
projects, such as a national media tour, by conti-
nually building relationships and responding to 
media requests and the development of a media 
primer CD.  Many requests for soybean checkoff 
collateral material, background and support in-
formation as well as photographs and graphics 
are filled. The news media are also monitored to 
take advantage of emerging topics to leverage 
checkoff communications and provide support to 
other program areas.  
 
The producer communications program main-
tains and updates a media database to better leve-
rage resources when contacting the media, send-
ing news releases, and conducting media tours 
and special events.  
 
USB and state farmer-directors also work to es-
tablish themselves as “expert” resources for in-
formation and interviews on soybean checkoff 
and industry-related topics through a national 
media tour. 
  About 13% of producers are familiar 
with the program, 66% are somewhat 
familiar, and 20% are not at all familiar; 
  Producer support for the program steadi-
ly increased from 65% to 75% while op-
position decreased from 30% to 14%; 
  Most producers believed the program to 
be effective, efficient, and farmer driven;  
  The percentage of producers who be-
lieve that the program has helped to ex-
pand or develop new international mar-
kets for U.S. soybeans increased from 
67% to 81%;  
  The percentage of producers who be-
lieve that production research expendi-
tures had helped develop any new ad-
vances or improvements in soybean pro-
duction techniques increased from  63% 
to 76%; 
  The percentage of producers who be-
lieved that the program had helped to 
develop any new uses for soybeans in-
creased from 78% to 89%; and 
  The percentage of producers who be-
lieve that the program is still a good in-
vestment for the industry increased from 
63% to 71% (only measured over the 
2004/05 to 2008/09 period. 
 
 Purchasing Power of Soybean 
 Checkoff Investments 
 
Despite an upward trend in the nominal dol-
lar value of soybean checkoff expenditures 
over the years, inflation in the U.S. and for-
eign countries and a general depreciation in 
the value of the U.S. dollar against foreign 
currencies have eroded the real purchasing 
power of those expenditures over time in 
all countries. In other words, each U.S. dol-
lar could purchase less promotion and re-
search in 2007/08 than was the case in 
1970/71 which has eroded the impact of 



















































In the U.S., inflation has had an important 
effect on the real level of research  and do-
mestic promotion purchased particularly in 
recent years (Figure 10).  As a result of in-
flation, research and domestic promotion 
dollars spent in 2007/08 purchased only 
about a third or less of what those dollars 
would have purchased in 1970/71.  In other 
words, the nearly $30 million spent on re-
search in 2007/08 purchased only about $10 
million in research when the effects of infla-
tion are removed.  In the case of domestic 
promotion, despite an expenditure of about 
$12 million in 2007/08, the actual promotion 
purchased was worth only about 25% of that 
figure (about $4 million) when measured in 
1970/71 dollars. 
 
In foreign markets, the combination of infla-
tion and a depreciating U.S. dollar combined 
for an even more serious impact on the pur-
chasing power of checkoff dollars spent on 
international market promotion programs.   
In both the EU15/27 and Japan, for example, 
inflation and a declining value of the dollar 
reduced the purchasing power of soybean 
checkoff expenditures in those countries 
even more rapidly than the planned reduc-
tion in nominal dollars (Figures 11 and 12).  
In less developed and other countries to 
which checkoff dollars have been increa-
singly shifted over the years, progressively 
rapid inflation, particularly since the mid-
1980s, has seriously reduced the effective-
ness of the market development activities in 
many of those countries (Figure 13).  In es-
sence, the rate of inflation in the cost of 
goods and services in many of those coun-
tries has far outpaced the annual rate of in-
crease in checkoff dollars expended in those 
same countries. The consequence has been  
a serious erosion in the purchasing power of 
the budgets of the foreign soybean promo-
tion offices (USSEC) which has hindered 
their ability to maintain levels of promotion 
much less expand activities in many cases. 
Summary of Key Characteristics of 
Soybean Checkoff Expenditures 
 
For any checkoff program, two main factors 
affect the estimate of its market effects and 
returns to producers: (1) the statistical rela-
tionship estimated between the checkoff ex-
penditures and market demand and supply 
and (2) the expenditure strategy of the 
checkoff board as revealed by the commodi-
ty, region, and promotional activity patterns 
of expenditures over time.  The methods and 
results of the statistical measurement of the 
relationship between checkoff expenditures 
and the market demand and supply of soy-
beans and soybean products  are presented 
and discussed later in this report. 
 
This section of the report summarizes the 
preceding review of checkoff expenditure 
patterns and highlights nine key important 
features of soybean checkoff expenditure 
patterns that will provide a strong basis for 
understanding the statistical results and re-
lated interpretation and conclusions pre-
sented later in this report.  The following 
nine characteristics highlight changes in 
checkoff expenditure strategies with the im-
plementation of the national checkoff pro-
gram in the early 1990s: 
 
1.  Expenditures have tended to switch from 
international promotion to production 
research over time. The share of check-
off expenditures allocated to internation-
al promotion dropped from 85% before 
the early 1990s to about 30% in recent 
years while the production research 
share jumped from 15% to 40% over the 
same period. The consequence has been 
less demand “pull” being generated in 
world markets by the checkoff program 
and more supply “push” leading to less 
support for soybean and product prices 
since implementation of the national 













































































Nominal Real (mil 1970/71 SDRs)
Figure 11:  EU15/27 International Market Promotion Expenditures, Nominal (million $US) 
























































Figure 10:  U.S. Production Research and Domestic Promotion Expenditures, Nominal vs. 
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Nominal Real (mil 1970/71 Yen)
Figure 12: Japan International Market Promotion Expenditures, Nominal (million $US) vs. 


























































































Figure 13: Rest of the World International Market Promotion Expenditures, Nominal 



































2.  During most of the 1990s, expenditure 
allocations tended to favor domestic 
promotion as international marketing 
promotion expenditures  declined.  From 
virtually nothing in the early 1990s, the 
share of expenditures allocated to do-
mestic promotion programs spiked at 
40% in 1999/00 while expenditure allo-
cations to international marketing pro-
motion were declining sharply.  Because 
that was also when allocations to pro-
duction research were also rising rapidly, 
the increasing allocations to both domes-
tic promotion and production research 
pulled soybean checkoff programs deci-
dedly away from traditional promotion 
activities in foreign markets toward ac-
tivities focused on U.S. markets. 
  
3.  The share of checkoff expenditures allo-
cated to domestic promotion after 
1999/00 was cut in half from 40% of to-
tal expenditures to only 20%.  Because 
the expenditure allocation to internation-
al promotion stabilized during that pe-
riod at about 30%-40%, the result was 
even greater emphasis on production re-
search to shift out the supply curve while 
emphasis on demand promotion waned.  
This change added even more supply 
“push” to soybean checkoff programs 
and less demand “pull.” 
 
4.  In international promotion programs, 
the focus over time has switched from 
maintaining and building a few large, 
mature markets to opening and develop-
ing many new, smaller markets. The 
share of international market promotion 
expenditures going to the European Un-
ion and Japan, the two largest, single 
markets for U.S. soybeans and products, 
declined from 80%-90% in the 1970s to 
only 10%-15% in recent years. Nearly 
90% of all international market promo-
tion expenditures are now allocated to 
smaller, less developed countries and re-
gions.  The trade-off has pitted a philos-
ophy of maintaining sales in large but 
stable markets against one of building 
sales in a large number of smaller, grow-
ing markets.  The problem is that the re-
direction of international market promo-
tion expenditures from mature to new 
markets must generate at least the same 
return to the checkoff dollars spent as 
might have been achieved without re-
directing those expenditures to avoid 
revenue losses. As emphasized in the 
next section, it can take years of expend-
itures in new markets before substantial 
returns are generated but only a short pe-
riod of no expenditures to lose any gains 
previously achieved.  
 
5.  In international promotion programs, 
the commodity emphasis of expenditures 
since the early 1990s has shifted from   
value-added soybean products to soy-
beans. Over time, checkoff dollars allo-
cated to international market promotion 
have been increasingly used to promote 
foreign demand for U.S. soybeans rather 
than for soybean products. This shift 
may be the consequence of the growing 
emphasis on new, less developed mar-
kets rather than the larger, more mature 
markets in international market promo-
tion strategy.  Over time, as the newer 
markets mature, market demand and 
promotion expenditures might be ex-
pected to shift towards value-added 
products (soymeal, soyfood, and soyoil).   
In the meantime,  lower returns may be 
generated by a relative increase in pro-
motion-induced soybean exports relative 
to those of value-added products. 
 
6.  The leveraging of international promo-
tion program checkoff dollars with third 
party, in-country contributions declined 
in the 1990s and ceased completely in  
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1998/99.  Accounting for 1/3 or more of 
the funds used to promote foreign de-
mand for soybeans and products during 
the voluntary checkoff program era, con-
tributions from third party, in-country 
contributors apparently are no longer 
sought after as a means of magnifying 
the purchasing power of checkoff dollars 
in foreign markets. Efforts to leverage 
international market promotion dollars 
by partnering with in-country retailers, 
merchandisers, and manufacturers began 
to wane with the substantial increase in 
the availability of checkoff and 
FAS/USDA funds with the implementa-
tion of the national soybean checkoff 
program. The consequence has been a 
further weakening of the traditional, for-
eign market promotion program in favor 
of domestic promotion and production 
research programs than might be the 
case if third party leveraging was still an 
important component of the international 
market promotion strategy. 
 
7.   Total checkoff expenditures are extreme-
ly small compared to the value of soy-
bean production. Although the $60-$70 
million of annual checkoff expenditures 
is a great deal of money to most produc-
ers, that amount of money represents a 
drop in the bucket compared to the value 
of U.S. soybean production each year.   
Checkoff expenditures represent less 
than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of 
the value of production.  Consequently, 
it would be unreasonable to expect that 
such a relatively small amount of money 
to have huge impacts on market supply, 
demand, and price.  The effects are like-
ly to be small but as long as the cost of 
bringing about small changes is even 
smaller, the returns to producers per dol-
lar spent could be quite large. 
 
8.  Producer communications expenditures 
have no effect on the supply of or de-
mand for soybeans and soybean prod-
ucts in U.S. or world markets. While ne-
cessary to maintain support among pro-
ducers for the checkoff program, check-
off expenditures for producer communi-
cations are neither expected nor intended 
to increase soybean productivity, reduce 
soybean production costs, or promote 
demand for soybeans or soybean prod-
ucts. Thus, the effectiveness of producer 
communications expenditures cannot be 
measured using the same statistical 
procedures used to analyze the effec-
tiveness of supply- and demand-oriented 
expenditures.  Consequently, this study, 
like those of other commodity checkoff 
programs, does not include producer 
communications expenditures in the 
analysis of the effectiveness of the soy-
bean checkoff program. 
9.  Inflation in all countries and deprecia-
tions in the value of the U.S. dollar in 
foreign markets have seriously eroded 
the purchasing power of soybean check-
off expenditures. In the U.S., checkoff 
dollars spent in 2007/08 purchased only 
about a third or less of what those dollars 
would have purchased in 1970/71. In 
foreign markets, depreciation in the dol-
lar combined with rapid inflation have 
caused the cost of goods and services in 
many of those countries to far outpace 
the annual rate of increase in checkoff 
dollars expended in those same coun-
tries. Thus, despite growth in the nomin-
al  value of dollars spent at home and 
abroad, the real, effective purchasing 
power of those dollars has increased 
much less rapidly and even declined in 






The Expected Effects of Research and 
Demand Promotion Expenditures  
 
The primary objective of any commodity 
checkoff program is to foster the growth and 
profitability of the production of that com-
modity. Ultimately, however, the individual 
farmers contributing to the program expect 
that the funds will be spent in such a way 
that they are individually better off than they 
would have been without the checkoff pro-
gram. What can reasonably be expected of a 
research and promotion program in terms of 
the market effects and the effects on produc-
ers?  The section explores what could be ex-
pected - and what should not be expected - 
from a checkoff program. 
 
The Expected Effects of 
Investments in Research  
 
From the perspective of the individual pro-
ducer, checkoff expenditures on production 
research offer the potential for increased 
profits through technological advances that 
reduce their production costs and/or boost 
their yields (i.e., output per unit of input). 
From a market perspective, however, if such 
research-induced technological advances are 
successful, the effect across all producers is 
an increase in the aggregate, market supply 
of the commodity and a potentially negative 
effect on each producer’s profits from a 
lower market price. If the market price drop 
is large compared to the cost decline or 
supply increase of the individual producer, 
revenues and profits could also decline. If 
not, then individual producers would likely 
benefit from the research expenditures. 
Whether a research-induced shift out of a 
given market supply curve will reduce or 
increase producer profits (welfare) depends 
critically on three factors: (1) the effect of 
the research on the supply curve, (2) the 
revenue effect of the research-induced mar-
ket supply increase, and (3) the cost effect of 
the supply increase. 
 
The effects of expenditures on production 
research on the market supply of a commod-
ity are often not immediate,  measurable, or 
direct. Checkoff dollars may fund either ba-
sic, long-term types of research or more ap-
plied, short-term types of research. Because 
the lag between expenditures on research 
(particularly basic research) and the com-
mercialization of new technologies available 
for adoption by soybean producers may be 
quite lengthy, the full market impacts and 
any benefits of checkoff-funded research to 
soybean producers may not be felt for a long 
time following the research expenditures. 
 
Also, research expenditures may not always 
result in measurable market impacts.  For 
example, basic or applied research that pro-
vides knowledge about what does not work 
in increasing yields or reducing costs has 
value but is not measurable in terms of mar-
ket impacts. Also, applied research often is 
related to or depends on previous expendi-
tures on basic research.  Consequently, ex-
penditures on basic research may have only 
indirect market effects to the extent that the 
results of that research lead to more applied 
research to develop new technologies and 
processes for adoption by producers. 
 
Even if funded production research results in 
an increase in supply in a given period, the 
impact on producer profits (sales  revenues 
minus production costs) depends critically 
on the responsiveness of demand to price 
changes.  Assume, for example, that market 
demand is highly price responsive (i.e., price 
elastic) as represented by demand curve De 
in Figure 14.  A research-induced shift out 
in the market supply curve from S to S’ 
leads to an increase in the market sales of 
the commodity from Q to Qe and a decline 
in the market price from P to Pe.  
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 Figure 14: Production Research Expen-




















In this case, total sales revenues (i.e., farm 
cash receipts) actually increase even though 
the price declines because the percentage 
increase in the quantity sold from Q to Qe is 
greater than the percentage drop in market 
price from P to Pe. Although the total cost of 
production (represented by the area under 
the supply curve up to the point of produc-
tion) may also increase, for a highly elastic 
demand curve, the revenue increase is likely 
to be greater than the cost increase resulting 
in a net increase in producer profits.  The 
positive net effect on producer profits is 
represented in Figure 14 by sum of the two 
greenish areas minus the light brown area 
(i.e., the net change in producer surplus). 
 
On the other hand, if market demand is 
highly unresponsive to price (i.e., price in-
elastic), as is the case with demand curve Di 
in Figure 14, then the same research-induced 
shift in supply (S to S’) leads to a larger per-
centage drop in market price (P to Pi) than 
the percentage increase in the quantity sold 
in the market (Q to Qi).  As a consequence, 
farm cash receipts decline.  
 
Total production costs  might also decline in 
this second case as well but, given a highly 
inelastic demand curve, the revenue drop 
could be greater than the cost decline result-
ing in a net loss to producers represented in 
Figure 14 by the darker green area minus the 
darker brown area. The more inelastic the 
demand, the more likely the darker green 
area will be smaller than the darker brown 
area resulting in a net loss to producers.   
That is, the more unresponsive demand is to 
price changes, the more likely it is that 
checkoff expenditures on research will lead 
to a drop rather than an increase in farm 
profits. 
 
Some researchers (e.g., Schuh 1984) have 
argued that while domestic market demand 
for agricultural products tends to be fairly 
unresponsive to price (i.e., price inelastic), 
export demand tends to be quite responsive 
to price changes (i.e., price elastic).  Conse-
quently, total demand (domestic plus export 
demand) for agricultural products could well 
be elastic.  If that is the case, then checkoff-
induced increases in supply would be ex-
pected to enhance farm profits. 
 
Other researchers (e.g., Schmitz 1988 and 
Bredahl, Meyers, and Collins 1979), howev-
er, have argued that the increasing preva-
lence of protectionism in world markets, in-
cluding import quotas and nontariff barriers 
of all types, state trading, and other institu-
tional arrangements “make the excess de-
mand curve facing the U.S. relatively price 
inelastic” (Schmitz).  If the export demand 
for an agricultural product is indeed price 
inelastic, then total demand for that product 
is likely price inelastic so that a research-
induced outward shift in supply could well 



























The Expected Effects of 
Demand Promotion  
 
While ostensibly more straightforward than 
that of research investments, the relationship 
between investments in demand promotion 
and farm profits is not necessarily more di-
rect nor less complex. Clearly, the objective 
of demand promotion is to shift out demand 
and, thereby, increase the market price on a 
higher volume of sales over time.  Indeed, 
promotion programs that successfully move 
out the demand curve raise price.  In raising 
the price, however, they also stimulate a 
greater level of production over time than 
would have occurred which moderates the 
extent of the price increase.   
 
Assume, for example, that a particular de-
mand promotion program shifts out the 
demand for soybeans in a given year from D 
to D’ in Figure 15.  Given a supply of soy-
beans for that year of S*, the demand shift 
would tend to raise the price from P  to P*.   
In this case, supply is so responsive to price 
changes (i.e., price elastic) that most of the 
adjustment to a successful promotion pro-
gram is manifest as an increase in output and 
sales (Q to Q*) rather than an increase in 
price.  Even though the price increase from 
the promotion-induced demand shift is mod-
erated by the vigorous supply response in 
this case, farm sales revenue increases by a 
greater percentage than the price increases 
over time because the quantity sold at the 
somewhat higher price also increases.   
 
Although the total cost of production also 
increases in this case, the increase in rev-
enue given a demand shift is greater than the  
cost increase so that the net effect on pro-
ducer profits is positive, represented by 
small blue lined area in Figure 15. Thus, 
while it could appear to individual producers 
that the promotion program was not highly 
successful because the price did not increase  
Figure 15: Demand Promotion Expendi-




















much or as much as expected over time, in 
fact the program is quite successful in boost-
ing farm revenues and even profits. 
 
A much less price-responsive supply (such 
as S’ in Figure 15), however, would result in 
a higher price increase (P0 to P’) relative to 
the increase in sales (Q to Q’) as a result of 
the same demand increase (D to D’) and, 
thus, a larger positive effect on farm profits 
(represented by the light red area in Figure 
15). 
 
Thus, the extent of the increase in farm prof-
its from a promotion-induced increase in 
demand depends on the responsiveness of 
supply to price over time (i.e., the long-run 
price elasticity of supply).  The stronger the 
competition from competing suppliers of a 
commodity, the more likely the long-run 
market supply curve will look like S* (price 





For example, if a U.S. industry faces stiff 
competition in an international market rela-
tively free of trade restrictions, a price rise 
induced by an increase in world demand will 
stimulate production not only in the U.S. but 
also in competing countries so that world 
supply increases by more than just the in-
crease in the U.S. supply.  Given the strong 
competition U.S. soybean producers face in 
the world market from South American pro-
ducers, any increase in world demand for 
soybeans is likely to generate a substantial 
increase in world soybean supply to meet 
that demand which would moderate any 
price increase that might be expected.   
 
The important issue, then, is the extent to 
which an increase in world soybean demand 
from checkoff supported promotion activi-
ties increases the U.S. share of increased 
world soybean sales compared to that of 
U.S. competitors in the world market. Given 
the intensity of competition in world soy-
bean and soybean product markets, the ef-
fects of a checkoff-supported international   
market promotion program on both the level 
and world market share of U.S. exports of 
soybeans and products is perhaps a better 
indicator of the successfulness of the pro-
gram than changes in U.S. soybean and 
product price. 
 
A number of researchers have reported that 
the supply response can effectively prevent a 
long-term rise in producer price or even 
completely offset the effects of producer-
funded commodity promotion programs.   
Two separate studies of the effectiveness of 
the soybean checkoff program (Williams   
1985 and Williams, Shumway, and Love 
2002) concluded that although the program 
was effective in expanding demand and gen-
erated a high benefit-cost ratio, the farm 
price of soybeans was not much affected as 
the result of supply expansion. 
 
Similar results have been found by other re-
searchers for other checkoff commodities.   
The problem of advertising response in an 
industry without supply controls was first 
discussed in a now classic article by Nerlove 
and Waugh in 1961. Nevertheless, relatively 
few studies of the effects of advertising have 
considered the possibility of a supply re-
sponse. Kinnucan, Nelson, and Xiao (1995) 
determined that supply response completely 
eliminated returns to advertising of catfish 
over time.   
 
Carman and Green (1993) found that while 
avocado producers benefitted from generic 
advertising during the initial years of the 
program (1960s and mid-1970s), supply ex-
pansion eventually led to negative returns to 
producers from continued advertising. While 
avocado producers existing at the time the 
advertising program was initiated benefitted, 
they conclude that "as acreage expanded, 
prices were forced down toward a level that 
would have existed for a smaller acreage 
without advertising. Now real returns per 
acre for avocados are similar to those that 
would have occurred without the advertising 
but the advertising has become a built-in 
cost." They question whether there are long-
run benefits to advertising in an industry 
without supply control. 
 
  Besides the complications of a potential 
supply response to a promotion program, the 
linkage between investments in demand 
promotion and the anticipated market effects 
is further complicated by a number of well 
documented characteristics of the response 
of sales to advertising and promotion pro-
grams: (1) the magnitude of the sales re-
sponse to promotion, (2) the minimum pro-
motion threshold, (3) the delay or lagged 
effect of promotion, (4) the carryover effects 
of promotion, (5) the decay of promotion 




The Magnitude of the Sales Response  
 
Research has shown that the sales response 
to advertising is normally positive and statis-
tically significant but fairly small in magni-
tude or elasticity (Williams and Nichols 
1998). Substantial advertising and promo-
tion expenditures may be necessary to 
achieve an acceptable sales response.  In ad-
dition, the particular type of promotion ac-
tivities undertaken may have differing levels 
of effectiveness and cost.  Unfortunately, 
little research has been done to indicate the 
relative effectiveness of different types of 
promotion activities in expanding sales. 
 
Most of the large commodity checkoff 
groups, like those for beef, pork, cotton, 
orange juice, and dairy, have focused in-
tensely on domestic market promotion 
through mass media advertising. Cost con-
siderations have forced most smaller com-
modity promotion groups to rely heavily on 
non-mass media forms of promotion.  Be-
cause soybeans and soybean products are 
sold primarily in wholesale markets, little 
retail-level media advertising is done to 
promote their demand either in this country 
or abroad. 
 
Unlike the cotton checkoff program, for ex-
ample, which has adopted a strategy of pro-
moting cotton directly to consumers as a 
preferred “ingredient” of clothes and other 
retail textile goods, the soybean checkoff 
program has historically opted to promote 
sales of soybeans and products through 
funding new use development, working di-
rectly with manufacturers and other indus-
trial users, and other forms of non-media 
advertising
14. Whether a media advertising 
or non-media promotion strategy is more 
                                                           
14  The several inset boxes presented on preceding pages provide 
some detail on the types of research, promotion, and producer 
communications activities  that are funded with soybean checkoff 
dollars. 
effective in boosting sales and the return to 
checkoff promotion dollars has received lit-
tle attention in the literature.  A recent study 
for milk in New York state markets suggests 
that both advertising and non-advertising 
promotion activities are effective in enhanc-
ing demand although advertising was found 
to be the most effective promotion strategy 
(Zheng and Kaiser 2009). 
 
The Minimum Promotion Threshold  
 
Some minimum level of promotion expendi-
tures and messages are normally required for 
the expenditures to begin having any effect.  
Below that level, promotion expenditures 
may be simply unable to generate sufficient 
recall or awareness to motivate consumers.  
Little research has been done to determine 
appropriate threshold levels.  Most certainly, 
however, the threshold level is different for 
each commodity (soybeans, soybean oil, and 
soybean meal), situation, time period, and 
world location. 
 
The Delay or Lagged 
Effect of Promotion  
 
Even if investments in promotion activities 
well above the threshold level are made, the 
investments may still take time to yield re-
sults depending on the type and objective of 
the promotion program (Williams 1991).   
Mass media advertising is often intended to 
generate an immediate response of sales ra-
ther than to generate brand loyalty and re-
peat sales. Non-mass media promotion ac-
tivities, however, are more often intended to 
generate streams of new revenues which 




Figure 16:  Delay, Carryover, and Decay Effects of 
Demand Promotion  
Time
Delay
A B C D
Aggregate Sales Impact
A = Initial treatment    B = First effects begin  C = Second treatment D = Third treatment
Consequently, the re-
sponse of sales to  non-
mass-media types of pro-
motion programs appar-
ently favored by the Unit-
ed Soybean Board may 
not be apparent for some 
time after initiation of the  
programs. Several expo-
sures to a promotion mes-
sage over time may be re-
quired before an individu-
al decides to buy (Lee, 
Brown, and Fairchild 
1989). Attempts to meas-
ure the effectiveness of the 
promotion effort in the 
early stages of the pro-
gram, therefore, may yield disappointing 
results. 
 
The Carryover Effects 
of Promotion  
 
Promotion expenditures in the current period 
often do not have their full impact within the 
current accounting period but continue to 
impact sales over an extended period of 
time.  This "carryover effect" has been re-
ported to last from 1 month up to 2 or more 
years depending on the commodity and the 
type of promotion activity (Jensen et al. 
1992). 
 
Some promotion programs are intended to 
have little or no carryover effects because 
they involve temporary specials or product 
attributes that will not continue (Forker and 
Ward 1993). For that type of advertising, the 
objective is an immediate response without 
any intent to gain consumer loyalty to the 
product.  Generic promotion activities, like 
those generally funded by soybean checkoff 
dollars in both the domestic and foreign 
markets, are generally directed toward long-
er-term responses and, therefore, have often 
been found to generate lengthy carryover 
effects  (Forker and Ward 1993).   
 
The Decay of Promotion Effects  
 
While the effects of promotion activities of-
ten persist beyond the period when the ex-
penditures are made, they do not last forev-
er.  A decay in those effects is expected after 
some period of time. Research shows that 
the promotion message will be forgotten if 
the potential users are not continuously ex-
posed to it (Zielske 1959).  Krugman (1972) 
concludes that continued expenditures on 
promotion are necessary because users filter 
messages and only respond when they are 
ready to make a purchase.  If  the user is in-
terested, relatively few exposures to the 
promotion message are necessary for an ef-
fect. Also, without repeated exposure to the 
message, the number of recalls decreases. 
 
Figure 16 illustrates a typical pattern of 
promotion effects on sales.  Following the 
initial treatment (expenditure) at point A, 
there is usually some delay before the ex-
penditures begin having an effect on sales at 
point B, assuming that the promotion ex- 
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penditures are above some threshold level. 
The maximum impact of the initial treatment 
in Figure 16 is eventually reached after 
which there is some decay in the sales ef-
fects.  The decay from the initial treatment 
can be avoided and aggregate sales boosted 
if additional expenditures are made before 
the decay begins (point B).  
 
Continued promotion treatments (expendi-
tures) (points C and D) can maintain the 
aggregate level of sales achieved with the 
first two treatments (dark black line in Fig-
ure 16).  Higher and higher expenditures, 
however, can push sales to higher levels 
while a drop off in the level of promotion 
expenditures results in a decay in the sales 
effects.  If promotion activities are ended 
altogether, the level of sales will taper off 
toward the pre-promotion program level 
over time. 
 
Research suggests, however, that because 
promotion programs may achieve some 
permanent change in user behavior, sales 
will not drop all the way back to pre-
program levels after a  promotion campaign. 
Forker and Ward (1993) note that without 
the decay phenomenon, there would be no 
reason for continued expenditures on pro-
motion activities after the initial effort. 
 
 
Advertising Wearout  
 
While continued expenditures can help stem 
the decay of the effects on sales of a given 
promotion program, it is possible that after 
long periods the promotion expenditures 
will begin to lose some of their original ef-
fects. This phenomenon, known as "adver-
tising wearout," was initially discussed for 
generic advertising of agricultural products 
by Kinnucan, Chang, and Venkateswaran 
(1993). Appel (1971) provides evidence that 
a particular promotion activity changes in 
effectiveness with the passage of time.  Re-
berte et al. (1996) found that two major ge-
neric milk advertising campaigns in New 
York City during the 1986 to 1992 period 
exhibited wearout. 
 
Most studies of the wearout phenomenon 
have focused on media advertising rather 
than generic commodity promotion. Even 
so, the concept may have important applica-
tions for non-media promotions of the type 
characteristic of soybean checkoff demand 
promotion expenditures. The effectiveness 
of feeding trials to demonstrate the im-
proved performance of livestock on ba-
lanced rations as a means of promoting the 
use of soybean meal in a country, for exam-
ple, will likely erode over time for many of 
the same reasons that a particular media ad-
vertising promotion program may suffer 
wearout. 
 
 The implication is that continued treatments 
over time are necessary to sustain the level 
of market sales impact achieved with the 
initial treatments. Conversely, allowing 
treatments to lapse (e.g., allowing  a decline 
in expenditures to promote the use of soy-
meal in balanced livestock rations in one or 
more countries) will result in a decline in 
sales revenues.  Achieving that same level of 
sales impact once again with increased fund-
ing will take time and additional potential 
revenues will be lost in the meantime. 
 
Overview of Research on Effectiveness 
of Commodity Research and 
Promotion Programs 
 
Early evaluation of the effectiveness of and 
producer returns from commodity checkoff 
programs relied largely on anecdotal evi-
dence and simple comparisons of gross 
promotion expenditures against changes in 
prices, profitability, and utilization of the 
commodities being promoted. During the  
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1970s, when commodity markets and pro-
ducer profits as well as voluntary checkoff 
program expenditures on research and de-
mand promotion for soybeans and a few 
other commodities were growing rapidly, 
this approach to evaluation yielded some 
persuasive stories and even more impressive 
upward-sloping graphical relationships be-
tween promotion expenditures and market 
prices, demand, and profits. 
 
The problem with simply comparing market 
trends and profits with checkoff program 
expenditures to measure program effective-
ness, of course, is that many factors other 
than the promotion expenditures affect the 
markets for agricultural commodities, in-
cluding events in related markets, the costs 
of inputs, currency exchange rate fluctua-
tions, the performance of U.S. and foreign 
macroeconomies, changes in consumer buy-
ing habits, and changes in government poli-
cies around the world to name just a few.  
This problem became rather apparent in the 
early 1980s for the voluntary checkoff pro-
grams in existence when commodity mar-
kets experienced a sharp, unexpected down-
turn despite continued expenditures by those 
checkoff programs for both  research and 
demand promotion. Such events, combined 
with concern over federal deficits and in-
tense scrutiny of federal programs, under-
scored the need to devise better means of 
isolating and measuring the unique contribu-
tion of commodity checkoff programs to the 
performance and profitability of the U.S. 
soybean sector. 
 
Studies on the Returns to 
 Investments in Research  
 
The evaluation of the economic returns to 
investments in agricultural research builds 
on the seminal work of T.W. Schultz and 
Zvi Griliches in the 1950s. Major contribu-
tions to both the theory and empirical litera-
ture concerned with measuring the returns to 
investments in the development and imple-
mentation of new technology subsequently 
have been made by a variety of researchers, 
including Evenson (1967), Peterson (1967), 
Huffman and Evenson (1993), Norton and 
Davis (1981), Fox (1985), Pardey and Craig 
(1989), Chavas and Cox (1992), and Yee 
(1995). 
 
Although empirical estimates of the rate of 
return to agricultural research vary by com-
modity, location, and method of estimation, 
they have been remarkably high. Recent 
work has addressed possible errors in earlier 
methods, including the failure to account for 
losses associated with tax collection to sup-
port public research (Fox 1985, Yee 1995).  
Nevertheless, estimates of the rate of return 
to public agricultural research are still above 
typical rates of return on private invest-
ments. 
 
Unfortunately, most studies on the returns to 
production research have held prices ex-
ogenous to the models used.  That is, the 
price-depressing effects of research-induced 
supply expansion over the years has not 
been generally accounted for in these stu-
dies. Because the demand for agricultural 
products is often price-inelastic, the negative 
price effects of research induced supply ex-
pansion over the years could turn positive 
measured welfare gains from such research 
into welfare losses. 
 
Although research on the economic returns 
to agricultural research investments in gen-
eral has been substantial, comparatively lit-
tle attention has been paid to the returns to 
commodity checkoff program expenditures 
on production research. Two of the more 
prominent of these studies consider the re-
turns to soybean producers from their in-
vestments in production research through 
the voluntary and mandatory soybean  
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checkoff programs. Lim, Shumway, and 
Love (2002) conclude that checkoff-funded 
expenditures on production research over   
1970-1994 returned $2.22 (present value) 
per dollar invested. They also found that re-
turns to yield-enhancing research was nega-
tive but highly positive for cost-reducing 
research and conclude that “yield-enhancing 
research should be discontinued as one of 
the Soybean Board’s investments” (p. 145). 
 
In a broader study of the soybean checkoff 
program, Williams, Shumway, and Love 
(2002) consider the returns to soybean 
checkoff expenditures on production re-
search and demand promotion together over 
the period of 1978-1994. For production re-
search expenditures, they find a negative 
return to producers and conclude that “pro-
duction research not only failed to recover 
its investment, it actually had a negative im-
pact on farmer net returns” (p. 109). 
 
Studies on the Return to Commodity Pro-
motion Expenditures 
 
Most studies of the effects of commodity 
advertising and promotion have focused on 
one or both of two related measures: (1) the 
responsiveness (i.e., elasticity) of sales or 
consumption of specific agricultural com-
modities to advertising campaigns and pro-
motion programs and/or (2) the benefits to 
producers from investing in  advertising and 
promotion.  
 
In either case, the major statistical challenge 
generally is to effectively isolate the effects 
of the promotion program from those of all 
other market forces. The most extensively 
studied commodity checkoff promotion pro-
grams have been those funded by nationally 
mandated programs, including dairy prod-
ucts, beef, pork, cotton, and soybeans. 
Among other salient studies of the effective-
ness of commodity checkoff advertising and 
promotion programs include those focusing 
on lamb, poultry, fats and oils, potatoes, 
orange juice, eggs, avocados, wool, apples, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and cigarettes. 
 
Sales Response to  
Promotion Studies  
 
Most studies of the effectiveness of com-
modity checkoff advertising and promotion 
programs measure and report the respon-
siveness of the sales of the corresponding 
checkoff commodity to changes in checkoff 
advertising and promotion expenditures. The 
advertising and promotion responsiveness is 
usually represented in the form of an "adver-
tising elasticity" which is the estimated per-
centage change in sales from a 1% change in 
advertising and promotion after controlling 
for all other factors that could affect sales. 
Kinnucan and Zheng (2009) provide an 
overview of some recent estimates of the 
checkoff advertising and promotion elastici-
ties for dairy, beef, pork, and cotton. Wil-
liams and Nichols (1998) provide a histori-
cal summary of the advertising and promo-
tion elasticities estimated across a broader 
range of commodities. 
 
One highly consistent finding across virtual-
ly all studies and all checkoff commodities 
is that the checkoff advertising and promo-
tion elasticities are quite small.  For U.S. 
fluid milk sales, for example, the reported 
estimated generic advertising elasticities 
have ranged from as low as 0.0018 (Kinnu-
can et al. 2001) to as high as 0.150 (Schmit 
et al. 2002). That is, a 1% change in adver-
tising has been estimated to have resulted in 
an increase in U.S. fluid milk sales of as low 
as 0.0018% and as high as 0.15%. Thus, a 
doubling of advertising expenditures (100% 
increase) would be expected to increase U.S. 
fluid milk sales by only between about 




For red meat, the estimated advertising elas-
ticities are equally small, ranging from a low 
of -0.00004 (Boetel and Liu 2003) to 0.028 
(Ward 2001) for beef and from -0.0005 
(Brester and Schroeder 1995) to 0.11 (Davis 
et al. 2001) for pork.  For lamb, Capps and 
Williams (2008) estimate the checkoff pro-
motion elasticity to be 0.044. 
 
For cotton and orange juice, the results are 
similar. Estimated cotton checkoff advertis-
ing and promotion elasticities range from 
0.023 (Murray, et al.) to 0.066 (Ding and 
Kinnucan 1996). A more recent and detailed 
study of the cotton checkoff program esti-
mates the retail-level advertising elasticity to 
be 0.05 and 0.03 for non-agricultural pro-
duction research. Williams, Capps, and 
Bessler (2004) estimated the orange juice 
checkoff program advertising and promotion 
elasticity at 0.127. In contrast, Ward (1988) 
found an orange juice advertising elasticity 
of 0.027 while Lee and Brown (1992) found 
an advertising elasticity of 0.01. 
 
For the soybean checkoff program, three 
studies have provided estimates of the 
checkoff promotion advertising elasticity.   
Since the soybean checkoff program pro-
motes both foreign and domestic demand for 
3 separate products (soybeans, soybean oil, 
and soybean meal), the studies estimated 
elasticities for each product in the U.S. and 
the foreign countries or regions in which 
promotion programs are conducted.  Wil-
liams (1985) estimated that the promotion 
elasticity of the foreign demand for soy-
beans ranged from 0.029 to 0.045 for the 
period of 1969 to 1979 depending on the 
country or region of promotion. For soymeal 
and soyoil, he estimated promotion elastici-
ties of between 0.037 and 0.061 and be-
tween 0.001 and 0.08, respectively. 
 
With updated data for the 1978-1994 period, 
Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002) esti-
mated the promotion elasticity for foreign 
soybean, soymeal, and soyoil demand to 
range from 0.023 to 0.068, 0.045 to 0.073, 
and 0.016 to 0.045, respectively, depending 
on the country or region of promotion. 
 
A 2003 study by World Perspectives, Inc. 
and AgriLogic, Inc. estimated a single  pro-
motion elasticity for the foreign export de-
mand for each of the three products: 0.357 
for soybeans, 0.819 for soymeal, and 1.46 
for soyoil. Obviously, these estimated pro-
motion elasticities are extremely high and 
well out of the range of those estimated for 
any other checkoff commodity. 
 
While the estimates of the advertising and 
promotion elasticities have ranged widely 
even for the same commodity in different 
studies, the consensus across a broad range 
of research is that: (1) advertising can, but 
does not always, effectively increase com-
modity sales and  (2) the response of sales to 
advertising (the advertising elasticity) for 
most commodities is small and usually in 
the range between close to zero and 0.1. 
  
Producer Benefits from Advertising 
and Promotion Studies 
 
Even though advertising and promotion is 
now generally considered to be effective at 
increasing sales of most checkoff commodi-
ties, the important question for the producers 
and others who pay for the programs is 
whether the increase in sales and revenues 
generated are sufficiently large to cover the 
costs of the related advertising and promo-
tion programs. A standard method of deter-
mining if advertising and promotion pay has 
been to calculate the average return per dol-
lar spent on advertising and promotion, i.e., 
a benefit-cost ratio (BCR),  as the increase 
in market sales revenue or cash receipts (net 
of promotion costs) per checkoff dollar  
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spent on advertising and promotion, referred 
to as a revenue BCR  (RBCR). 
When any additional production costs are 
first netted out of the additional revenue cal-
culated to be generated by the program, the 
resulting BCR can be referred to as a profit 
BCR (PBCR).  Sometimes economists use 
measures of the producer economic welfare, 
or producer surplus, generated by the pro-
gram instead of revenue or profit to calcu-
late a surplus BCR (SBCR).  
 
The BCR reported in many studies is a static 
or ceteris paribus measure of the effective-
ness of advertising and promotion.  In other 
words, many reported BCRs are calculated 
assuming that nothing (including prices) but 
demand changes when advertising expendi-
tures change.
15 A few studies report a more 
appropriate, dynamic BCR calculated as the 
sum of the returns to producers (in addition-
al sales, profits, or economic surplus) over 
time divided by total advertising and promo-
tion expenditures during that period, allow-
ing not just demand but also supply, prices, 
and other clearly endogenous variables to 
change in response to the advertising and 
promotion expenditures (e.g., Williams 
1985; Reberte, Schmit, and Kaiser 1996; 
Sellen, Goddard, and Duff 1997; Schmit et 
al. 2002; Williams, Shumway, and Love 
2002; Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2004; 
Capps and Williams 2006). To account for 
the time value of money, a dynamic BCR 
can be discounted to present value (i.e., a 
discounted BCR or DBCR) by first discount-
ing the calculated  returns to producers over 
time before dividing by total advertising and 
promotion expenditures. 
 
However calculated, an estimated BCR of 
greater than 1 is taken as an indication that 
the program is beneficial because sales, 
                                                           
15  In other words, the BCR is calculated from the regression coef-
ficient for advertising expenditures in the demand equation valued 
at the mean of historical demand. 
profits, or producer surplus have increased 
by more than one dollar for every dollar 
spent on advertising and promotion.  On the 
other hand, a BCR of less than 1 is taken to 
mean that advertising and promotion do not 
pay since each dollar spent generates less 
than a dollar in additional sales, profits, or 
producer surplus. 
 
Many studies report a “return on invest-
ment” (ROI) measure of the returns to pro-
ducers from checkoff advertising/promotion 
expenditures. Often, those studies actually 
report a BCR rather than a true ROI. Often 
referred to as the “marginal rate of return” 
(MRR), an ROI is properly calculated as the 
percentage increase in sales revenues (reve-
nue ROI), profits (profit ROI), or economic 
surplus (surplus ROI) from a 1% increase in 
advertising/promotion expenditures.   
 
The estimated advertising elasticities dis-
cussed in the preceding section provide 
some notion of a static or ceteris paribus 
advertising or promotion ROI (i.e., the reve-
nue, profit, or surplus ROI assuming that 
everything, including prices, except adver-
tising expenditures remain constant).  As 
with the BCR measure, an ROI would be 
more appropriately calculated as a dynamic 
concept, that is, as the percentage increase in 
the returns to producers (in additional sales, 
profits, or economic surplus) over time from 
a 1% increase in advertising and promotion 
expenditures in some initial period when all 
supply, demand, prices, and other endogen-
ous variables are allowed to change in re-
sponse to the change in the advertising and 
promotion expenditures. 
 
A dynamic ROI can also be discounted to 
account for the time value of money and 
then compared to the rates of return from 
alternative investment opportunities to pro-
vide a measure of the successfulness of the 
commodity promotion investments in terms  
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of the opportunity costs of the funds used for 
advertising and promotion. Unfortunately, 
no study has reported measuring the effec-
tiveness of advertising and promotion using 
a dynamic ROI calculation. 
 
Most commodity checkoff program studies 
have found that advertising/promotion in-
crease sales revenues (gross or net of costs) 
by more than the cost of the advertising and 
promotion programs generating those reve-
nues. In most cases, the calculated BCRs 
have been found to be much in excess of 1. 
 
For fluid milk, for example, the estimated 
return ranges from $1.85 to $7.04 (Table 2). 
A more recent study by Kaiser (2000) esti-
mated the fluid return to advertising to be 
$4.3.  Other studies focusing on diverse 
checkoff commodities such as beef, pork, 
lamb, orange juice, cotton, eggs, and rice 
have likewise reported impressive returns 
from their respective advertising and promo-
tion programs (Table 2). 
 
For the soybean checkoff program over the 
1978-1994 period, Williams, Shumway, and 
Love (2002) estimated a producer profit ROI 
of $8 ($5 when discounted to present value 
over the life of the program). Using a model 
that the authors admit basically “mimicked” 
that of Williams, Shumway, and Love 
(2002), World Perspectives, Inc. and Agri-
Logic, Inc. (2002) estimated a producer 
profit BCR for the soybean checkoff pro-
gram of $6.75 for the 1995-2001 period.   
 
The estimated BCRs for many other check-
off commodities are similar to those pre-
sented here in terms of both magnitude and 
range. The consensus across a wide range of 
studies by many researchers covering a large 
number of checkoff commodities seems to 
be that the return to producers from advertis-
ing and promotion by commodity checkoff  
organizations is positive.  That is, in general, 
commodity checkoff program advertising 
and promotion have been found not only to 
increase sales but to increase sales by more 
than enough to cover the costs of the adver-
tising and promotion activities. 
 
Although the estimated level of return per 
dollar spent in advertising varies widely 
across commodities, countries, and time 
periods, the BCRs calculated by most stu-
dies for domestic advertising and promotion 
programs fall in the range of about $2 to 
$10. Unfortunately, most of these studies 
ignore cross-promotion effects, i.e., the ef-
fects of promoting one commodity on the 
sales of another. Thus, for example, expend-
itures that successfully promote the demand 
for pork likely shift some consumption from 
beef to pork, reducing beef consumption and 
offsetting the effects of beef promotion ex-
penditures on the demand for beef.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
o measure and compare the returns to 
soybean checkoff program invest-
ments in research and demand pro-
motion, the first step was to isolate the 
effects of those investments in domestic 
and foreign soybean and soybean product 
markets from those of other events that may 
have affected those same markets over the 
years. For this purpose, soybean checkoff 
research, domestic promotion, and for-
eign demand promotion stock variables 
were constructed and incorporated into a 
world model of soybeans and soybean 
products. The model was then simulated 
over the 1980/81 to 2006/07 under alterna-
tive assumptions regarding soybean check-
off research and demand and international 
market promotion expenditure levels and the 
results used to calculate benefit-cost ratios 





Table 2: Returns to Generic Commodity Promotion, Selected Studies
a 
Commodity/Study             Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) 
 
 
Milk - Fluid  
  Liu et al. (1989) 
  Ward and McDonald (1986) 
   Kaiser (2000) 
 
Meat 
  Beef:   Ward (2001) 
  Pork:   Davis et al. (2001) 
  Pork:   Sellen, Goddard, and Duff (1997) 
  Lamb: Capps and Williams (2008) 
 
Soybeans 
  Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002) 
 World  Perspectives/AgriLogic (2003) 
 
Orange Juice 
  Lee and Fairchild (1988) 
  Capps, Williams, and Bessler (2004) 
 
Cotton 
  Capps et al. (1996) 
  Murray et al.  (2001) 
  Capps and Williams (2006) 
 
Eggs 
  Schmit, Reberte, and Kaiser (1996) 
  Reberte, Schmit, and Kaiser (1996) 
 
Rice   Rusmevichientong and Kaiser (2009) 
average $ earned per  


















                     6.1 (2.9) 
 
 
3.23 to 3.49 
3.2 to 6.0 









          a  BCRs in parentheses are discounted to present value. 
        
b  Depending on the magnitude of the assumed prices elasticity of excess supply. 
    
 
The Structural Model  
 
The analysis of the returns to producers 
from the soybean checkoff program in this 
study utilizes a fifth generation, 180-
equation, annual econometric, non-spatial,  
 
 
price equilibrium simulation model of world 
soybean and soybean product markets 
(SOYMOD5) (see Williams 1981, Williams 
and Thompson 1984, Williams 1985, Wil-
liams 1994, Williams 1999, and Williams 
Shumway, and Love 2002 for more details  
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on the model).  Because they all have their 
roots in the early work of Houck, Ryan, and 
Subotnik (1972), SOYMOD5 is similar in 
form and specification to the world oilseed 
models utilized by Meilke and Griffith 
(1983) and more recently by Meilke, Wens-
ley, and Cluff (2001). 
 
SOYMOD5 allows for the simultaneous de-
termination of the supplies, demands, prices, 
and trade of soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil 
in six major world trading regions: (1) the 
United States, (2) Brazil, (3) Argentina, (4) 
the European Union, (5) Japan, and (6) a 
Rest-of-the-World region which accounts 
for the effects of China and other new 
growth areas in world soybean markets. The 
domestic market of each region in the model 
is divided into four simultaneous blocks of 
equations: (1) a soybean block, (2) a soy-
bean meal block, (3) a soybean oil block, 
and (4) an excess supply or excess demand 
block (Figure 17).  For each region, the first 
three blocks contain behavioral relationships 
specifying the manner in which soybean 
supply (acreage planted, acreage harvested, 
soybean yields, and production), soybean 
domestic demand (crush and stocks), and the 
supply, consumption, and stocks of soybean 
meal and soybean oil behave in response to 
changes in variables like prices of soybeans 
and products, prices of various competing 
commodities, technology, income, livestock 
production and prices, government policy, 
etc. as appropriate. 
 
For the U.S., the soybean block contains re-
gional rather than national acreage planted, 
acreage harvested, yield, and production eq-
uations (equation (1) in Figure 17) for seven 
production regions (Atlantic, Cornbelt, Del-
ta, Lakes, Plains, South, and Other) to 
represent the soybean supply relationship 
and account for interregional competition 
within the United States: 
 
[1] ASkt  =  ASkt(PS   , RSkt, αkt ), 
 
[2] HSkt  =  HSkt(ASkt),  
 
[3] YSkt  =  YSkt(RSkt, Θkt ), 
 
[4] SSkt  = YSkt    HSkt , 
 
where k = production region 1,..., 7; t = time 
period; AS = soybean acreage planted; HS = 
soybean acreage harvested; YS= soybean 
yield; SS = soybean production; RS = soy-
bean research stock variable; α and θ are ap-
propriate shift variables and PS
e = expected 
soybean farm price for each region: 
 
[5] PS
e = MAX(PSt-1, LSt)  D5901 +  
                MAX(PSt-1, 0.85  TSt + 0.15   
                 LSt)  D0207 
 
where LS = the soybean loan rate; TS = 
soybean target price; D5901 = indicator va-
riable which equals 1 for 1959/60 through 
2001/02 and 0 otherwise; and  D0207 = in-
dicator variable which equals 1 for 2002/03 
through 2007/08 and 0 otherwise. 
 
The soybean research stock variables (RSk) 
used in equations (1) and (3) were devel-
oped by Bessler (2009) based on two main 
results from previous research on the returns 
to research: (1) research benefits are not 
immediate so that a lag exists from the time 
the expenditures are made and possible real 
time adoption of results in the field and (2) 
research results from many years ago may 
still be yield benefits for a number of years 
into the future.  Consequently, the RSk are 
formed as weighted averages of historical 
soybean checkoff expenditures on produc-
tion research at the national and state level 
measured in constant dollars to account for 
the time lag in the impact of  research ex-





















(12) Soyoil ES (ESO ) = OS  - OD -    OI  (25) Soyoil ED (EDO ) = OD  +   OI - OS 
(11) Soybean ES (ESS ) = SP  - CD -    SI 
(13) Soymeal ES (ESM ) = MS  - MD -    MI 
SOYBEAN BLOCK 
(1) Soybean Production (SP ) i
(2) Soybean Crush Demand (SD ) i
(3) Soybean Stock Demand (SI ) i
SOYBEAN MEAL BLOCK
(4) Soymeal Production (MS ) i
(5) Soymeal Demand (MD ) i
(6) Soymeal Stock Demand (MI ) i
SOYBEAN OIL BLOCK
(7) Soyoil Production (OS ) i
(8) Soyoil Demand (OD ) i
(9) Soyoil Stock Demand (OI ) i
 Block Price Linkage
(10) Crush Margin (CM ) =







   EXCESS SUPPLY (ES) BLOCK
i ii i
i ii i
Domestic Market of Exporter i
(24) Soybean ED (EDS ) = CD  +   SI - SP 
(26) Soymeal ED (EDM ) = MD +   MI - MS 
SOYBEAN BLOCK 
(14) Soybean Production (SP ) j
(15) Soybean Crush Demand (SD ) j
(16) Soybean Stock Demand (SI ) j
SOYBEAN MEAL BLOCK
(17) Soymeal Production (MS ) j
(18) Soymeal Demand (MD ) j
(19) Soymeal Stock Demand (MI ) j
SOYBEAN OIL BLOCK
(20) Soyoil Production (OS ) j
(21) Soyoil Demand (OD ) j
(22) Soyoil Stock Demand (OI ) j
 Block Price Linkage
(23) Crush Margin (CM ) =







   EXCESS DEMAND (ED) BLOCK
j jj j
j jj j
Domestic Market of Importer j
(30)   ESS  =    EDS  i i j j
(31)   ESM =    EDM  i i j j
(32)   ESO  =   EDO  i i j j
International Trade Flow Linkages
(27) PS  =  ZS    PS   +  ZS i1 i j j 2 i j
(28) PM  =  ZM    PM   +  ZM i 1ij j 2ij
(29) PO  =  ZO    PO   +  ZO i 1ij j 2ij
International Price Linkages
1
Note:  i = any exporter i=1, ... , n; and j = any importer j=1, ... , k.  Also,      should be read "change in."
The Z  and  Z   include all multiplicative (e.g. exchange rates and ad valorem subsidies) and additive (transportation costs, specific tariffs, etc.) measures  that come between prices of country i and j. 1
2      and      are meal and oil extraction rates; PS, PO, and PM are soybean, soyoil, soymeal prices. 
12
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s [6] RSk = Σ rISt-r,    Σ t  =1, 
 
 
where ISt  = ISt/pt  is the constant-dollar re-
search investment in year t, ISt is the nomin-
al-dollar research investment in year t, pt is 
the corresponding research price index, λr is 
the weight on the constant dollar research 
expenditures lagged r years and i is the 
number of years before the first impact and s 
is the lag length over which research in-
vestments are expected to impact farm deci-
sions. The RSk are proxies for the quantity 
of effective research. 
 
To determine which of several alternative 
weighting schemes and lag structures on re-
search investment is preferred for purposes 
of defining research stock variables, Bessler 
(2009) conducts a series of model specifica-
tion tests, balancing fit and forecasts (or par-
simony) in possible models. The metric used 
is that of Hannan and Quinn
16, given as:     
 
[7] Mk   =  ln(Fk
2 )   +  [2k (ln(ln(T)))]/T,        
 
which has two components: (1) ln(Fk
2 ) 
which falls as more terms are added to the 
right hand side of the models tested where ln 
is the natural logarithm transformation and 
Fk
2 is the residual error variance from fit 
versions of the model with k lags and (2) a 
penalty function which increases with more 
complex models. 
 
The model specification that minimizes the 
Hannah and Quinn criterion (the sum of 
both terms) indicates a delay of four periods 
between actual expenditures of check-off 
production research dollars and new tech-
nology adoption and use in the field.  Bess-
ler selects (somewhat arbitrarily) an upper 
bound of ten lags since he could not search 
                                                           
16  For more discussion on this metric see Geweke and Meese 
(1981). 
over more than 10 years due to degrees of 
freedom limitations. The resulting research 
stock (RSt) measure developed by Bessler 
(2009) and used in equations [1] and [3] is a 
convex combination of research expendi-
tures for the years t-4, t-5, t-6, t-7, t-8, t-9, t-
10, with respective weights of .10, .20, .20, 
.20, .20, .05, and .05.  Other weight patterns 
explored gave generally the same results
17.  
 
The specification of the domestic demands 
(D) in the soybean, soybean meal, and soy-
bean oil blocks of SOYMOD5 (correspond-
ing to equations (2), (5), and (8) for any ex-
porting region i and equations (15), (18), 
and (21) for any importing region j in Figure 
17) include promotion stock variables, often 
referred to as “goodwill” variables (G), to 
capture the effects of soybean check-off 
funded promotion activities in each region 
where such activities have been conducted: 
 
[8] Dist  =  Dist(Pist, Gist, ßist), 
 
where i = world region {1, ... , 6}; s = com-
modity {soybeans, soybean meal, and soy-
bean oil}; t = time period; P = domestic 
market price; and β represents appropriate 
shift variables. 
 
The Gij (promotion stock variables) used as 
regressors in the appropriate SOYMOD5 
demand equations were constructed follow-
ing Williams (1999) and Williams, Shum-
way, and Love (2002) as weighted averages 
of the respective inflation- and exchange-
adjusted expenditures on promotion activi-
ties in each region as appropriate. To capture 
diminishing marginal returns to domestic 
and foreign checkoff promotion expendi-
tures, a square root transformation of the Gij 
was used. In most applications of evaluating 
                                                           
17  See chapter 3 of Alston, Norton and Pardey (1998) for a general 




the effectiveness of promotion campaigns, a 
logarithmic transformation of promotion ex-
penditures is useful to capture diminishing 
marginal returns. However, because of the 
presence of zero promotion expenditures for 
some commodities in some years, a square 
root transformation was used instead.  
 
To account for the time lag in the impact of 
the promotion investments on the soybean, 
soybean meal, and soybean oil demands in 
each region, Williams (1999) and Williams, 
Shumway, and Love (2002) used a second 
order polynomial inverse lag (PIL) formula-
tion based on Mitchell and Speaker (1986).  
An alternative lag formulation commonly 
used in the analysis of advertising effective-
ness is the Almon polynomial distributed lag 
(PDL).  Other  lag models have been em-
ployed in the literature on checkoff promo-
tion programs, including moving averages 
and unrestricted lags of varying lengths. 
 
The lag formulation and lag length used for 
each demand equation for each commodity 
(soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil) in each re-
levant region of the model (U.S., EU15/27, 
Japan, and the Rest-of-the-World) were se-
lected using the process described earlier for 
production research expenditures.  Although 
the PIL does not require specifying the lag 
length, it is conceptually an infinite lag.   
Thus, the use of the PIL lag formulation im-
poses the assumption on the model that ad-
vertising expenditures in one period have 
infinitely long impacts over time on con-
sumption.  Consequently, in testing for lag 
length, the PIL model was not included leav-
ing the PDL formulation, moving averages, 
and simple lags of varying lengths as the 
potential lag formulations to be considered.  
The search for the pattern and time period 
over which soybean checkoff promotion ex-
penditures influence soybean and soybean 
product demand in each region in the model 
involved a series of nested OLS regressions. 
For each lag formulation considered, lags of 
up to 10 years were considered and for the 
PDL up to fourth degree polynomials with 
alternative choices of head and tail restric-
tions. Based on a composite set of criteria, 
including the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), the Schwarz statistic, the Hannan-
Quinn criterion, and  heuristic measures
18 
(i.e., the number of significant parameters 
and number of expected signs on own-price 
demand response), a second order PDL of 
two lags with head and tail restrictions was 
selected for U.S. soybeans, soymeal, and 
soyoil demand functions. 
 
For foreign market demands, simple, one-
year lags of the square root transformation 
of the respective Gij were selected using the 
same criteria. Before  being transformed in 
this way, however, the Gij for the U.S. and 
foreign markets were first deflated by the 
wholesale price index in the respective re-
gions and then the foreign Gij were con-
verted from U.S. dollars to foreign currency 
with the respective exchange rates.  
 
Simultaneous interaction of soybean and 
soybean product markets within each region 
in SOYMOD5 is insured through the endo-
genous soybean crush margin (equations 
(10) and (23) in Figure 17) which is the own 
price variable in the crush demand equations 
((2) and (15) in Figure 17). The fourth block 
in each domestic market (equations (11)-
(13) and (24)-(26) in Figure 17) of the mod-
el includes net excess supply relationships 
for exporting regions and net excess demand 
relationships for importing regions specified 
as the residual differences between their re-
spective domestic supply and demand sche-
dules. 
                                                           
18 The heuristic aspect of the composite criteria may be viewed as 
ad hoc but is equivalent to restricting the class of models to be 
only those consistent with underlying theory.  This procedure is 
commonly encountered in the literature, especially in analyses 
where equilibrium displacement models are used and only parame-
ter values consistent with theory are utilized.  
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Because of the important simultaneous inte-
raction between the U.S. soybean and corn 
markets, SOYMOD5 also includes a model 
of the U.S. corn market.  The specification 
of the U.S. supply and demand blocks of the 
corn model is similar to that for soybeans.  
The U.S. corn market model, however, is 
closed with a world corn import demand eq-
uation. 
 
The soybean and soybean product markets 
of the trading countries in the model are 
linked through international price and trade 
flow relationships.  The prices of soybeans, 
soymeal, and soyoil in exporting and im-
porting regions are linked through price 
transmission equations (equations (27)-(29) 
in Figure 17) following Bredahl, Meyers, 
and Collins (1979) which account for the 
effects of exchange rates as well as tariffs, 
export subsidies, border taxes, transportation 
costs, etc. and other factors (the Zij) that 
drive a wedge between prices in each world 
region. International market clearing condi-
tions (equations (30)-(32) in Figure 17) re-
quire equality of the world excess supply 
and demand for soybeans, soymeal, and 
soyoil in each time period. 
 
Figure 18 summarizes the many dimensions 
of SOYMOD5. The model includes acreage, 
yield, production, consumption, inventory, 
price, and trade relationships and operates at 
both the farm and wholesale levels in all 
countries and regions for four products 
(corn, soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil).  The 
U.S. model includes seven production 
regions and the full model includes six trad-




SOYMOD5 includes 180 equations and en-
dogenous variables and 409 exogenous va-
riables. Two types of data were needed for 
the analysis of the soybean checkoff pro-
gram: (1) data to support SOYMOD5 (e.g., 
supply, demand, trade, price, policy, etc. da-
ta by country and commodity over time) and 
(2) soybean checkoff and related expendi-
tures over time. 
  
The first set of data relate to most of the 
model endogenous and exogenous variables 
(supply, demand, trade, price, policy, etc. by 
country and commodity over time) and are 
taken from numerous public sources, includ-
ing USDA (for example, USDA-ERS, US-
DA-FAS, and USDA-NASS) for 1959/60 
through 2006/07 as available. The full data 
base is compiled, published, and available in 
TAMRCd (2009).  
 
Three types of soybean checkoff and related 
expenditures were needed for the analysis: 
(1) national and state-level expenditures for 
soybean production research, (2) national 
and state-level expenditures to promote soy-
beans and products in the United States, and 
(3) national and state-level international 
market promotion expenditures. The nation-
al and state-level soybean research expendi-
ture data for 1970/71 through 2006/07 were  
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provided by Keith Smith and Associates.   
These data are compiled, published, and 
available in TAMRCc (2009).  Unfortunate-
ly, the production research data for 1996/97 
through 1999/00 were not collected and 
maintained and, thus, were interpolated fol-
lowing a random walk model (Bessler 
2009). 
 
National-level (USB) data on expenditures 
to promote the domestic demand of soy-
beans, soymeal, and soyoil were provided by 
Smith Bucklin Corp., a management con-
tractor of the United Soybean Board.  Unfor-
tunately, data for state-level (QSSB) ex-
penditures to promote domestic and interna-
tional soybean and product demand have not 
been systematically collected and main-
tained.  Both Williams, Shumway, and Love 
(2002) and World Perspectives, Inc./ Agri-
Logic, Inc. (2003)  reported the same prob-
lem with the QSSB promotion expenditure 
data in their studies of the soybean checkoff 
program. Williams, Shumway, and Love 
(2002) attempted to collect the needed data 
by survey but report that the data they col-
lected “were fragmentary, highly inconsis-
tent in quality, type, time period, and level 
of aggregation” and, therefore, not useful for 
analytical purposes (p. 103). 
 
Undaunted, the authors of this study once 
again attempted to collect state-level domes-
tic and international promotion expenditure 
data from the QSSBs for the period since the 
implementation of the national soybean 
checkoff program. Because many QSSBs 
had not changed their expenditure data col-
lection and maintenance practices since the 
first attempt to collect that data by Williams, 
Shumway, and Love (2003) in the mid-
1990s, many simply reported that the data 
were not available or reported a few years of 
sketchy data that had been kept.  A few state 
QSSBs, notably those in Kansas, Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, the Northeast Region, Ohio, Ten-
nessee, and Texas, provided good records of 
expenditures for that time period. Several 
others provided what little they had.  In the 
end, however, the result was the same as be-
fore in that the data in the aggregate were 
too full of holes and inconsistent in time pe-
riod, coverage, and other details to be useful 
for analysis. Consequently, in the analysis of 
domestic and international promotion pro-
grams, only national-level data are used. All 
domestic promotion expenditure data col-
lected, at both the national and state-level, 
are compiled, published, and available in 
TAMRCa (2009). 
 
Data on national-level international demand 
promotion expenditures by product, country, 
and contributor for 1970/71 through 2006/07 
were compiled from various sources, pri-
marily the American Soybean Association 
(ASA), the U.S. Soybean Export Council 
(USSEC), the USDA Foreign Agriculture 
Service (FAS), and the United Soybean 
Board (USB). The data used are compiled, 
published, and available in TAMRCb 
(2009).  Although fragmentary at best, 
available soybean international market pro-
motion expenditure data prior to 1970/71 
indicate that the international promotion 
program was quite small during that period 
and that promotion activities occurred al-
most entirely in Japan. Consequently, soy-
bean and product international market pro-
motion expenditures were assumed to be 
zero for the pre-1970/71 period. 
 
Model Parameter Estimation 
and Validation  
 
The parameters of the U.S. soybean supply 
and corn blocks of the model were estimated 
using the Nonlinear Iterative Seemingly Un-
related Regression (ITSUR) estimator with 
annual data for 1970/71 through 2006/07.   
Normalization by an exogenous input price  
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index maintained linear homogeneity in 
prices. 
 
In their model of U.S. regional soybean 
supply, Lim, Shumway, and Love (2000) 
also maintained symmetry among cross-
price parameters.  Negative estimated own-
price elasticities of supply in their model, 
however, led them to square the own-price 
parameters to force upward slopes on 
supply. The consequence was own-price 
elasticities that were extremely close to zero 
in most cases and not statistically significant 
in all but one U.S. soybean production re-
gion and two corn production regions.  In 
addition, tests for nonjoint production in 
each region of the Lim, Shumway, and Love 
model led to the “surprising” conclusion that 
soybeans are not jointly produced with corn 
or any other commodity in any region. 
 
Given the questionable and counterintuitive 
econometric results of Lim, Shumway, and 
Love, the specification of the equations in 
the U.S. soybean and corn supply blocks of 
SOYMOD was simplified, including relax-
ing the symmetry condition.  The estimated 
parameters of the behavioral equations in all 
production regions in both blocks are uncon-
strained, consistent with a priori expecta-
tions in sign and magnitude, and statistically 
significant.  All Durbin-h and Durbin Wat-
son statistics indicate no evidence of auto-
correlation. 
 
As expected, the responsiveness of soybean 
acreage and yield to changes in both the 
soybean farm price and the soybean research 
stock, particularly over the long-run, is gen-
erally higher outside the Cornbelt in the less 
traditional and more marginal regions of 
soybean production (Table 3). Both price 
and research stock elasticities for planted 
acreage and yield are similar across regions 
and of the same order of magnitude and sta-
tistical significance as those estimated by 
Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002).  The 
main exception is that the estimated rela-
tionships between the acreage planted in the 
Atlantic, Delta, and South regions and the 
respective research regional stock variables 
in this study were not found to be statistical-
ly significant.  Consequently, in the simula-
tion analysis of the effectiveness of the soy-
bean checkoff program discussed later in 
this study, the coefficients of the research 
stock variables in those three regions were 
set to zero. 
 
The remaining parameters of the model were 
estimated by means of a truncated two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) procedure based on 
principal components using data for 1969/70 
to 2006/07
19 in most cases. The use of a sys-
tems estimator like three-sage least squares 
was deemed impractical since the common 
time period over the  large dataset required 
to support the model was only about 27 
years so that the cost in terms of lost de-
grees of freedom would be likely to be at 
least as large as any gain in efficiency that 
might be achieved.  
 
The model regression statistics indicate an 
excellent fit of the data.  Also, the signs and 
sizes of all estimated parameters in each 
model equation are consistent with a priori 
expectations.  Details of the full model, es-
timated parameters, and regression statistics, 
are provided in Appendix 1 with  variable 
definitions in Appendix Table 2. 
 
The estimated direct price and promotion 
stock elasticities of demand are provided in 
Table 4. In each case, the promotion stock 
elasticities are quite small and consistent in 
both magnitude and sign with the results of 
Williams, Shumway, and Love (2003) as  
                                                           
19 The 2SLS, principal components estimator used here, and first 
proposed by Kloek and Mennes (1960), is consistent since it may 
be reduced to an instrumental variables estimator (Brundy and 























        0.046* 
      0.040*** 
  0.034* 
  0.059** 
0.029* 
0.031** 
Japan  0.020*  -0.316*  -0.219*          0.029**     0.043*  0.020*** 
ROW   -1.00
d -.80
d   -.80
d          0.063**     0.062  0.052** 
a All elasticities evaluated at the means of the data..  * = significant at the 1% level. **= significant at the 5% level, and ***=significant at the 
10% level. 
b Elasticities of domestic demand with to respect to the gross soybean crushing margin for the U.S., EU-15/27, and Japan and elasticity of import 
demand with respect to soybean price for the Rest-of-the-World (ROW). 
c Direct price elasticities of domestic demand for U.S., EU-15/27 and Japan and direct import demand elasticities for ROW. 
d For the ROW (Rest-of-the-World) region, price elasticities are constrained. 
Table 3.  SOYMOD5 Estimated U.S. Soybean Acreage and Yield Elasticities




U.S. Planted Acreage    U.S. Yield 
Soybean Farm Price    Research Stock
b   Research  Stock 
Short Run  Long Run    Short Run  Long Run    Short Run  Long Run 
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0.0176* 
     
0.0253**   












    0.2107* 
 
a Elasticities evaluated at the means of the data based on the coefficients used in the simulation model.    * = coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
**= coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
b  Because the 
  estimated coefficients of the research stock variables for planted acreage in the Atlantic, Delta, and South regions were not signifi-




well as with studies of other checkoff com-
modities (see earlier section on “Studies on 
the Return to Commodity Promotion Ex-
penditures” to compare these results to those 
of other Studies).  Most estimated promotion 
stock elasticities are statistically significant 
at the 1% or 5% level. 
 
Validation of the structural model included 
both a check of the dynamic, within-sample 
(ex-post) simulation statistics for the fully 
simultaneous structural model and a sensi-
tivity analysis to check the stability of the 
model.  The common time period across all 
data types defined 1980/81 to 2006/07 as the 
period for the simulation analysis of the ef-
fectiveness of the soybean checkoff pro-
gram. Dynamic simulation statistics (e.g., 
the root mean squared error, Theil inequality 
coefficients, and the Theil error decomposi-
tion proportions) were calculated from simu-
lating the full model over the 1980/81 
to2006/07 sample period, i.e., the baseline 
historical simulation (see Appendix Table 
3).  Those statistics indicate a highly satis-
factory fit of the historical, dynamic simula-
tion solution values to observed data. 
The Theil U coefficients were small with all 
less than 0.4. The Theil bias error proportion 
indicated no systematic deviation of simu-
lated from actual data values for any of the 
endogenous variables. To check the stability 
of the model, a test of the sensitivity of the 
model to a one-period shock in checkoff in-
vestments was conducted. First, nominal 
checkoff investments both in U.S. soybean 
production research and in demand promo-
tion in the U.S. and across all importing re-
gions and all commodities were increased by 
10% in 1980/81 (the first year of the simula-
tion sample period).  The respective invest-
ment stock variables were then re-generated 
and the model was re-simulated over the 27-
year period of 1980/81 to 2006/07.  Follow-
ing the initial period shock, all endogenous 
variables returned to equilibrium within a 
reasonable time period (most within 5-10 
years) indicating that the model is highly 
stable to changes in checkoff investments 
over time.  
 
 





ecall that the primary objective of 
this analysis of the effectiveness of 
the soybean checkoff program is to 
answer two key questions: 1) What have 
been the effects of the soybean checkoff 
program over time on U.S. and world soy-
bean and soybean product markets (supplies, 
demands, prices, trade, etc.) and (2) Have 
soybean producers benefitted from the soy-
bean checkoff program and, if so, by how 
much? To answer these questions, two sce-
narios were analyzed using SOYMOD5 (as 
developed and presented earlier in this re-
port):  (1) a with soybean checkoff expendi-
tures scenario (referred to as the “with sce-
nario”) and (2) a without soybean checkoff 
expenditures scenario (referred to as the 
“without scenario”). 
 
The with scenario represents actual history, 
that is, the level of supply, demand, prices, 
trade, etc. in world soybean and soybean 
product markets that include any effects on 
those markets from soybean checkoff ex-
penditures in the U.S. and around the world. 
The  with scenario analysis was conducted 
through historical simulation of SOYMOD5 
over the 1980/81 through 2006/07 period of 
analysis to generate a baseline scenario of 
the endogenous variables in the model (e.g., 
production, demand, prices, trade, etc.) that 
closely replicate the actual, historical values 





Because the baseline historical simulation 
for this study was generated in the process 
of validating SOYMOD5, the accuracy of 
the model in tracking the historical values of 
model values can be determined through in-
spection of the baseline simulation statistics 
discussed earlier and presented in Appendix 
Table 3. The statistics show that the model 
replicates the functioning of U.S. and world 
soybean markets extremely well and that the 
baseline simulation of the model variables 
fits the historical data equally as well. 
 
 The  without scenario analysis was con-
ducted by setting the historic values of soy-
bean checkoff production research and U.S. 
and international market promotion expendi-
tures to zero in SOYMOD5 and then  simu-
lating the model again over the 1980/81 to 
2006/07 period of analysis to generate new 
values for U.S. and world soybean and 
product production, consumption, trade, 
prices, etc. Because the changes in the en-
dogenous model variables in this without  
scenario were generated by changing only 
the levels of checkoff expenditures, they 
represent those that would have existed over 
time if there had been no checkoff program.   
Differences in the simulated levels of the 
model variables (world supplies, demand, 
prices, trade, etc.) in the with scenario from 
those in the without scenario are then taken 
as direct measures of the effects of the 
checkoff expenditures. Because no other ex-
ogenous variable in the model (e.g., levels of 
inflation, exchange rates, income levels, 
agricultural and trade policies, etc.) other 
than checkoff expenditures is allowed to 
change in either scenario, this process effec-
tively isolates the effects of the soybean 
checkoff program on the U.S. and world 
soybean markets, prices, and trade. That is, 
the simulated differences between the values 
of the endogenous variables from the with 
checkoff expenditure scenarios and from the 
without checkoff expenditures scenario in 
which those expenditures are set to zero 
provide direct measures of the historical ef-
fects of the soybean checkoff expenditures 
(and only those expenditures) on the U.S. 
and world soybean and product markets. 
 
The analysis of the effectiveness of the soy-
bean checkoff program begins by consider-
ing the first question posed earlier through 
an examination of the simulated effects of 
the soybean checkoff program on U.S. and 
world soybean product markets, that is, the 
differences between the with and without 
scenario results. Then the second question is 
considered by using the scenario analysis 
results to conduct a benefit-cost analysis of 
the soybean checkoff program over the 
1980/81-2006/07 period of analysis at the 
soybean grower level.  
 
Effects of the Soybean Checkoff Program 
on U.S. and World Soybean and Soybean 
Product Markets 
 
A comparison of the with and without sce-
nario analyses indicates clearly that the soy-
bean checkoff program has been effective in  
increasing U.S. soybean production, crush, 
exports, price, world market share, and pro-
ducer profits. The results indicate that, on 
average between 1980/81 and 2006/07, U.S. 
soybean planted acreage was 3.7% higher in 
each year than would have been the case in 
the absence of the soybean checkoff pro-
gram (Table 5). Likewise, U.S. soybean 
production was higher by 4.2%, soybean 
farm price by 1.6%, and soymeal price by 
2.1% on average in each year as a result of 
the checkoff program. 
 
On the other hand, the net effects on the   
soyoil price and the crush margin were 
slightly negative over the full 1980/81-
2006/07 period (Table 5).  The negative re-
sult for the soyoil price is likely the result of 
at least two factors: (1) the declining share  
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of expenditures allocated to soyoil in inter-
national market promotion in recent years 
and (2) the increasing relative importance of 
domestic promotion programs in which the 
soymeal allocation is relatively higher than 
has historically been the case for soymeal in 
international promotion programs. The small 
change in the crush margin simply reflects 
the offsetting effects of the higher soybean 
price against the higher soymeal price. 
 
Note that the average annual levels of U.S. 
soybean crush and soymeal and soyoil con-
sumption were also higher over the 1980/81-
2006/07 period as a result of the soybean 
checkoff program by 4.2%, 1.6%, and 2.0%, 
respectively (Table 5). These average annual 
results for the full period, however, obscure 
the actual effectiveness of the domestic 
promotion programs since they have been in 
place only since the early 1990s. 
 
Table 5 decomposes the effects of the soy-
bean checkoff program into two time pe-
riods: (1) the 1980/81-1991/92 period prior 
to the implementation of the national soy-
bean checkoff program (referred to as the 
“voluntary checkoff period”) and (2) the 
1992/93-2006/07 period since the national 
program was implemented (referred to as the 
“national checkoff period”). Note that over 
the  national checkoff period, the average 
annual level of crush demand was 5.3% 
higher than would have been the case with-
out the program while those of soymeal and 
soyoil consumption were 3.1% and 3.4% 
higher, respectively. Importantly, these ef-
fects are the net result of two forces: (1) the 
direct effects of U.S. domestic checkoff 
promotion programs and (2) the indirect ef-
fects of all soybean checkoff programs (U.S. 
and foreign) on prices which affects the 
quantities consumed of each commodity. 
 
During the national checkoff program pe-
riod, the relatively larger increase in soy-
bean crush demand than in soymeal or 
soyoil demand implied an increase in sup-
plies of soymeal and soyoil relative to their 
demands. The consequence was a lower 
price of soymeal and soyoil during that pe-
riod as a result of the program than other-
wise would have been the case.  The indirect 
effect of  lower prices led to higher quanti-
ties of soymeal and soyoil consumed adding 
to the direct effects of the promotion pro-
grams in shifting out the demands of the two 
products.  In this case the direct and indirect 
effects worked together to produce greater 
effectiveness of the promotion programs for 
U.S. demand for soymeal and soyoil. 
 
In the case of soybean crush, however, the 
direct and indirect effects work against each 
other producing a net effect on the level of 
soybean crush that is lower than would be 
the case without the indirect price effects. 
The lower average annual crush margin dur-
ing the national checkoff period put down-
ward pressure on the domestic soybean 
crush demand while the direct effects 
pushed the crush demand outward resulting 
in a net 5.2% increase in U.S. soybean crush 
demand.  
 
The importance of the direct and the indirect 
effects of the checkoff program is particular-
ly notable during the voluntary  checkoff 
program period when there were no check-
off expenditures for domestic promotion 
programs.  During that period, the large ex-
penditures on international market promo-
tion relative to those on  production research 
resulted in an increase in foreign demand for 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil and an in-
crease in the prices of soybeans, soymeal, 
and soyoil of 5%, 2.1%, and 2.4%, respec-
tively. The indirect effects of those price 
increases put downward pressure on 
soymeal and soyoil use in U.S. markets dur-
ing that period. Without domestic promotion 
programs to generate direct effects in shift-  
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ing out the demand curves of those two 
products to offset the negative indirect price 
effects, the final result during that period 
was lower annual average domestic use of 
soymeal and soyoil by 1.1% and 0.4%, re-
spectively as a result of checkoff programs 
than otherwise would have been the case.  
 
Figure 19 provides some insight on the 
changes in U.S. markets and prices over 
time brought about by the voluntary and na-
tional mandatory checkoff programs. In the 
voluntary checkoff period, the checkoff pro-
gram was responsible for increasing soybean 
production annually by an average of about 
              1980/81-91/92          1992/93-2006/07           1980/81-2006/07
Annual Average Change In: 1,000 acres % 1,000 acres % 1,000 acres %
U.S. Soybean Planted Acres
  Cornbelt 700.6 2.3 1,096.3 3.3 920.4 2.9
  Delta 243.9 2.8 184.8 3.1 211.1 3.0
  South 338.0 5.3 206.1 6.1 264.7 5.6
  Plains 256.8 4.4 714.0 6.4 510.8 5.8
  Lakes 266.1 4.3 425.3 4.6 354.6 4.5
  Atlantic 135.1 3.3 78.2 2.6 103.5 3.0
  Other 17.9 5.6 35.0 6.4 27.4 6.1
  Total 1,958.4 3.2 2,739.8 4.1 2,392.5 3.7
mil. bu. % mil. bu. % mil. bu. %
U.S. Soybean Production
  Cornbelt 27.9 2.7 55.6 4.0 43.3 3.5
  Delta 6.9 3.7 6.3 3.6 6.6 3.7
  South 8.5 6.0 6.4 6.2 7.3 6.1
  Plains 7.4 4.6 25.9 6.7 17.7 6.2
  Lakes 9.1 4.4 16.7 4.8 13.3 4.7
  Atlantic 3.4 3.7 2.4 2.8 2.8 3.2
  Other 0.6 5.9 1.3 6.5 1.0 6.3
  Total 63.8 3.5 114.5 4.6 92.0 4.2
U.S. Soybean Crush 24.6 2.3 77.5 5.3 54.0 4.2
1,000 tons % 1,000 tons % 1,000 tons %
U.S. Soybean Meal Consumpti -214.7 -1.1 881.8 3.1 394.4 1.6
mil. lbs. % mil. lbs. % mil. lbs. %
U.S. Soybean Oil Consumption -37.9 -0.4 512.7 3.4 268.0 2.0
$/unit % $/unit % $/unit %
U.S. Wholesale Soybean and Product Prices
  Soybean ($/bu) 0.15 2.4 0.06 1.0 0.10 1.6
  Soymeal ($/ton) 9.38 5.0 -0.31 -0.2 3.99 2.1
  Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.44 2.1 -0.39 -1.7 -0.02 -0.1
  Crush Margin ($/bu) 0.13 14.6 -0.11 -7.7 -0.01 -0.4 
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64 million bushels (top left graph in Figure 
19). The annual impact on production 
remained the same until about 1997/98 
when growing soybean research expendi-
tures during national checkoff period began 
to have an effect on   production.  While the 
average annual production impact of the 
checkoff program increased increased to 92 
million bushels during the  national check-
off period, the annual impact has continued 
to grow, hitting about 170 million bushels in 
2006/07.  The growth in the checkoff pro-
gram’s effect on production will likely con-
tinue growing in the future as past expendi-
tures continue to have an impact into the fu-
ture and additional expenditures are made.   
Recall from an earlier section that Bessler 
(2009) found that there is a four year lag be-
tween expenditures on production research 
and initial production effects and that the 
expenditures continue to have an effect for 
up to ten years. 
 
The larger annual increase in production 
during the national period made increasing 
additional supplies of soybeans available for 
crushing. As a result, the annual increase in 
soybean crush jumped from an average of 
about 25 million bushels during the volunta-
ry period to a high of nearly 120 million bu-
shels in 1998/99 following implementation 
of the national checkoff program (see top 
right graph of Figure 19).  At the same time,  
the large increase in production meant that 
instead of supporting soybean and soybean 
product prices as it had during the voluntary 
period, the checkoff program actually pres-
sured prices down to lower levels than oth-
erwise would have existed during the na-
tional period (see bottom left graph in Fig-
ure 19).   
 
The increased soybean production during 
national period as a result of the checkoff 
program together with a growing shift of   
international promotion funds to promoting 
soybeans rather than value-added soybean 
products also led to a sharp increase in soy-
bean exports over that period to an average 
annual level of about 2.3 million metric tons 
(mt) increase in 2006/07. This checkoff-
induced surge in U.S. soybean exports began 
during the late 1990s, when the impact of 
the checkoff program on U.S. soybean 
exports had all but disappeared  (bottom 
right graph of Figure 19).  In 1998/99, the 
annual impact of the checkoff program on 
soybean exports had dropped to only 70,000 
mt compared to 1.1 million mt just four 
years earlier. The surge that followed 
pushed the annual impact on soybean ex-
ports up almost continually to nearly 2.3 
million mt in 2006/07.  
 
On average over the entire 1980/81-2006/07 
period, the soybean checkoff program 
boosted soybean exports each year by an 
average of 993,600 mt or nearly 5% (Table 
6).  Although the program also raised the 
annual level of Brazilian soybean exports, 
the increase was less than a third of the in-
crease experienced by U.S. soybean ex-
ports (295,900 mt). The U.S. soybean-
checkoff-induced increase in Argentine soy-
bean exports was only 123,600 mt on aver-
age each year over the same period. 
 
For U.S. soymeal and soyoil, the checkoff 
program boosted exports by an annual av-
erage of 15% and 24%, respectively, over 
the full 1980/81-2006/07 period (Table 6). 
Although both Brazil and Argentina also 
experienced increases in their average an-
nual exports of soymeal and soyoil due to 
the checkoff, the increases were insufficient 
to maintain their shares of world trade in the 
two products.  Consequently, the U.S. share 
of world soymeal and soyoil exports in-
creased by over 9 and 23 percentage points, 
respectively, while those of Brazil and Ar-
gentina declined.  In other words, the U.S. 











80/81 83/84 86/87 89/90 92/93 95/96 98/99 01/02 04/05


































80/81 83/84 86/87 89/90 92/93 95/96 98/99 01/02 04/05
Crush Soymeal Use (SB Equiv) Soyoil Use (SB Equiv)
mil. bu.

































Change in Regional Production  Change in U.S. Soybean and Product Use 






















soybean, soymeal, and soyoil exports and 
the U.S, export market share of all three 
products while reducing the export shares of 
both Brazil and Argentina. 
 
By comparing the impact of the checkoff 
program on world soybean and product trade 
before and after the implementation of the 
national soybean checkoff program, the ef-
fects of the shift in international promotion 
strategy become more clear. The increasing 
share of international market promotion 
funds allocated to smaller, less developed 
countries and away from the EU and Japan 
resulted in a sharp decline in the annual av-
erage increase in imports of all three prod-
ucts by the latter two countries and a surge 
in imports by other countries (Table 6). The 
average annual increase in soybean imports 
by the EU and Japan dropped from just over 
754,400 mt and 197,800 mt, respectively, 
during the voluntary period to only 444,900 
mt and 100,900 mt, respectively, during the 
national period. In contrast, the average an-
nual increase in soybean imports by the rest 
of the world as a result of the checkoff pro-
gram jumped substantially from 340,300 mt 
to nearly 1.6 million mt. The story is the 
same for soymeal and soyoil imports.  In the 
case of EU, the reduction in U.S. promotion 
of soyoil consumption in those countries 
over time led to lower soyoil demand by 
those countries and, thus, greater EU exports 
of soyoil in competition with U.S. exports. 
 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of the  
Soybean Checkoff Program  
 
Clearly, based on a comparative analysis of 
the  with and without checkoff expenditure 
scenarios as summarized in the previous sec-
tion and illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 and 
Figure 19, the answer to the first key ques-
tion regarding the U.S. soybean checkoff 
program posed earlier is that it has effective-
ly increased the supply, demand,  prices, 
trade, and export market shares of U.S. soy-
bean and soybean products. 
 
The second key question, the more critical 
question that must be answered about the 
U.S. checkoff program, is whether any gains 
in profit realized by soybean producers as a 
result of the program have been sufficient to 
more than pay for the cost of the program. 
That is, has the program run at a loss or a 
profit over time?  Have the market effects 
induced by the checkoff program been sub-
stantial enough to generate sufficient addi-
tional profits to soybean producers over time 
to more than cover the cost of the checkoff 
program?  If not, then the conclusion would 
be that the program should be discontinued   
because the program costs producers more 
than it returns to them.  On the other hand, if 
the profits generated more than cover the 
costs, the program would be deemed a suc-
cessful investment opportunity for soybean 
producers. 
 
This section, then, provides a benefit-cost 
analysis of the soybean checkoff program to 
answer these questions based on the results 
of the scenario analyses discussed in the 
previous section. As usually calculated, the 
producer profit Benefit Cost Ratio (PBCR) 
is the additional industry profits (additional 
cash receipts net of additional production 
costs and checkoff assessments) earned by 
producers as a consequence of the checkoff 
expenditures (as measured through the sce-
nario analyses) divided by the historical lev-
el of checkoff expenditures made to generate 
those additional profits. For the soybean 
checkoff program, the additional soybean 
industry profits (in $million) generated by 
the program in any given year (t) are calcu-
lated as: 
 




Table 6:  Soybean Checkoff Program Effects on World Soybean and Products Trade and 
U.S. Market Share, 1980/81-2006/07
Average Change In:             1980/81-1991/92                 1992/93-2006/07                1980/81-2006/07
1,000 mt  % 1,000 mt % 1,000 mt %
World Soybean Imports
   EU-15 754.4 5.9 444.9 3.0 582.4 4.2
   Japan 107.8 2.4 100.9 2.2 104.0 2.3
   Rest of the world 340.3 6.0 1,035.9 4.8 726.8 5.0
  Total 1,202.5 5.3 1,581.7 3.8 1,413.2 4.3
World Soybean Exports
   United States 1,040.0 5.6 956.6 4.0 993.6 4.6
   Brazil 141.7 6.8 419.3 3.5 295.9 3.9
   Argentina 20.8 0.9 205.8 4.0 123.6 3.2
   Total 1,202.5 5.3 1,581.7 3.8 1,413.2 4.3
World Soymeal Imports
   EU-15 1,147.2 15.1 620.2 3.8 854.4 6.9
   Japan 71.1 23.2 55.8 5.7 62.6 9.2
   Rest of the world 14.0 0.2 794.4 5.5 447.6 3.9
  Total 1,232.3 7.6 1,470.4 4.7 1,364.6 5.5
World Soymeal Exports
   United States 727.2 14.8 873.8 15.3 808.6 15.1
   Brazil 441.6 5.7 540.2 4.9 496.4 5.2
   Argentina 63.5 1.8 56.4 0.4 59.5 0.6
   Total 1,232.3 7.6 1,470.4 4.7 1,364.6 5.5
World Soyoil Imports
   Japan 0.3 3.9 -13.6 -47.1 -7.4 -39.0
   Rest of the world 241.7 9.3 283.8 4.7 265.1 5.9
  Total 242.0 9.3 270.1 4.5 257.6 5.7
World Soyoil Exports (000 mt)
   United States 138.4 23.9 158.8 24.1 149.8 24.0
   Brazil 49.0 6.9 36.4 2.3 42.0 3.5
   Argentina 13.5 2.1 12.7 0.4 13.0 0.6
   EU-15 41.0 6.1 62.2 13.6 52.8 9.6
   Total 242.0 9.3 270.1 4.5 257.6 5.7
Exporter Share of Soybean Imports
   United States 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
   Brazil 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6
   Argentina -0.5 -4.4 0.0 0.6 -0.2 -1.7
Exporter Share of Soymeal Imports
   United States 2.0 7.1 1.8 11.3 1.9 9.4
   Brazil -0.9 -1.7 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.6
   Argentina -1.2 -4.6 -1.8 -4.2 -1.5 -4.4
Exporter Share of Soyoil Imports
   United States 3.2 19.8 2.0 26.4 2.5 23.4
   Brazil -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -1.8 -0.5 -1.2
   Argentina -2.2 -5.8 -2.1 -4.3 -2.2 -5.0







where p is the farm price of soybeans 
($/bu.); c is production cost ($/acre); A is 
the area planted to soybeans (million acres); 
q is production of soybeans (million bu.); 
and “wo” and “w” indicate the values from 
the  with checkoff expenditure scenario 
(baseline simulation) and the without check-
off expenditures scenario (zero checkoff ex-
penditures), respectively. 
 
  Then the grower profit BCR is calculated 
as: 
 
[10]  PBCR  =   
 
 
where E is total checkoff expenditures ($ 
million) across all programs (production re-
search, domestic promotion, and interna-
tional market promotion). 
 
If the cost of the checkoff program in each 
year (Et) is first netted out of the additional 
profit generated (Rt) in those years (i.e., Rt - 
Et) since the checkoff represents a cost to 
producers, then the net grower profit BCR is 
calculated as: 
 
[11]  NBCR  =  PBCR  - 1 . 
 
If the time value of money is accounted for 
as various researchers have done in consi-
dering the soybean and other commodity 
checkoff programs, then the discounted net 








where i is the interest rate chosen to discount 
the additional profit flows to present value.    
Obviously the level of the DBCR depends 
on the rate used to discount the benefits over 
time.  In this study,  the DBCR was calcu-
lated using the 30-day Treasury bill interest 
rates (IMF) for 1980/81 through 2006/07 as 
done by Williams (1999), Williams, Shum-
way, and Love (2002) and others.  Sellen, 
Goddard, and Duff (1997) and Davis et al. 
(2001) made an arbitrary choice of an an-
nual 5% fixed rate as the discount rate.  The 
Treasury bill interest rate, which averaged 
5.6% between 1980/81 and  2006/07, was 
selected simply because it represents a rea-
listic alternative investment rate for the 
1980/81 through 2006/07 period. 
 
Recall that a BCR as calculated in equations 
[10], [11], and [12] that is greater than 1 is 
interpreted as meaning that the program has 
more than paid for itself. Otherwise, the 
program would be considered to be ineffec-
tive in increasing the profits of the soybean 
producers who pay for the program. 
 
Using the with and without soybean check-
off expenditure scenario results and equa-
tions [9] – [12], the net profit BCR (NBCR) 
for the U.S. soybean program over the 
1980/81 to 2006/07 period is calculated to 
be $6.4, indicating that the benefits in terms 
of the net additional soybean industry profits 
generated by the U.S. soybean checkoff pro-
gram far exceeded the cost of the program 
expenditures over that period (Table 7). This 
NBCR compares quite favorably to those 
found by earlier studies of the soybean 
checkoff program and for other checkoff 
commodities
20.  Even when the net grower 
benefits are discounted to present value (the 
DBCR), the ratio of benefits (net grower 
profits) to costs is still respectable at $2.4 
(Table 7).  
 
Interestingly, the calculated NBCR for the 
soybean checkoff program was substantially    
                                                           
20 See Table 1 and the associated discussion in an earlier section of 
this report. 
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higher in the voluntary checkoff period of 
1980/91 to 1991/92 ($14.1) than in the sub-
sequent national checkoff period of 1992/93 
to 2006/07 period ($2.8) (Table 7).  Does 
that mean that the program was  more effec-
tive before the implementation of the na- 
 
tional soybean checkoff program than after?  
Not necessarily.  In the first place, the level 
of soybean checkoff funding increased by 
nearly 300% from $17.3 million in 1992/93 
to $63.2 in just 5 years.  Research has shown 







Added Soybean Cash Receipts ($ million) 7,700.2 11,833.4 19,533.7
Soybean Checkoff Investment
a ($ million) 234.8 511.0 745.8
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) ($/$ spent)) 32.8 23.2 26.2
Cost of Production ($/acre)
  Total 179.71 239.88 213.14
  Variable cash expenses 60.44 79.48 71.02
   All other (capital, land, etc.) 119.27 160.40 142.12
Cost of Production ($/bu)
  Total 5.87 6.25 6.08
  Variable cash expenses 1.97 2.07 2.03
   All other (capital, land, etc.) 3.90 4.18 4.06
Cost of Added Production ($ million)
  Total 4,148.8 9,901.3 14,050.1
  Variable cash expenses 1,399.3 3,256.2 4,655.5
   All other (capital, land, etc.) 2,749.5 6,645.0 9,394.6
Net Revenue
b ($ million) 3,551.4 1,932.2 5,483.6
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (PBCR) ($/$ spent) 15.1 3.8 7.4
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (NBCR) ($/$ spent) 14.1 2.8 6.4
Discounted NBCR
c (DBCR) ($/$ spent) 5.4 1.0 2.4
a  Production Research (lagged 10 years to account for lag between expenditure and impact) + Domestic  
Promotion + International Market Development (ASA/USB, FAS, and Third Party contributions). 
b  Added cash receipts minus added production costs. 
c  The interest rate on the 30-day Treasury Bill used as the discount rate.  
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return from promotion and advertising tend 
to decline as the level of funding increases.  
In other words, the relationship between ex-
penditures and returns is not linear.  As ex-
penditures increase, each additional dollar 
spent is less and less effective at moving out 
the demand curve. With such a huge in-
crease in funding, the BCR would be ex-
pected to decline to some extent. 
 
The increased size of the checkoff is not 
likely the whole reason for the drop in the 
BCR both because the decline is so large 
and because Williams, Shumway, and Love 
(2002) report finding a similar decline using 
data only through 1994/95.  They found a 
much smaller decline between the period of 
1978/79-1989/90 and 1990/91-1994/95 from 
$11.1 to $4.9. They conclude that the de-
cline was the result of a shift in funding al-
location strategy that funneled more funds to 
production research and less to international 
market promotion. 
 
That change in strategy apparently was con-
tinued because the share of checkoff funds 
allocated to production research continued 
to surge after 1992/93 while the share allo-
cated to international marketing was declin-
ing sharply (see Figure 2 and associated dis-
cussion). After 1999/2000, the continuing 
increase in the allocation of checkoff funds 
to production research came at the expense 
of the allocations to not only international 
market promotion but also domestic promo-
tion. This shift in strategy as the national 
checkoff program was implemented added 
tremendous supply push to checkoff pro-
gram funding while reducing the demand 
pull of the program. At the same time, the 
international promotion strategy was moving 
away from funding value-added product 
promotion activities and focusing less on the 
large mature markets of Europe and Japan 
and focusing more on smaller, less devel-
oped countries. 
The net effect of these strategic changes in 
checkoff funding allocations was that the 
“supply push” of the production research 
program began to have a greater impact on 
U.S. and world soybean and product markets  
than the “demand pull” of the domestic and 
international demand promotion programs 
particularly since 2000/01.  This was exactly 
opposite of what had occurred under the vo-
luntary checkoff program. The consequence 
has been a small but growing decline in 
market prices as a direct result of the strateg-
ic re-allocation of checkoff funds since the 
implementation of the national soybean 
checkoff program and, therefore, a smaller 
positive effect on soybean producer profits 
than was the case in previous years. Note in 
Table 5 and in Figure 19 how the positive 
average annual increases in prices during the 
voluntary checkoff period turned negative 
with the implementation of the national 
checkoff program. 
 
A final reason that the BCR in the more re-
cent period is likely lower than in the earlier 
period is the long lag found between ex-
penditures on production research and mar-
ket impact and the lengthy period over 
which such expenditures were found to have 
an impact.  Bessler (2009) found that the lag 
between expenditure and initial market im-
pact was ten years and that the expenditures 
in a given year could have market impacts 
for up to 10 years (see “Methodology and 
Data” section). That means that the returns 
from much of the growing current level of 
production research expenditures may not be 
realized for years to come. Consequently, 
the BCR for the period since the implemen-
tation of the national checkoff likely unde-
restimates the true BCR since the future re-






CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
 
 
he main conclusion of this study is 
that the U.S. soybean checkoff pro-
gram has been highly effective over 
the years in enhancing the profitability, 
competitiveness, and size of the U.S. soy-
bean industry.  Among the major findings of 
this study are the following: 
 
●  The Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of the 
soybean checkoff program has been rel-
atively high at $6.4 in additional profit 
earned by U.S. soybean farmers for 
every checkoff dollar spent. 
 
For every checkoff dollar spent to pro-
mote the demand for U.S. soybeans and 
soybean products at home and abroad 
and to improve the international compe-
titiveness of U.S. soybean production   
through soybean production research be-
tween 1980//81 and 2006/07, U.S. soy-
bean farmers earned an additional $6.4 
in profits (cash receipts minus produc-
tion costs and checkoff assessments). 
This BCR compares favorably to those 
found by similar studies for other com-
modities and by two earlier studies of   
the soybean checkoff program. Even 
when the benefits are discounted to 
present value to account for the time 
value of money, the benefit-cost ratio for 
the 1980/81 to 2006/07 period is still a 
reasonable $2.4. 
 
●  The soybean checkoff program has in-
creased the size of the U.S. soybean in-
dustry. 
 
On average each year between 1980/81 
and 2006/07, as a result of  soybean 
checkoff program expenditures on pro-
duction research and domestic and for-
eign demand promotion: 
  1.  U.S. soybean production and crush 
each averaged 4.2% higher than 
would have been the case without the 
checkoff program; 
  2.  The price farmers received for their 
soybeans averaged almost 2% higher 
than would have been the case with-
out the program; 
  3.  The price of soymeal averaged more 
than 2% higher than would have 
been the case without the program 
with little change in the price of   
soyoil; and 
  4.  U.S. soybean meal and oil use were 
both 2% higher than would have 
been the case without the program. 
  
●  The soybean checkoff program has  re-
duced the competitive threat of the South 
American soybean industry. 
 
U.S. soybean, soymeal, and soyoil ex-
ports averaged 5%, 15%, and 24%, re-
spectively, more each year than would 
have been the case without the program. 
Also, the U.S. shares of world soybean, 
soybean meal, and soybean oil exports 
were respectively 0.3, 9, and 23 percen-
tage points higher than would have been 
the case without the program. 
 
●  The Benefit-Cost Ratio for the soy-
bean checkoff program was substan-
tially lower in the period following 
implementation of the national 
checkoff program than was the case 
during the voluntary checkoff pro-
gram years. 
 
While the BCR for the soybean 
checkoff program was estimated to be  
a respectable $2.8 since the imple-
mentation of the national checkoff 




was calculated to be several times 
higher during the years when the 
checkoff program was voluntary.   
Economics, program funding strate-
gy, and the nature of returns from 
production research likely account for 
the lower BCR in the more recent pe-
riod. A well-established feature of   
the economics of commodity check-
off programs is that the returns per 
dollar spent tend to decline as the 
level of promotion and advertising 
expenditures increase.  The rush of 
funds into the checkoff program cof-
fers following the implementation of 
the national soybean checkoff pro-
gram undoubtedly worked to reduce 
the returns to program expenditures.  
Also, a new funding strategy was 
adopted with the implementation of 
the national checkoff which favored 
production research over international 
market promotion and even over do-
mestic promotion in recent years.   
The consequence was less price in-
crease from the program, and thus,   
lower industry revenues and profits. 
Finally, the BCR is also likely lower 
because the returns from production 
research expenditures in recent years 
have not yet been fully realized and 
may not be for some time to come. 
 
These conclusions suggest a number of im-
plications for program management purpos-
es.  First and foremost is that the U.S. soy-
bean industry continues to underinvest in the 
soybean checkoff program despite the sharp 
increase in funding with the national check-
off program.  The high benefit-cost ratio to 
checkoff expenditures suggests that large 
additional benefits in terms of net grower 
profits can be realized from an additional 
increase in those expenditures. As the level 
of expenditure increases, the benefit-cost 
ratio would be expected to drop to some ex-
tent. But because the current level of ex-
penditure is still relatively low, amounting 
to less than 0.5% of soybean farm cash re-
ceipts, even an extraordinary expansion in 
the current level of investments would likely 
have only a small negative effect on the 
benefit-cost ratio. 
 
Second, the current mix of checkoff expend-
itures appears to be reducing potential re-
turn. A comparison of the market effects and 
returns to the checkoff program before and 
after the implementation of the national soy-
bean checkoff program and an examination 
of the key characteristics of checkoff ex-
penditures discussed earlier in the report 
suggest that the following adjustments in the 
current funding allocation strategy would 
likely lead to an increase in returns to soy-
bean producers: 
(1)  more demand pull from domestic and 
international demand promotion rela-
tive to supply push from production 
research; 
(2)  more international promotion relative 
to domestic demand promotion; 
(3)  more promotion of value-added prod-
ucts (soymeal, soyoil, soyfood) rela-
tive to promotion of the raw product 
(soybeans); and 
(4)  some re-examination of the near aban-
donment of large, mature, developed 
country markets like the European Un-
ion and Japan in favor of smaller, less 
developed country markets for interna-
tional promotion activities.  
 
Third, care must be taken in determining the 
proper share  funds to allocate to production 
research.  One the one hand, production re-
search shifts out the supply curve and, there-
fore, tends to reduce prices suggesting that a 
low level of funding for production research 
may be most appropriate. On the other hand, 
Brazil, Argentina, and other U.S. competi-
tors in world soybean markets have invested  
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heavily and continue to invest in research to 
boost their soybean yields, reduce their soy-
bean production costs, and, thereby, increase 
their competitive edge in world soybean 
markets. The failure of the  U.S. to invest 
aggressively in research to develop new, 
high-yielding and cost-efficient soybean 
production technologies and techniques 
could allow the comparative advantage in 
the production and export of soybeans and 
soybean products to shift slowly over the 
long run to countries like Brazil and Argen-
tina that continue to invest in production re-
search. 
 
Finding the proper mix is a complicated 
problem and requires additional research 
much beyond the scope of this study.  There 
is a possibility that if soybean growers 
stopped financing soybean production re-
search, much of the needed research might 
be done by the federal government or pri-
vate soybean breeding companies anyway
21.  
Unfortunately, however, federal research 
funds are expected to continue to decline 
over the foreseeable future. At the same 
time, private soybean breeders invest more 
in applied types of research rather than in 
more basic types of research because of the 
difficulty of capturing the returns to such 
research. Thus, there may be an important 
role for the soybean checkoff program to 
play in helping maintain the international 
competitiveness of U.S. soybean production.  
In any case, soybean growers must weigh 
carefully the tradeoff between the cost of 
investments in production research from a 
lower overall return to checkoff investments 
and the possible loss of competitiveness in 
world markets from curtailing such invest-
ments. 
 
                                                           
21 This possibility was suggested by Harry Kaiser, Cornell Univer-
sity. 
Fourth, a failure to maintain and enhance the 
growth in soybean checkoff expenditures in 
any area over any time period can have se-
rious negative impacts on soybean producer 
profitability over many years.  Checkoff ex-
penditures are intended to create a stream of 
new revenues over time. Expenditures in 
any given year are not realized immediately 
but rather are distributed over a number of 
years.  Consequently, any reduction in fund-
ing for even one year can seriously erode the 
effectiveness of the program in boosting ex-
ports and raising producer profits not just in 
that year but over a long period of time.  By 
the same token, increasing funding levels 
again after some period of lapse usually re-
quires years before the benefits are fully rea-
lized once again.  In the mean time, the re-
turns from the program drop. In essence, this 
is what occurred with the severe reduction in 
the share of funding allocated to internation-
al marketing that began in the early 1990s 
and likely explains much of the drop in the 
BCR to the soybean checkoff program since 
that time  (see Figure 2 and associated dis-
cussion). 
 
Fifth, a return to the practice of leveraging 
international market promotion funds with 
contributions from third party in-country 
contributors could substantially enhance the 
level of funds and the effectiveness of the 
international promotion program. The loss 
of third party contributions, which at one 
time accounted for a third of all funds used 
to promote soybeans and products in foreign 
markets, was an important contributing ele-
ment in the decline of the share of total ex-
penditures accounted for by the international 
market program beginning in the 1990s.  
 
Sixth, the way in which funds for interna-
tional and domestic demand promotion are 
allocated among soybeans and soybean 
products and across countries can have im-
portant implications for the return to those  
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investments and for U.S. competitiveness in 
foreign markets.  For example, a shift in the 
commodity allocation of international pro-
motion funds which pushed the soybean 
share from 8% in 1985/86 to over 70% by 
2004/05 kept the soybean price from falling 
during that period despite the downward 
price pressure of the production-research-
induced increase in soybean supplies. The 
prices of soymeal and soyoil during that pe-
riod, however, were lower than they would 
have been because of the reduced emphasis 
on those products in international promotion 
in favor of soybeans.  At the same time, in-
ternational promotion funds were being redi-
rected from the traditional markets of Japan 
and Western Europe to Asia, Latin America, 
and other newer, less developed country 
markets.  Research is needed to determine 
the optimal or highest yielding regional and 
commodity allocation of international pro-
motion programs. 
 
Finally, a harmonized, systematic procedure 
for collecting, classifying, maintaining, and 
reporting data on soybean checkoff expendi-
tures by state and national soybean groups is 
critically needed for future program evalua-
tion and management purposes. Even though 
some groups like Smith Bucklin, USSEC, 
and the Foreign Agriculture Service have 
developed database management systems for 
their internal purposes, those systems are 
different, use different classification 
schemes, and maintain different levels of 
detail on funded program activities. At the 
state level, only a few QSSBs attempt to 
systematically track their expenditure activi-
ties. However, the QSSBs have not worked 
together to establish a common set of guide-
lines for expenditure data collection, classi-
fication, maintenance, and reporting. The 
result is that every five years when an evalu-
ation of the checkoff program must be con-
ducted per USDA guidelines, researchers 
must spend a great deal of time and effort to 
collect the necessary data from many differ-
ent groups using different data management 
systems, if indeed they even attempt to 
maintain the needed expenditure data over 
time. Because of the cost and time involved, 
the expenditure dataset that can be assem-
bled every time an analysis is required in the 
amount time allowed will necessarily be of 
lower quality than desired for such studies.  
Because the results of these evaluations can 
be no better than the expenditure data avail-
able for the analysis, the study results may 
also be less accurate than could be possible 
with a more complete set of expenditure da-
ta.  For this reason, developing an industry-
wide, cooperative system for tracking 
checkoff expenditures by activity and other 
relevant characteristics across state- and na-
tional-level organizations over time must be 
a high priority for the United Soybean Board 
and associated state and federal organiza-
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This appendix provides details on SOY-
MOD5, the model used in the evaluation of 
the soybean checkoff program, including the 
model structure, parameter estimates, and 
regression statistics as well as the historical 
model simulation validation statistics.  The 
180 econometric, structural equations that 
make up SOYMOD5 are presented in Ap-
pendix Table 1.  The definitions of variables 
are provided in Appendix Table 2.  
 
Note that the equations are organized by 
world region (U.S., EU-15/27, Japan, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Rest-of-the-World). Within 
each region in Appendix Table 1, the equa-
tions are organized by commodity block 
(soybeans, soymeal, soyoil, and corn (U.S. 
only)).  Within each commodity block, the 
supply equations are first presented and then 
those for demand followed by the market 
clearing identities. 
 
Those model equations that were re-
normalized on price for simulation purposes 
are marked with an asterisk (*) after the de-
pendent variable of the equation. The  soy-
bean checkoff research and demand promo-
tion expenditure stock variables are hig-
hlighted in bold type to assist the reader in 
locating them in the model.  For more de-
tails on the model, the reader is referred to 
the “Methodology and Data” section of this 
report and to Williams 1981, Williams and 
Thompson 1984, Williams 1985, Williams 
1994, Williams 1999, and Williams, Shum-
way, and Love 2002. 
 
The estimated parameters are those pre-
sented below each equation with the t-value 
in parentheses. The adjusted R
2 and the 
Durbin-Watson statistic for serial correlation 
are provided for each equation.  For equa-
tions that include a lagged dependent varia-
ble, the Durbin-h statistic is provided as a 
check for serial correlation.  All Durbin-
Watson and Durbin-h statistics indicate the 
absence of serial correlation at the 5% level 
or the 2.5% level except for those few 
marked with an asterisk (*). The  parameters 
of the soybean and corn production block 
were estimated using Nonlinear Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Least Squares (IT-
SUR) in SAS (Statistical Analysis System) 
with data for 1970/71 through 2006/07. The 
remaining model parameters were estimated 
with a truncated two stage least squares 
(2SLS) procedure based on principal com-
ponents in SAS using data for 1969/70 to 
2006/07 as data were available.  All equa-
tions were estimated in linear form. The pa-
rameters for the price variables in the soy-
bean, soymeal, and soyoil demand equations 
were constrained to insure elasticities of  
-1.0, -0.8, and -0.8, respectively.  
 
Appendix Table 3 provides the Theil  fore-
cast error (i.e., the Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) Decomposition Proportions Inequali-
ty Coefficients) simulation validation statis-
tics from simulating SOYMOD5 over the 
1980/81 to 2006/07 sample period (ex post 
simulation).  Those statistics indicate a high-
ly satisfactory fit of the historical, dynamic 
simulation solution values to observed data.  
The Theil U coefficients were small with all 
but one less than 0.2.  The one variable with 
a higher Theil coefficient (0.4) was Japanese 
soyoil imports which historically has been 
extremely small and has fluctuated from a 
positive to a negative (net exports) number.  
The Theil bias error proportions (UM) indi-
cate no systematic deviation of simulated 
and actual data values for any of the endo-
genous variables. The variance proportions 
(US) are also remarkably low for such a 




Appendix Table 1:  SOYMOD5 Structure and Regression Results  
 
United States 
U.S. Soybean Supply 
Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Planted 
ASOYSAC=ASOYSAC0+ASOYSAC1*ASOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67)+ASOYSAC2*ACORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) 
 +  ASOYSAC3*AOATPPC/LAG(UFPI67)+ASOYSAC4*LAG(ASOYSAC)+ASOYSAC5*D82 
 
  ASOYSAC0: 194.86(0.65)    ASOYSAC1: 819.74(8.26)  ASOYSAC2: -605.84(-2.89) 
  ASOYSAC3: -909.15(14.2)  ASOYSAC4: 0.71833(18.51)  ASOYSAC5: 104.82(5.10) 
 
   Adj R





  -CSOYSAC0: -278432(-4.82)  CSOYSAC1: 2055.66(5.71`)  CSOYSAC2: 3426.84(-3.34) 
  CSOYSAC3: 0.67221(12.98)  CSOYSAC4: 42.5956 (3.47)  CSOYSAC5: -4223.56(-5.46`) 
 




              +DSOYSAC3*DWHEPPC/LAG(UFPI67)+DSOYSAC4*LAG(DSOYSAC)+DSOYSAC5*DWD1 
              +DSOYSAC6*DWD2 
 
  DSOYSAC0: 348.3985(0.56)  DSOYSAC1: 1185.59(5.36)  DSOYSAC2: -387.43(-3.34) 
  DSOYSAC3: -405.28(-1.40)  DSOYSAC4: 0.7939(23.65)  DSOYSAC5: 1070.60(2.53) 
 DSOYSAC6:  -1480.38(-3.31) 
 





               +LSOYSAC6*DFB96+LSOYSAC7*DWL 
 
  LSOYSAC0: -101010(-3.67)  LSOYSAC1: 668.53(4.77)   LSOYSAC2: -684.99(-1.30) 
  LSOYSAC3: -1447.83(-3.19)  LSOYSAC4: 0.6487(7.35)   LSOYSAC5: 69.9043(8.47) 
 





               +OSOYSAC6*DFB96+OSOYSAC7*DWO1+OSOYSAC8*DWO2 
 
  OSOYSAC0: -7643.17(-5.73)  OSOYSAC1: 71.7050(10.24)  OSOYSAC2: -139.053(-5.63) 
  OSOYSAC3: -48.9595(-3.32)  OSOYSAC4: 0.6894(15.71)  OSOYSAC5: 94.1924(13.23) 
  OSOYSAC6:  25.6541(3.11)  OSOYSAC7: -45.5361(-7.14)  OSOYSAC8: -31.9897(-4.16)   
 









Appendix Table 1 (continued)  
 
  PSOYSAC0: -125565(-4.47)  PSOYSAC1: 462.0434(3.03)  PSOYSAC2:  -1610.84(-2.91) 
  PSOYSAC3: -268.61(-0.73)  PSOYSAC4: 0.7348(14.41)  PSOYSAC5:  110.971(10.121) 
  PSOYSAC6: 1217.648(5.38)  PSOYSAC7:  -1020.68(-6.56)  PSOYSAC8:  -722.838(-4.61) 
 






  SSOYSAC0: -2127.09(-5.90)  SSOYSAC1: 1796.638(9.58)  SSOYSAC2: -1224.86(-3.42) 
  SSOYSAC3: 0.768812(30.27)  SSOYSAC4: 1705.935(4.65)   
 





Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Harvested 
ASOYSHC=ASOYSHC0+ASOYSHC1*ASOYSAC 
 
  ASOYSHC0: -5446.8( -4.94)  ASOYSHC1:  0.9995(104.40) 
 





  CSOYSHC0:  -108.677( -0.89)  CSOYSHC1: 0.993957( 237.97) 
 





 DSOYSHC0:  -38.2084(-0.72)  DSOYSHC1:  0.9769(145.60) 
 





 LSOYSHC0:  3.9585(0.17)   LSOYSHC1:  0.9823(294.77) 
 





 OSOYSHC0:  -3.1365(-2.10)  OSOYSHC1:  0.9856(273.90) 
 





  PSOYSHC0: -8.0199(-0.41)  PSOYSHC1: 0.9786(388.23) 
 
   Adj R
2=0.9997 DW=2.3677  
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  SSOYSHC0: -116.123(-3.68)  SSOYSHC1: 0.9704(160.96) 
 





Regional Soybean Yields 
ASOYSYC=ASOYSYC0+ASOYSYC1*ACHKRES 
 
  ASOYSYC0: 16.4182(4.59)  ASOYSYC1: 0.021(2.81) 
 





  CSOYSYC0: 35.1502(20.27)  CSOYSYC1: 0.0116(3.66) 
 





  DSOYSYC0: 19.8267(3.80)  DSOYSYC1: 0.016(1.66) 
 





  LSOYSYC0: 32.4248(17.26)  LSOYSYC1: 0.0112(2.51) 
 





  OSOYSYC0: 31.8161(21.24)  OSOYSYC1: 0.0089(2.71) 
 





  PSOYSYC0: 28.4754(17.72)  PSOYSYC1: 0.0133(4.30) 
 





  SSOYSYC0: 18.6529(2.50)  SSOYSYC1: 0.022(1.45) 
 
   Adj R
2=0.0389 DW=0.9214* 
 














Regional Market Price (Farm Level) 
ASOYPFC=ASOYPFC0+ASOYPFC1*USOYPFC 
 
  ASOYPFC0 -0.0785(-1.32)  ASOYPFC1 1.0166(91.13) 
 





  CSOYPFC0: -0.0335(-0.65)  CSOYPFC1: 1.0119(105.14) 
 





  DSOYPFC0: -0.0032(-0.04)  DSOYPFC1: 1.016093(67.88) 
 





  LSOYPFC0: 0.0880(1.63)  LSOYPFC1: 0.9629(94.37) LSOYPFC2:  1.0444(8.76) 
 





 OSOYPFC0:  -0.1219(-1.33) OSOYPFC1:  0.0089(58.63) 
 





  PSOYPFC0: -0.0616(-1.62)  PSOYPFC1: 0.9727(135.39)  PSOYPFC2: 0.9017(10.75) 
 





  SSOYPFC0: -0.1069(-1.78)    SSOYPFC1: 1.0215(90.54) 
 
 Adj  R
2=0.9944 DW=2.0808 
 




Appendix Table 1 (continued)  
 
Regional Expected Farm Price 
              +0.15*ASOYPLC)*D02T07 
CSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(CSOYPFC),CSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(CSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
              +0.15*CSOYPLC)*D02T07 
DSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(DSOYPFC),DSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(DSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
              +0.15*DSOYPLC)*D02T07 
LSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(LSOYPFC),LSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(LSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
               +0.15*LSOYPLC)*D02T07 
OSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(OSOYPFC),OSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(OSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
               +0.15*OSOYPLC)*D02T07 
PSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(PSOYPFC),PSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(PSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
               +0.15*PSOYPLC)*D02T07 
SSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(SSOYPFC),SSOYPLC)*D59T01+MAX(LAG(SSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
               +0.15*SSOYPLC)*D02T07 
 






  USOYDCC0: 104.2572(5.31)  USOYDCC1: 1.9127(2.72)  USOYDCC2: 12.2678(3.43) 
  USOYDCC3: -98.0161(-3.89)  USOYDCC4: 0.3100(6.64)  USOYDCC5: 0.22311(8.30) 
  USOYDCC6: 0.5562(5.12)  USOYDCC7: 134.6680(7.78)  USOYDCC8: 86.1386(2.40) 
 
 Adj  R
2=0.9862 DW=1.233   
 
where PDLSEXP = 0.045*LAG(SQRT(USOYEXPR) + 0.055*LAG2(SQRT(USOYEXPR) 





  USOYHEC0: -210.185(-5.02)  USOYHEC1: -24.730(-3.53)  USOYHEC2: 51.69361(2.66) 
  USOYHEC3: 0.1372(6.76)  USOYHEC4: -0.2592(-2.11)  USOYHEC5: 0.3511(4.97) 
 USOYHEC6:  139.8208(5.57) 
 





  USOYPWC0: 0.1137(1.48)  USOYPWC1: 1.0311(71.30)  USOYPWC2: 1.5905(9.53) 
  USOYPWC3: -0.6401(-3.80)  USOYPWC4: 0.5835(3.49) 
 











Appendix Table 1 (continued)  
 






  UHPMDDC0: 7297.86(7.42)  UHPMDDC1: -82.5311(-4.18)  UHPMDDC2: 15.8876(13.21) 
  UHPMDDC3: 0.9589(2.21)  UHPMDDC4: 0.9670(2.47)  UHPMDDC5: 1525.479(5.14) 
  
 Adj  R
2=0.9899 DW=1.947 
where PDLMEXP = 0.7253*LAG(SQRT(USOMEXPR) + 0.9670*LAG2(SQRT(USOMEXPR) 




 +  .8103*UCOMSPC+1.124*UPEMSPC))+UCOMDPC3*LN(LAG(UCOMDPC))+UCOMDPC4*D80 
 
  UCOMDPC0: 0.0545(2.12)  UCOMDPC1: -0.30206(-4.34)  UCOMDPC2: 0.8369(32.94) 
  UCOMDPC3: 0.1689(6.25)  UCOMDPC4: -0.76973(-20.30) 
 










  USOMHEC0: 240.1005(5.75)  USOMHEC1: -0.49406(-2.90)  USOMHEC2: 0.321543(4.48) 
  USOMHEC3: 287.3877(7.67)  USOMHEC4: -111.317(-4.17)  USOMHEC5: 123.3497(4.55) 
 












  UOLODDC0: 5.2939(2.23)  UOLODDC1: -0.73437(-5.24)  UOLODDC2: 0.3742(4.05)   
  UOLODDC3: 11.1454(21.26)  UOLODDC4: 0.3902(3.22)  UOLODDC5:  -5.4690(-3.01) 
 
 Adj  R
2=0.9942 DW=1.9106 
 
where PDLOEXP = 0.2926*LAG(SQRT(USOOEXPR) + 0.3902*LAG2(SQRT(USOOEXPR) 











  UCOODPC0: -0.08077(-1.28)  UCOODPC1: -0.4315(-3.07)  UCOODPC2: 0.1495(3.38) 
  UCOODPC3: 0.818625(15.80)  UCOODPC4: -0.23503(-2.28) 
 











  USOOPWC0: -234.945(-1.42)  USOOPWC1: -39.1529(-6.19)  USOOPWC2: 0.1873(12.13) 
  USOOPWC3: -0.4764(-1.38)  USOOPWC4: 2.4436(1.66)  USOOPWC5: 0.6537(8.72) 
  USOOPWC6: -0.44088(-5.43)  USOOPWC7: 477.6181(5.53) 
 







U.S. Corn Supply 
 





  ACORSA0: 1508.128(4.34)  ACORSA1: 494.2308(2.95)  ACORSA2: -57.0043(-2.04) 
  ACORSA3: 0.5349(8.67)    ACORSA4: -743.841(-4.09)  ACORSA5: -17.5229(-4.82) 
 ACORSA6:  -772.848(-6.38) 
 







  CCORSA0: 17161.66(5.76)  CCORSA1: 6683.483(5.28) CCORSA2:  -625.021(-3.55) 
  CCORSA3: 0.3932(5.34)    CCORSA4: -11019.4(-8.66)  CCORSA5: -17.228(-6.77)
 CCORSA6:  -3153.88(-3.49) 
 








Appendix Table 1 (continued)  
 
  
DCORSAC0: 143.9955(1.05)  DCORSAC1: 165.0028(1.55)  DCORSAC2: -92.0846(-1.60) 
  DCORSAC3: 0.7619(18.84)  DCORSAC4: 625.7426(8.41) 
 







  LCORSAC0: 3545.477(3.04)  LCORSAC1: 5233.03(4.85)  LCORSAC2: -239.771(-2.58) 
  LCORSAC3: -2449.76(-2.94)  LCORSAC4: 0.580693(7.70)  LCORSAC5: -1304.93(-2.35) 
  LCORSAC6: -3486.53(-6.02)  LCORSAC7: -85.083(-6.12) 
 







  OCORSAC0: -285.547(-1.89)  OCORSAC1: 568.5899(5.15)  OCORSAC2: -23.2854(-1.52) 
  OCORSAC3: 0.979957(24.04)  OCORSAC4: -282.134(-2.72)  OCORSAC5: -354.278(-3.45) 
  OCORSAC6: -3.71366(-1.69)  OCORSAC7: -154.373(-2.21) 
 







  PCORSA0: 9177.879(5.43)  PCORSA1: 2236.906(1.97)  PCORSA2: -159.49(-1.74) 
  PCORSA3: -4080.62(-4.43)  PCORSA4: 0.547292(7.22)  PCORSA5: -745.761(-1.26) 
  PCORSA6: -3762.27(-5.59)  PCORSA7: -107.131(-5.39) 
 







  SCORSAC0: 858.6548(2.19)  SCORSAC1: 1692.38(5.22)  SCORSAC2: -295.571(-1.94) 
  SCORSAC3: 0.6676(17.01)  SCORSAC4: -1097.28(-3.93)  SCORSAC5: -18.0948(-3.23) 
 SCORSAC6:  -349.102(-2.33)   
 







  TCORSAC0: 418.0528(1.48)  TCORSAC1: 234.1463(1.80)  TCORSAC2: -3.9881(-0.23) 
  TCORSAC3: 0.915073(12.62)  TCORSAC4: -271.30(-2.99)  TCORSAC5: -358.255(-2.91) 
TCORSAC6: -147.314(-1.22)  TCORSAC7: -4.9511(-1.21)  
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Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Harvested 
ACORSHC=ACORSHC0+ACORSHC1*ACORSAC 
 
  ACORSHC0: -94.1786(-1.75)  ACORSHC1: 0.873611(53.49) 
 





  CCORSHC0: -49233.5(-6.69)  CCORSHC1: 0.95904(53.3)  CCORSHC2: 24.83043 
 





  DCORSHC0: -43.4121(-4.14)  DCORSHC1: 0.973575(90.60)  DCORSHC2: -44.6373(-5.06) 
 





  LCORSHC0: -1564.45(-5.69)  LCORSHC1: 0.9937(47.35)  LCORSHC2: -697.241(-10.34) 
 





  OCORSHC0: -509.887(-6.34)  OCORSHC1: 0.790966(27.36)  OCORSHC3: -241.398(-2.97) 
 





  PCORSHC0: -1443.75(-3.55)  PCORSHC1: 1.004653(37.15)  PCORSHC2: -841.099(-6.58) 
 





  SCORSHC0: -11727.2(-4.24)  SCORSHC1: 0.935159(53.08)  SCORSHC2: -1655.27(-17.49) 
 SCORSHC3:  -607.905(-6.87) 
 





  TCORSHC0: -149.091(-2.83)  TCORSHC1: 0.648547(32.18)  TCORSHC2: -186.75(-8.06) 
 Adj  R








  TCORSHC0: -149.091(-2.83)  TCORSHC1: 0.648547(32.18)  TCORSHC2: -186.75(-8.06) 
 


















Regional Market Price (Farm Level) 
ACORPFC=ACORPFC0+ACORPFC1*UCORPFC+ACORPFC2*DFB96 
 
  ACORPFC0: 0.036572(0.630)  ACORPFC1: 1.0710(39.12)  ACORPFC2:  0.29211(3.65) 
 





  CCORPFC0: -0.02462(-1.95)  CCORPFC1: 1.0120(172.01) 
 





 DCORPFC0:  0.0346(0.51)   DCORPFC1:  1.0861(33.13) DCORPFC2:  0.7591(5.51) 
 





  LCORPFC0: -0.02077(-0.85)  LCORPFC1: 0.9703(84.70) 
 





 OCORPFC0:  0.2123(4.33)   OCORPFC1:  1.0804(53.48) OCORPFC2:  -0.1212(-4.66) 
 









  PCORPFC0: -0.0068(-0.38)  PCORPFC1: 0.9791(115.83) 
 





  SCORPFC0: 0.0547(1.52)   SCORPFC1: 1.0584(61.96)  SCORPFC2:  0.0921(3.49) 
 





 TCORPFC0:  0.1591(4.80)   TCORPFC1:  1.028506(63.98) 
 
 Adj  R
2=0.9900 DW=1.6475 
 

















    UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D74T90+(MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 
    -NORFLEX/100)+(NORFLEX/100)*UCORPLC))*D91T95+(MAX(LAG(LCORPFC), 
    UCORPLC))*D96T01+(MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+UCORPLC*.15))*D02T07 
 
OCORPPC=(MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D59T73+(MAX(LAG(OCORPFC), 
    UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D74T90+(MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 
    -NORFLEX/100)+(NORFLEX/100)*UCORPLC))*D91T95+(MAX(LAG(OCORPFC), 
    UCORPLC))*D96T01+(MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+UCORPLC*.15))*D02T07 
 
PCORPPC=(MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D59T73+(MAX(LAG(PCORPFC), 
    UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D74T90+(MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 
    -NORFLEX/100)+(NORFLEX/100)*UCORPLC))*D91T95+(MAX(LAG(PCORPFC), 
    UCORPLC))*D96T01+(MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+UCORPLC*.15))*D02T07 
 
SCORPPC=(MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D59T73+(MAX(LAG(SCORPFC), 
    UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D74T90+(MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 
    -NORFLEX/100)+(NORFLEX/100)*UCORPLC))*D91T95+(MAX(LAG(SCORPFC), 
 UCORPLC))*D96T01+(MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+UCORPLC*.15))*D02T07  
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    UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100)))*D74T90+(MAX(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 











  UCORDFC0: -6530.23(-11.12)  UCORDFC1: -350.676(-6.48)  UCORDFC2: 125.1447(15.69) 
  UCORDFC3: 22.7607(4.76)  UCORDFC4: 12.3111(4.07)  UCORDFC5: 493.3948(5.91) 
 






  UCORDOC0: -8.7012(-0.15)  UCORDOC1: -158.409(-4.17) UCORDOC2:  0.3263(3.54) 
  UCORDOC3: 75.4202(2.84)  UCORDOC4: 0.8078(15.76)  UCORDOC5: 183.3124(7.26) 
 







  UCORMEC0: -491.131(-1.40)  UCORMEC1: -3.87672(-2.12)  UCORMEC2: -1.1747(-10.39) 
  UCORMEC3: 11.1920(2.62)  UCORMEC4: 0.5509(4.85)  UCORMEC5: 0.7715(15.15) 
 UCORMEC6:  -247.186(-2.98) 
 






  UCORHOC0: -1860.57(-8.98)  UCORHOC1: -325.141(-7.01) UCORHOC2:  0.4018(18.42) 
  UCORHOC3: 0.3782(4.25)  UCORHOC4: 0.4173(11.85)  UCORHOC5: 852.8902(9.72) 
 UCORHOC6:  1061.9143(7.92) 
 





  UCORPFC0: -0.09074(-3.66)  UCORPFC1: 0.9568(87.79)  UCORPFC2: -0.5562(-10.67) 
 









  ECORPIA0: 54.1901(4.77)  ECORPIA1: 35.0363(20.53)  ECORPIA2: -44.9744(-4.38) 
  ECORPIA3: 18.5330(2.82)  ECORPIA4: 23.19357(3.41) 
 







European Union (15/27) 





  ESOYDCC0: 2372.727(8.80)  ESOYDCC1: 60.5232(3.98)  ESOYDCC2: 0.6774(6.13) 
 ESOYDCC3:  176.0174(1.71)  ESOYDCC4:  -2174(-9.95)   ESOYDCC5:  -2053.77(-4.57) 
 





  ESOYPIA0: 14.0640(2.25)  ESOYPIA0: 0.9404(31.05)  ESOYPIA2: 34.6090(3.73) 
 ESOYPIA3:  31.06224(3.33) 
 












  ESOMDDC0: -21917(-5.13)  ESOMDDC1: -560.682(-5.75)  ESOMDDC2: 11.0314(7.85) 
  ESOMDDC3: 268.7651(8.54)  ESOMDDC4: 480.0915(2.02) ESOMDDC5:  -2891.89(-4.78) 
 





  ESOMPIA0: -2.1543(-0.48)  ESOMPIA1: 1.056715(40.72) ESOMPIA2:  24.4446(4.94) 
 








Appendix Table 1 (continued)  
 








 ESOODDC0:  -99.2496(-1.13)  ESOODDC1:  -15.8287(-6.29) ESOODDC2:  15.00(4.48) 
  ESOODDC3: 1.0696(7.04)  ESOODDC4: 0.6952(10.44)  ESOODDC5: 23.1041(2.38) 
 ESOODDC6:  389.3277(10.34) 
 







  ESOOPXA0: -20.2861(-1.90)  ESOOPXA1: 1.0276(42.97) ESOOPXA2:  -200.782(-8.43) 
 ESOOPXA3:  117.2918(4.92) 
 
  Adj.  R
2=0.9791 DW=1.5581 
Japan 






  JSOYDCC0: 792.6693(5.24)  JSOYDCC1: 0 .0040(2.06) JSOYDCC2:  0.7628(17.15) 
JSOYDCC3: 0.3801(1.98)   JSOYDCC4: -317.822(-3.43)  JSOYDCC5: -417.272(-6.40) 





 JSOYPUA0:  28.103(3.78)   JSOYPUA1:  1.1497(38.44) JSOYPUA2:  -22.5117(-5.49) 
 JSOYPUA3:  -55.6456(-4.51) 
 










 +  JSOMDDC3*LAG(SQRT(JSOMEXPR))+JSOMDDC4*D82 
 
  JSOMDDC0: 1555.514(7.71)  JSOMDDC1: -0.01214(-6.61)  JSOMDDC2: 0.6247(13.32) 
  JSOMDDC3: 0.5736(3.18)  JSOMDDC4: 232.6031(5.22) 
 
  Adj.  R
2=0.9926 Dh=0.6541  
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  JSOMPUA0: 12.3561(2.03)  JSOMPUA1: 1.19587(32.14)  JSOMPUA2: -86.9739(-6.47) 
 JSOMPUA3:  -48.815(-4.94)   
 










 +  JSOODDC3*EPAOPIA*XJAUSA/JWPI85+JSOODDC4*LAG(SQRT(JSOOEXPR)) 
 
  JSOODDC0: 116.603(3.05)  JSOODDC1:-.00055(-3.29)  JSOODDC2: 0.8662(17.98) 
  JSOODDC3: 0.00046(2.69)  JSOODDC4: 0.08716(1.84) 
 





  JSOOPUA0: 341.8325(9.10)  JSOOPUA1: 1.0251(15.39)  JSOOPUA2: -280.191(-12.71) 
 











 RSOYMIN0:15568.22(34.08)  RSOYMIN1:-2344.94(c)  RSOYMIN2:  0.9990(19.79) 
  RSOYMIN3: 17.1762(2.37)  RSOYMIN4: 11677.09(13.27)  RSOYMIN5: -7391.12(-12.47) 
Note: c=constrained  
 
  Adj.  R
2=0.9959 Dh=-1.7049 
 







  RSOMDDN0: 20451.23(22.57)  RSOMDDN1: -107.516(c)   RSOMDDN2: 0.9775(27.67) 
  RSOMDDN3: 17.9494(1.46)  RSOMDDN4: -15918.2(-16.40) RSOMDDN5:  9767.63(21.94) 
 
Adj.  R
















  RSOODDN0: 4182.26(14.97)  RSOODDN1: -294.935(c)   RSOODDN2: 4688.371(24.94)
  RSOODDN3: 0.7852(17.14)  RSOODDN4: 8.9780(2.04)  RSOODDN5: 2162.51(16.49) 
RSOODDN6:  1458.658(16.55)  Note: c=constrained 
 






Brazil Soybean Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
LN(BSOYSHC)=BSOYSHC0+BSOYSHC1*LAG(LN(BSOYPXC*XBZUSA/BWPI85)) 
 +  BSOYSHC2*LAG(LN(BSOYSHC))+BSOYSHC3*LN(TIME)+BSOYSHC4*D8587 
 
  BSOYSHC0: -460.067(-11.29)  BSOYSHC1: 0.3821(10.73)  BSOYSHC2: 0.6179(14.48) 
 BSOYSHC3:  61.7881(11.32)  BSOYSHC4:  -1025.92(-3.30) 
 










  BSOYDCC0: 5208.466(5.83)  BSOYDCC1: 9.7225(2.43)  BSOYDCC2: 1.3752(2.30) 
 BSOYDCC3:  -13.0338(-2.91)  BSOYDCC4: 0.2774(10.73)  BSOYDCC5: 0.3414(4.99) 
  BSOYDCC6: -2939.974(-5.82)  BSOYDCC7: -2936.974(4.22) 
 





 BSOYPXC0:  -15.524(-3.77)  BSOYPXC1:  1.0944(53.08) BSOYPXC2:  -47.6133(-5.59) 
 

















  BSOMDDC0: 1136.062(3.17)  BSOMDDC1: -2.43688(-3.20)  BSOMDDC2: 0.968702(24.38) 
 BSOMDDC3:  522.0162(3.43)   
 





  BSOMPXC0: 4.4261(0.76)  BSOMPXC1: 0.9581(29.43)  BSOMPXC2: -32.5853(-5.46) 
 












 BSOODDC0:  -177.705(-2.44) BSOODDC1:  -0.24022(-3.93) BSOODDC2:  0.2977(3.07) 
  BSOODDC3: 0.194951(7.49)  BSOODDC4: 426.5776(3.18)  BSOODDC5: -225.151(-3.31) 
 





  BSOOPXC0: -63.4459(-4.17)  BSOOPXC1: 1.0945(30.56)  BSOOPXC2: 77.9649(5.54) 
 











  GSOYSHC1: 0.26194(6.02)  GSOYSHC0: -446.33(-5.72)  GSOYSHC2: 0.6573(11.8) 
  GSOYSHC3: 58.827(5.71)  GSOYSHC4: 496.88(4.96) 
 















  GSOYDCC0: -1754.05(-6.11)  GSOYDCC1: 0.1731(2.95)  GSOYDCC2: -0.0655(-1.41) 
  GSOYDCC3: 0.3347(12.68)  GSOYDCC4: 0.6370(16.64)  GSOYDCC5: 2626.212(1.91) 
 GSOYDCC6:  3737.815(11.20)   
 





  GSOYPXA0: 24.4350(4.60)  GSOYPXA1: 0.8836(34.36)  GSOYPXA2: 540.0959(48.70) 
 GSOYPXA3:  81.2739(7.42) 
 












  GSOMDDC0: -165.624(-4.14)  GSOMDDC1: -3442.59(-1.72)  GSOMDDC2: 0.0019(15.63) 
GSOMDDC3: 111.4525(4.12)  GSOMDDC4: 170.8404(10.96)   
 





  GSOMPXA0: 37.9752(8.83)  GSOMPXA1: .6955(26.40)  GSOMPXA2: -95.0186(-9.55) 
 GSOMPXA3:  -25.3968(-5.58) 
 












  GSOODDC0: -22.9609(-0.92)  GSOODDC1: -589.666(-1.98)  GSOODDC2: 0.9518(25.07) 
  GSOODDC3: 0.0002(2.00)  GSOODDC4: +54.8233(-4.31)  GSOODDC5: 154.7835(10.23) 
 









  GSOOPXA0: 24.4350(4.60)  GSOOPXA1: 0.8836(34.36)   
 GSOOPXA3:  81.2739(7.42) 
 

















Appendix Table 2:  SOYMOD5 Variable Definitions  
 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
U.S. Regional Soybean Variables 
 
     Acres Planted   Acres Harvested  Yield
1   Production         Market Price
2  Expected Price
3 
Region              (1,000 acres)           (1,000 acres)          (bu/acre)        (1,000 bu)              ($/bu)  ($/bu)   
 
Atlantic  ASOYSAC  ASOYSHC ASOYSYC ASOYSPC ASOYPFC ASOYPCC 
Cornbelt CSOYSAC  CSOYSHC  CSOYSYC CSOYSPC CSOYPFC CSOYPCC 
Delta  DSOYSAC  DSOYSHC DSOYSYC DSOYSPC DSOYPFC DSOYPCC 
Lakes  LSOYSAC  LSOYSHC LSOYSYC LSOYSPC LSOYPFC LSOYPCC 
Other  OSOYSAC  OSOYSHC OSOYSYC OSOYSPC OSOYPFC OSOYPCC 
Plains PSOYSAC  PSOYSHC  PSOYSYC PSOYSPC PSOYPFC PSOYPCC 
South SSOYSAC  SSOYSHC  SSOYSYC SSOYSPC SSOYPFC SSOYPCC 
 
1 Weighted average regional yields with weights equal to the share of regional  production accounted for by each state in the region.
 
2 Average farm price over all states in the respective regions weighted by production in each state in the region. 
3 Expected price at the farm calculated as given in the model. 
 
U.S. National Soybean and Product Market Variables 
 
UCOMDPC  U.S. cottonseed meal share of high protein meal use (soymeal equivalents), marketing year 
UCOODPC  U.S. cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use, marketing year 
UHPMDDC  U.S. high protein meal use, 1,000 tons, marketing year (calculated as in model) 
UHPMPWC  U.S. high protein meal price, $/ton, marketing year, wtd ave. (calculated as in model) 
UOLODDC  U.S. oleic/linoleic oil use, mil lb., marketing year (calculated as in model) 
UOLOPWC  U.S. oleic/linoleic oil price, ¢/lb, marketing year, wtd ave. (calculated as in model) 
USOMDDC  U.S. soymeal use, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMDPC  U.S. cottonseed meal share of high protein meal use, marketing year 
USOMHEC  U.S. soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 tons, September 30 
USOMMEC  U.S. soymeal exports, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soymeal, $/ton, marketing year 
USOMSPC  U.S. soymeal production, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOODDC  U.S. soyoil use, mil lb., marketing year 
USOODPC  U.S. soyoil share of oleic/linoleic oil use, marketing year 
USOOHEC  U.S. soyoil ending stocks, mil lb., September 30 
USOOHTC  U.S. soyoil total ending stocks, mil lb., September 30 
USOOMEC  U.S. soyoil commercial exports, mil lb., marketing year 
USOOMTC  U.S. soyoil total exports, mil lb., marketing year 
USOOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soyoil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
USOOSPC  U.S. soyoil production, mil lb., marketing year 
USOYDCC  U.S. soybean crush, million bu., crop year 
USOYEHR  U.S. soybean stock to use ratio, crop year  
USOYGCC  U.S. soybean crush margin, $/bu, crop year (calculated as in model) 
USOYHEC  U.S. soybean private ending stocks, million bu., August 31 
USOYHTC  U.S. soybean total ending stocks, million bu., August 31 
USOYMEC  U.S. soybean exports, mil bu., crop year 
USOYPFC  U.S. farm price of soybeans, $/bu, crop year 
USOYPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soybeans, $/bu, crop year 
USOYSAC  Total U.S. soybean acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
USOYSHC  Total U.S. soybean acreage harvested, million acres, crop year 
USOYSPC  Total U.S. soybean production acreage harvested, million bu., crop year  
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U.S. Regional Corn Variables 
 
      Acres Planted  Acres Harvested   Production  Market Price
1 Expected  Price
2 
Region      (1,000 acres)    (1,000 acres)   (1,000 bu)     ($/bu)           ($/bu) 
 
Atlantic     ACORSAC    ACORSHC  ACORSPC  ACORPFC  ACORPPC 
Cornbelt    CCORSAC    CCORSHC  CCORSPC  CCORPFC  CCORPPC 
Delta      DCORSAC    DCORSHC  DCORSPC  DCORPFC  DCORPPC 
Lakes      LCORSAC    LCORSHC  LCORSPC LCORPFC LCORPPC 
Other      OCORSAC    OCORSHC  OCORSPC OCORPFC OCORPPC 
Plains      PCORSAC    PCORSHC  PCORSPC PCORPFC PCORPPC 
South      SCORSAC    SCORSHC  SCORSPC SCORPFC SCORPPC 
Residual    TCORSAC    TCORSHC  TCORSPC TCORSPC TCORPPC 
 
1 Average farm price over all states in the respective regions weighted by production in each state in the region. 
2 Expected price at the farm calcualted as given in the model. 
 
U.S. National Corn Market Variables 
UCORDFC  U.S. feed demand for corn, million bu., marketing year 
UCORDOC  U.S. food demand for corn, million bu.,marketing year 
UCORHOC  U.S. corn private ending stocks, million bu., September 30 
UCORHTC  U.S. corn total ending stocks, million bu., September 30 
UCORMEC  U.S. corn exports, million bu.,marketing year 
UCORPFC  U.S. farm price of corn, $/bu, marketing year 
UCORPPC  U.S. weighted ave. expected farm price of corn, $/bu, marketing year (calculated as in model) 
UCORPWC  U.S. wholesale price of corn, $/bu, marketing year 
UCORSAC  Total U.S. corn acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
UCORSHC  Total U.S. corn acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
UCORSPC  Total U.S. corn production,million bu, crop year 
 
European Union (15) National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
ECORPIA  EU import price of U.S. corn, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOMDDC  EU soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMMIC  EU net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMPIA  EU import price of soymeal, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOMSPC  EU production of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOODDC  EU soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOMXC  EU net exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOPXA  EU export price of soyoil, fob Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOOSPC  EU production of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYDCC  EU soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYMIC  EU net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYPIA  EU import price of soybeans, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
 
Japan National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
JSOMDDC  Japan soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMMIC  Japan net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMPUA  Japan unit import price of soymeal, $/mt, annual 
JSOMSPC  Japan production of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOODDC  Japan soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOMIC  Japan net imports of soyoil (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOPUA  Japan unit import price of soyoil, $/mt, annual 
JSOOSPC  Japan production of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year  
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JSOYDCC  Japan soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYMIC  Japan net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYPUA  Japan unit import price of soybeans, $/mt, annual 
 
Rest-of-the-World (ROW)
1 National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
RSOMDDN  ROW soymeal use, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOMMIN  ROW net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in model) 
RSOMSPN  ROW soymeal production, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOODDN  ROW soyoil use, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOOMIN  ROW net imports of soyoil (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in model) 
RSOOSPN  ROW soyoil production, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOYMIN  ROW net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in model) 
1  Defined as all countries except the EU-15/27, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S. 
 
Brazil National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
BSOMDDC  Brazil soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMMEC  Brazil exports of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMPXC  Brazil export price of soymeal, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOMSPC  Brazil soymeal production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOODDC  Brazil soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOMXC  Brazil net exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOPXC Brazil  export  price of soyoil, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOOSPC  Brazil soyoil production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYDCC  Brazil soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYMXC  Brazil net exports of soybeans (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYPXC  Brazil export price of soybeans, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOYSHC  Brazil soybean acreage harvested, 1,000 ha, crop year 
BSOYSPC  Brazil soybean production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
 
Argentina National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
GSOMDDC  Argentina soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMMEC  Argentina exports of soymeal (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMPXA Argentina  export  price  of soymeal, $/mt, calendar year 
GSOMSPC  Argentina soymeal production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOODDC  Argentina soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOMEC  Argentina exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOPXA Argentina  export  price  of soyoil, $/mt, calendar year 
GSOOSPC  Argentina soyoil production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYDCC  Argentina soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYMEC  Argentina exports of soybeans (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYPXA  Argentina export price of soybeans, $/mt, calendar year 
GSOYSHC  Argentina soybean acreage harvested, 1,000 ha, crop year 





Dn    Indicator variable for year n such that n=1 and all other years=0 
Dnm  Indicator variable for years n and  m such that years n and  m =1 and all other years=0 
DnTm  Indicator variable for years n through m such that years n through m =1 and all other years=0 
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United States 
ACHKRES  Atlantice region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, crop year  
ACORSYC  Atlantic region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
AOATPPC  Atlantic region expected farm price for oats (same formula as for corn, see model for formula) 
ASOYPLC  Atlantic region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year  
CCHKRES  Corn Belt region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, cropyear  
CCORSYC  Cornbelt region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
CSOYPLC  Corn belt region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
DCHKRES  Delta region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, annual  
D2CORF  Indicator variable for corn feed demand, 1977=-1, 1973=1, 1982=1,  and1994=1all other years = 0 
DCORSYC  Delta region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
DETHANOL  Indicator variable for surge in demand for ethanol, 2004, 2005, 2006 = 1, all other years=0 
DFB90    Indicator variable for the effects of the 1990 farm bill, 1990-1995=1, all other years =0 
DFB96    Indicator variable for the effects of the 1996 farm bill, 1996-2001=1, all other years =0 
DFB02    Indicator variable for the effects of the 1990 farm bill, 2002-2007=1, all other years =0 
DJEMBGO  Indicator variable for effects of U.S. 1972 soybean embargo, 1972-1973 = 1, all other years=0 
DPIK    Indicator variable for the 1982 U.S. payment-in-kind (PIK) program, 1982 =1, all other years =0 
DRICPPC   Delta region expected farm price for rice (same formula as corn,see model for formula) 
DSOOH3  Indicator variable for speculative increase in oil stocks, 1992=1, 2005=1, all other years= 0 
DSOYPLC  Delta region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year  
DWC    Cornbelt region weather indicator variable, 1973=1, 1978=1, 1979=1, all other years=0 
DWD1    Delta region weather indicator variable, 1993=1, all other years=0  
DWD2    Delta region weather indicator variable, 2001=1, all other years=0 
DWHEPPC   Delta region expected farm price for wheat (same formula as for corn, see model for formula) 
DWL  Lakes region weather indicator variable,1991=1, 2003=1, all other years=0 
DWO2    Other region weather indicator variable, 1979=-1, 1980=-1, 1981=1, all other years=0 
DWO2    Other region weather indicator variable, 1996, 1999=1 and 1997, 1998=-1,  all other years=0 
DWP1    Plains region weather indicator variable, 2005=1 and 2006=-1, all other years=0 
DWP2    Plains region weather indicator variable, 1993, 1996=1 and 1994=-1, all other years=0 
EMBARGO  Dummy variable for the 1972 U.S. embargo of U.S. soybean and product exports 
LBARPPC  Lakes region expected farm price for barley (same formula as for corn, see model for formula)  
LCHKRES  Lakes region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, annual  
LCORSYC  Lakes region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
LSOYPLC  Lakes region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year  
NORFLEX  Percent of acres required in the normal flex program under the 1990 farm bill, % 
OCHKRES  Other region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, annual  
OCORSYC  Other region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
OSOYPLC  Other region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year  
OWHEPPC  Other region expected farm price for wheat (same formula as corn, see model for formula)  
PCHKRES  Plains region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, annual  
PCORSYC  Plains region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
PDLMEXP  U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soymeal, $US, mktg  year  
PDLOEXP  U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soyoil, $US, mktg year 
PDLSEXP  U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soybeans, $US, mktg year  
PSOYPLC  Atlantic region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year  
RCORMEC  Corn exports by non-U.S. corn exporting countries, mil bu., crop year 
SCHKRES  South region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $1,000, annual  
SCORSYC  South region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
SSOYPLC  South region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
TCORSYC  Residual other region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
UCOMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of cottonseed meal, $/ton, marketing year 
UCOMSPC  U.S. production of cottonseed meal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
UCOODPC  U.S. cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oils use, marketing year  
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UCOOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of cottonseed oil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
UCOOSPC  U.S. production of cottonseed oil, mil lb, marketing year 
UCORARP  Corn acreage reduction program requirement, % 
UCORDZC  U.S. seed, feed, and other use of corn, mil bu, marketing year 
UCORHCC  U.S. government stocks of corn (CCC+FOR), mil bu., crop year 
UCORMMC  U.S. imports of corn, mil bu., crop year 
UCORPDC  Corn acreage diversion payments, $/bu, crop year 
UCORPLC  U.S. average corn loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
UCORPTC  U.S. corn target price, $/bu, crop year 
UCPI67   U.S. consumer price index, 1967=100, annual 
UFPI67   U.S. farm input price index (1967=100), September-August 
UGCAUA  U.S. grain consuming animal units, million head, marketing year 
UHOGPFC  U.S. farm price of hogs (barrow/guilt), $/cwt, marketing year 
ULAOPWC  U.S. lauric oils price (wtd average of coconut and palm kernel oils), ¢/lb, marketing year 
UOISCPC  U.S. soybean processing capacity, mil bu, marketing year 
UPEMDPC  U.S. peanut meal share of high protein meal use, marketing year 
UPEMSPC  U.S. production of peanut meal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
UPEMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of peanut meal, $/ton, marketing year 
UPEODPC  U.S. peanut oil share of oleic/linoleic oils use, marketing year 
UPEOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of peanut oil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
UPEOSPC  U.S. production of peanut oil, mil lb, marketing year 
UPOPA   U.S. population, millions, annual 
USLSPFC  U.S. price of slaughter steers, $/cwt, marketing year 
USOMDZC  U.S. other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMMMC  U.S. imports of soymeal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMQ  U.S. soymeal extraction rate, 1,000 tons/mil bu 
USOODZC  U.S. other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOOHGC  U.S. government stocks of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOMGC  U.S. government PL480 exports of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOMMC  U.S. imports of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOQ   U.S. soyoil extraction rate, lbs/ bu 
USOYDZC  U.S. seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYHGC  U.S. government stocks of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYMMC  U.S. imports of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYPLC  U.S. average soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
USOYPTC  U.S. soybean target price, $/bu, crop year  
UWHEPFC  U.S. farm price of wheat, $/bu, crop year 
UWPI67    U.S. wholesale price index, 1967=100, annual 
UYDA    U.S. personal disposable income, bil $US, annual 
 
European Union (15/27) 
ECWPI2  EU-15/27 wtd average wholesale price index, 1985=100, annual 
EGCAUA  EU-15/27 grain consuming animal units, million head, January 1 
EGDP   EU-15/27  aggregate GDP, billions of SDRs 
EPAOPIA  EU-15/27 palm oil price, cif NW Europe, $/mt, annual 
ESOMDZC  EU-15/27 other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated SDRs 
ESOMHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soymeal, end of marketing year 
ESOMQ   EU-15/27 soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
ESOODZC  EU-15/27 other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated SDRs 
ESOOHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soyoil, end of marketing year 
ESOOQ   EU-15/27 soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans  
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ESOYDZC  EU-15/27 seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real deflated SDRs 
ESOYHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soybeans, end of marketing year 
ESOYSPC  EU-15/27 production of soybeans, marketing year 
XECUSA  Exchange rate, SDRs$US, annual 
 
Japan 
DJEMBGO  Dummy variable for impact of U.S. soybean export embargo on Japanese soybean market, 
1972=1, 1973=1, 1974=1, all other years =0 
JGCAUA  Japan grain consuming animal units, million head, February 1 
JSOMDZC  Japan other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated Yen 
JSOMHEC  Japan ending stocks of soymeal, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOMQ   Japan soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
JSOODZC  Japan other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated Yen 
JSOOHEC  Japan ending stocks of soyoil, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOOQ    Japan soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
JSOYDZC  Japan seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real deflated Yen 
JSOYHEC  Japan ending stocks of soybeans, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOYSPC  Japan soybean production, 1,000 mt, Japan crop year 
JWPI85   Japan wholesale price index, 1985=100, annual 
XJAUSA  Exchange rate, Japanese Yen/$US, annual 
 
Rest-of-the-World (ROW) 
RGDP85  ROW real GDP index, real 1985 prices, annual 
RSOMEXPR  ROW stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated $US 
RSOOEXPR  ROW stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated $US 




BGDP85  Brazil real gross domestic product, 1985 prices, annual 
BSOMDZC  Brazil other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMHEC  Brazil soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOMMMC  Brazil soymeal imports, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMQ    Brazil soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
BSOODZC  Brazil other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOHEC  Brazil soyoil ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOOQ   Brazil soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
BSOYDZC  Brazil seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYHEC  Brazil soybean ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOYSYC  Brazil soybean yield, mt/hectare, crop year 
BWPI85   Brazil whole sale price index, 1985=1, annual 
XBZUSA  Exchange rate, Trillion Brazilian Reais/$US, annual 
 
Argentina 
GGDP85  Argentina real gross domestic product, 1985 prices, annual 
GSOMDZC  Argentina other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMHEC  Argentina soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOMMMC  Argentina soymeal imports, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMQ Argentina  soymeal  extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans  
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GSOODZC  Argentina other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOHEC  Argentina soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOOQ   Argentina soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
GSOYDZC  Argentina seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYHEC  Argentina soybean ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOYSYC  Argentina soybean yield, mt/hectare, marketing year 
GWPI85    Argentina wholesale price index, 1985=1, annual 





Appendix Table 3:  SOYMOD5 Ex-Post Simulation Validation Statistics, Theil Forecast 
Error Statistics, 1980/81 to 2006/07 
 
MSE Decomposition Proportions Inequality Coefficients   
   Bias   Reg   Dist  Var  Covar   Theil   Theil 
Variable  (UM)  (UR)  (UD)  (US)   (UC)     U1      U 
       
    ASOYPCC  0.10 0.30 0.60 0.11 0.79 0.0819  0.0404 
    CSOYPCC  0.10 0.23 0.67 0.07 0.83 0.0785  0.0387 
    DSOYPCC  0.04 0.43 0.53 0.13 0.83 0.1068  0.0527 
    LSOYPCC  0.06 0.23 0.70 0.07 0.87 0.0768  0.0380 
    OSOYPCC  0.06 0.36 0.58 0.13 0.81 0.0834  0.0412 
    PSOYPCC  0.08 0.26 0.67 0.07 0.85 0.0844  0.0416 
    SSOYPCC  0.07 0.34 0.59 0.11 0.81 0.0902  0.0445 
    ASOYSAC 0.05 0.49 0.46 0.14 0.81 0.0430  0.0214 
    CSOYSAC  0.22 0.08 0.70 0.00 0.78 0.0234  0.0117 
    DSOYSAC 0.05 0.03 0.92 0.18 0.77 0.0603  0.0304 
    LSOYSAC  0.04 0.03 0.93 0.01 0.95 0.0134  0.0067 
    OSOYSAC 0.01 0.12 0.87 0.05 0.94 0.0416  0.0208 
    PSOYSAC  0.04 0.08 0.88 0.12 0.85 0.0191  0.0096 
    SSOYSAC  0.08 0.49 0.44 0.05 0.87 0.1140  0.0560 
    USOYSAC 0.06 0.33 0.61 0.18 0.77 0.0205  0.0103 
    ASOYSHC 0.04 0.44 0.52 0.15 0.81 0.0387  0.0193 
    CSOYSHC  0.32 0.07 0.61 0.00 0.68 0.0239  0.0120 
    DSOYSHC 0.04 0.01 0.95 0.15 0.81 0.0654  0.0329 
    LSOYSHC  0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.0160  0.0080 
    OSOYSHC 0.01 0.13 0.87 0.06 0.93 0.0396  0.0198 
    PSOYSHC  0.09 0.07 0.85 0.09 0.82 0.0159  0.0080 
    SSOYSHC  0.07 0.50 0.43 0.09 0.84 0.1047  0.0516 
    USOYSHC 0.12 0.37 0.51 0.23 0.65 0.0200  0.0100 
    ASOYSPC  0.05 0.27 0.68 0.19 0.76 0.0403  0.0200 
    CSOYSPC  0.28 0.31 0.41 0.25 0.47 0.0232  0.0117 
    DSOYSPC  0.05 0.03 0.92 0.13 0.82 0.0579  0.0292 
    LSOYSPC  0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.0149  0.0074 
    OSOYSPC  0.00 0.23 0.76 0.17 0.83 0.0408  0.0204 
  PSOYSPC  0.08  0.06  0.85      0.08      0.83      0.0159      0.0080 
    SSOYSPC  0.11 0.63 0.26 0.48 0.40 0.1187  0.0578 
  USOYSPC  0.11      0.50      0.39      0.44      0.45      0.0195      0.0098 
  ACORPPC  0.05      0.01      0.94      0.09      0.86      0.1128     0.0558 
  CCORPPC  0.06      0.00      0.94      0.06      0.88      0.0850      0.0421 
  DCORPPC  0.07      0.01      0.91      0.29      0.64      0.1229      0.0607 
  LCORPPC  0.08      0.00      0.92      0.06      0.87      0.0657      0.0326 
  OCORPPC  0.05      0.06      0.89      0.01      0.94      0.1089      0.0538 
  PCORPPC  0.07      0.00      0.93      0.07      0.86      0.0741      0.0367 
  SCORPPC  0.10      0.03      0.86      0.05      0.84      0.1129      0.0555 
  TCORPPC  0.09      0.05      0.86      0.03      0.88      0.1112      0.0548 
  UCORPPC  0.10      0.00      0.90      0.07      0.83      0.0875      0.0432 
  ACORSAC  0.04      0.33      0.63      0.03      0.94      0.0773      0.0384 
  CCORSAC  0.18      0.25      0.57      0.06      0.76      0.0295      0.0146 
  DCORSAC  0.09      0.01      0.90      0.01      0.90      0.1034      0.0526 
  LCORSAC  0.58      0.21      0.21      0.00      0.42      0.0614      0.0300 
  OCORSAC  0.41      0.00      0.59      0.21      0.38      0.0677      0.0332 
  PCORSAC  0.18      0.31      0.51      0.02      0.80      0.0530      0.0268 
  SCORSAC  0.29      0.16      0.55      0.00      0.71      0.0935      0.0456  
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   Bias   Reg   Dist  Var  Covar   Theil   Theil 
Variable   (UM)  (UR)  (UD)  (US)   (UC)     U1      U 
 
  TCORSAC  0.61      0.12      0.28      0.00      0.39      0.0770      0.0397 
   UCORSAC  0.11      0.55      0.34      0.00      0.88      0.0326      0.0162 
  ACORSHC  0.00      0.45      0.55      0.05      0.95      0.0968      0.0484 
  CCORSHC  0.14      0.24      0.62      0.07      0.79      0.0300      0.0149 
  DCORSHC  0.10      0.11      0.79      0.00      0.90      0.1320      0.0673 
  LCORSHC  0.58      0.22      0.20      0.00      0.42      0.0663     0.0323 
  OCORSHC  0.29      0.03      0.68      0.22      0.49      0.0973      0.0475 
  PCORSHC  0.19      0.40      0.41      0.05      0.77      0.0630      0.0319 
  SCORSHC  0.28      0.35      0.37      0.03      0.69      0.1077      0.0523 
  TCORSHC  0.51      0.00      0.49      0.03      0.46      0.1057      0.0550 
  UCORSHC  0.07      0.52      0.41      0.03      0.90      0.0371      0.0185 
  ACORSPC  0.00      0.00      1.00      0.04      0.96      0.0967      0.0485 
  CCORSPC  0.12      0.02      0.86      0.08      0.80      0.0304      0.0151 
  DCORSPC  0.15     0.02      0.82      0.17      0.67      0.1307      0.0674 
  LCORSPC  0.60      0.04      0.35      0.01      0.39      0.0650      0.0317 
  OCORSPC  0.29  0.02      0.69      0.11      0.61      0.0879      0.0430 
  PCORSPC  0.19      0.02      0.78      0.02      0.79      0.0644      0.0327 
  SCORSPC  0.27      0.35      0.38      0.06      0.66      0.1103      0.0535 
  TCORSPC  0.50      0.01      0.49      0.03      0.48      0.1071      0.0557 
  UCORSPC  0.06      0.00      0.94      0.03      0.90      0.0363      0.0181 
  ASOYPFC  0.00      0.40      0.60      0.12      0.87      0.1481      0.0734 
  CSOYPFC  0.00      0.37      0.63      0.11      0.89      0.1410      0.0702 
  DSOYPFC  0.00      0.52      0.48      0.16      0.84      0.1738      0.0866 
  LSOYPFC  0.00      0.36      0.64      0.09      0.91      0.1444      0.0719 
  OSOYPFC  0.00      0.42      0.58      0.13      0.87      0.1519      0.0754 
  PSOYPFC  0.00      0.40      0.60      0.11      0.88      0.1511      0.0750 
  SSOYPFC  0.00      0.47      0.53      0.16      0.84      0.1563      0.0779 
  ACORPFC  0.01      0.53      0.47      0.12      0.87      0.1916     0.0944 
  CCORPFC  0.01      0.52      0.47      0.16      0.83      0.1844      0.0908 
  DCORPFC  0.01      0.45      0.54      0.05      0.93    0.2024      0.0996 
  LCORPFC  0.03      0.49      0.48      0.13      0.85      0.1972      0.0964 
  OCORPFC  0.01      0.53      0.46      0.15      0.84      0.1762      0.0869 
  PCORPFC  0.02      0.50      0.48      0.14      0.85      0.1927      0.0945 
  SCORPFC  0.01      0.53      0.46      0.14      0.85      0.1738      0.0857 
  TCORPFC  0.01      0.61      0.38      0.22      0.77      0.1743      0.0859 
  USOYDCC  0.01      0.30      0.69      0.15      0.84      0.0267      0.0134 
  USOYMEC  0.19      0.16      0.65      0.05      0.76      0.0503      0.0254 
  USOYPWC  0.00      0.28      0.72      0.06      0.94      0.1303      0.0650 
  USOYHEC  0.00      0.01      0.99      0.01      0.98      0.1657      0.0827 
  USOYHTC  0.00      0.01      0.99      0.01      0.98      0.1657      0.0827 
  USOYEHR  0.01  0.00      0.99      0.09      0.90      0.2015      0.1009 
  USOYGCC  0.02      0.29      0.69      0.02      0.95      0.3465      0.1702 
  USOMSPC  0.01      0.31      0.68      0.16      0.83      0.0268      0.0134 
  LCOMDPC  0.08      0.00      0.91      0.04      0.88      0.0141      0.0071 
  UCOMDPC            0.07      0.02      0.92      0.06      0.88      0.0467      0.0233 
  USOMDPC  0.07      0.01      0.92      0.04      0.89      0.0016      0.0008 
  UHPMDDC  0.00      0.65      0.34      0.57      0.43      0.0195      0.0098 
  USOMDDC  0.01      0.61      0.39      0.52      0.48      0.0195      0.0098 
  USOMPWC  0.04      0.06      0.90      0.00      0.96      0.0953      0.0472 
  USOMHEC  0.12      0.01      0.86      0.03      0.85      0.1485      0.0764  
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   Bias   Reg   Dist  Var  Covar   Theil   Theil 
Variable   (UM)  (UR)  (UD)  (US)   (UC)     U1      U 
 
  USOMMEC  0.02      0.37      0.61      0.09      0.89      0.1276      0.0631 
  USOOSPC  0.01   0.26      0.74      0.13      0.86      0.0268      0.0134 
  LCOODPC  0.47      0.22      0.31      0.33      0.20      0.0395      0.0195 
  UCOODPC  0.46      0.32      0.23      0.41      0.13      0.1320      0.0695 
  USOODPC  0.46      0.26      0.28      0.38      0.16      0.0066      0.0033 
  UOLODDC  0.00      0.13      0.86      0.06      0.94      0.0193      0.0096 
  UOLOPWC  0.00      0.01      0.99      0.06      0.94      0.0636      0.0318 
  USOODDC  0.03      0.05      0.92      0.01      0.96      0.0196      0.0098 
  USOOHEC  0.00      0.33      0.67      0.54      0.46      0.1449      0.0735 
  USOOHTC  0.00      0.33      0.67      0.54      0.46      0.1449    0.0735 
  USOOMEC  0.00      0.50      0.50      0.22      0.78      0.2754     0.1339 
  USOOMTC  0.00      0.46      0.54      0.19      0.81      0.2573      0.1256 
  UCORDFC  0.04      0.34      0.62      0.16      0.80      0.0268      0.0134 
  UCORDOC  0.00      0.03      0.97      0.02      0.98      0.0097      0.0048 
  UCORHOC   0.02      0.04      0.94      0.02      0.96      0.1618      0.0801 
  UCORMEC   0.44  0.04   0.51      0.01      0.55     0.0963   0.0467 
  UCORHTC    0.02      0.04      0.94      0.02      0.96      0.1612      0.0799 
  UCORPFC  0.01      0.52      0.47      0.16      0.83      0.1852      0.0911 
  ECORPIA      0.05      0.34      0.61      0.11      0.84      0.1400      0.0686 
  USOYPFC     0.00      0.40      0.60      0.12      0.88      0.1455      0.0723 
  UHPMPWC  0.04      0.06      0.90      0.00      0.96      0.0924      0.0458   
  USOOPWC   0.00      0.01      0.99      0.06      0.94      0.0689      0.0345 
  UCORPWC   0.01      0.46  0.53      0.16      0.83     0.1699      0.0836 
  ESOYDCC    0.26      0.01      0.73      0.01      0.73      0.0385      0.0194 
  ESOYMIC     0.26      0.00      0.74      0.01      0.73      0.0378      0.0191 
  ESOMSPC     0.26      0.01      0.72      0.01      0.73      0.0384      0.0194 
  ESOMDDC   0.02      0.14      0.85      0.06      0.93      0.0358      0.0179 
  ESOMMIC    0.01      0.10     0.89      0.03      0.96      0.0633      0.0315 
  ESOOSPC     0.26      0.01      0.73      0.01      0.73      0.0385      0.0195 
  ESOODDC    0.00      0.00      1.00      0.02      0.98      0.0368      0.0184 
  ESOOMXC  0.36      0.02      0.62      0.03  0.60  0.1108  0.0609   
  ESOYPIA  0.01      0.24      0.75      0.06      0.93      0.1194      0.0592 
  ESOMPIA  0.04      0.15      0.81      0.02      0.94      0.0992      0.0491 
  ESOOPXA  0.08      0.00      0.92      0.01      0.91      0.0606      0.0305 
  JSOYDCC  0.00      0.15      0.85      0.07      0.93      0.0331      0.0165 
  JSOYMIC  0.00  0.12      0.88      0.04      0.96      0.0253      0.0126 
  JSOMSPC  0.00      0.16      0.84      0.07      0.93      0.0331      0.0165 
  JSOMDDC  0.01      0.09      0.91      0.00      0.99      0.0387      0.0194 
  JSOMMIC  0.00      0.41      0.59      0.24      0.75      0.1454      0.0722 
  JSOOSPC  0.00      0.18      0.82      0.08      0.92      0.0333      0.0166 
  JSOODDC  0.00      0.03      0.97      0.26      0.74      0.0468      0.0234 
  ESOMPIA  0.04      0.15      0.81      0.02      0.94      0.0992      0.0491 
  ESOMPIA  0.04      0.15      0.81      0.02      0.94      0.0992      0.0491 
  ESOOPXA  0.08      0.00      0.92      0.01      0.91      0.0606      0.0305 
  JSOYDCC  0.00      0.15      0.85      0.07      0.93      0.0331      0.0165 
  JSOYMIC  0.00      0.12      0.88      0.04      0.96      0.0253      0.0126 
  JSOMSPC  0.00  0.16      0.84      0.07      0.93      0.0331      0.0165 
  JSOMDDC  0.01      0.09      0.91      0.00      0.99      0.0387      0.0194 
  JSOMMIC  0.00      0.41      0.59      0.24      0.75      0.1454      0.0722 
  JSOOSPC  0.00      0.18      0.82      0.08      0.92      0.0333      0.0166  
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   Bias   Reg   Dist  Var  Covar   Theil   Theil 
Variable   (UM)  (UR)  (UD)  (US)   (UC)     U1      U 
   
  JSOODDC  0.00      0.03      0.97      0.26      0.74      0.0468  0.0234 
  JSOOMIC  0.00      0.90      0.10      0.74      0.26      1.2834      0.4346 
  JSOYPUA  0.05      0.19      0.76      0.04      0.92      0.1090      0.0550 
  JSOMPUA  0.02      0.11      0.87      0.00      0.98      0.1084      0.0538 
  JSOOPUA  0.02      0.05      0.93      0.04      0.94      0.1196      0.0594 
  RSOYMIN  0.00      0.01      0.99      0.00      1.00      0.0601      0.0300 
  RSOMSPN  0.00      0.01      0.99      0.00      1.00      0.0601      0.0300 
  RSOMDDN  0.01      0.01      0.97      0.00      0.99      0.0547      0.0274 
  RSOMMIN  0.04      0.02      0.93      0.00      0.96      0.0675      0.0340 
  RSOOSPN  0.00  0.01  0.99  0.00      1.00      0.0601      0.0300 
  RSOODDN  0.01      0.10      0.90      0.06      0.93      0.0369      0.0185 
  RSOOMIN  0.03      0.19      0.78      0.13      0.83      0.0323      0.0162 
  BSOYDCC  0.02      0.04      0.93      0.01      0.97      0.0354     0.0177 
  BSOYMXC  0.04      0.00      0.96      0.04      0.92      0.1021      0.0508 
  BSOMSPC  0.02      0.04      0.94      0.01      0.97      0.0353      0.0176 
  BSOMDDC  0.38      0.19      0.43      0.13      0.48      0.0618      0.0303 
  BSOMMEC  0.07      0.00      0.93      0.04      0.89      0.0653      0.0330 
  BSOOSPC  0.02      0.04      0.93      0.01      0.97      0.0355      0.0177 
  BSOODDC  0.01      0.35      0.64      0.24      0.75      0.0236      0.0118 
  BSOOMXC  0.01      0.00      0.99      0.01      0.98      0.0905      0.0451 
  BSOYSHC  0.04      0.00      0.96      0.00      0.96      0.0549      0.0273 
  BSOYSPC  0.04      0.00      0.96      0.02      0.95      0.0529      0.0263 
  BSOYPXC  0.01      0.44      0.55      0.16      0.83      0.1428      0.0705 
  BSOMPXC  0.00      0.20      0.80      0.03      0.97      0.1168      0.0584 
  BSOOPXC  0.05      0.04      0.90      0.00      0.95      0.1060      0.0536 
  LBSOYSH  0.07      0.01      0.91      0.05      0.88      0.0051      0.0025 
  GSOYDCC  0.03      0.04      0.93      0.03      0.94      0.0178      0.0089 
  GSOYMEC  0.00      0.02      0.98      0.06      0.94      0.0999      0.0503 
  GSOMSPC  0.04      0.04      0.93      0.03      0.94      0.0178      0.0089 
  GSOMDDC  0.02      0.11      0.87      0.19      0.80      0.0477      0.0238 
  GSOMMEC  0.04      0.05      0.91      0.04      0.92      0.0179      0.0090 
  GSOOSPC  0.03      0.04      0.93      0.03      0.93      0.0177      0.0089 
  GSOODDC  0.00      0.00      0.99      0.00      1.00      0.0395      0.0198 
  GSOOMEC  0.03      0.04      0.93      0.03      0.94      0.0190      0.0095 
  GSOYSHC  0.01      0.18      0.81      0.20      0.78      0.0211      0.0106 
  GSOYSPC  0.03      0.13      0.84      0.15      0.82      0.0192      0.0096 
  GSOYPXA  0.01      0.20      0.80      0.03      0.96      0.1108      0.0551 
  GSOMPXA  0.05      0.13      0.82      0.02      0.92      0.0859      0.0425 
  GSOOPXA  0.00      0.00      1.00      0.07      0.93      0.0882      0.0442 
  GSOYSHC  0.00      0.24      0.75      0.28      0.72      0.0032      0.0016 
 
 